<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-size:small">I liked the Radiolab piece too. Alex Wellerstein, a contributor to that episode, has some of the best-informed and most thoughtful work online at <a href="http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/" target="_blank">http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.<wbr>com/</a>.<br><br>But for me the insanity/futility of nukes by the thousands really wouldn't be mitigated significantly much by a better protocol to review or check a president's order. When I look back at what the best and brightest (used ironically or not) have done in history, I don't trust *anyone* or *any* government with destructive power on the scale we came to take for granted in the 1950s and 1960s. </div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Apr 28, 2017 at 8:07 PM, John Bailey <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:sundayjb@gmail.com" target="_blank">sundayjb@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Radiolab had a very compelling episode recently titled Nukes, which<br>
looked at the exact process by which a nuclear strike can be launched<br>
by a US president and what checks and balances there are to prevent a<br>
childish and easily irritated prez from making the call (spoiler:<br>
none).<br>
I was also unaware just how many and how often nuclear warheads get<br>
lost, including one that fell on a rural US farmhouse and killed<br>
everyone inside.<br>
<a href="http://www.radiolab.org/story/nukes/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.radiolab.org/story/<wbr>nukes/</a><br>
<div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5"><br>
On Sat, Apr 29, 2017 at 6:33 AM, Monte Davis <<a href="mailto:montedavis49@gmail.com">montedavis49@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> "the long-hidden story... exposes the terrifying truth..."<br>
><br>
> No offense or pushback intended to Ish or to Schlosser, but that's some<br>
> choice vonBraunery from a promotional copy writer at PBS. Because I have mad<br>
> skillz to penetrate the deepest darkest cover-ups, I was able to find the<br>
> long-hidden story top center on p. 1 of the New York Times for Sept. 21,<br>
> 1980:<br>
><br>
> AIR FORCE IS SILENT ON WHEREABOUTS OF WARHEAD FROM DEMOLISHED SILO<br>
> The Air Force continued today to refuse even to confirm or deny the<br>
> existence of a nine-megaton nuclear warhead on the Titan II missile that<br>
> blew up in its silo yesterday, and some angry state officials and local<br>
> residents insisted that the military should tell them whether it had<br>
> recovered the warhead and what condition it was in...<br>
><br>
> As a nerdy Boomer into rocketry and aviation, conversant with lotsa<br>
> apocalyptic post-Bomb 1950s and 1960s SF, I knew about the nuclear-weapons<br>
> oopsies at Palomares in Spain, in South Carolina, and in Greenland as they<br>
> happened. 'Command and Control' is a well-researched, well-written, and<br>
> valuable book (and mostly free of that kind of now-it-can-be-told hype). But<br>
> what it says in essence is: If tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, year<br>
> after year, are deployed on and transported among several thousand aircraft<br>
> and missile silos and submarine launch tubes, and dozens of storage sites,<br>
> accidents *will* happen. Does that really come as a surprise or shock to<br>
> anyone with any experience of (1) large organizations and (2) human<br>
> fallibility?<br>
><br>
> It takes a lot of very precise, very precisely timed technology to detonate<br>
> a nuclear weapon. The chances of a fall, nearby explosion, vehicle crash,<br>
> etc. setting one off -- as opposed to scattering a few kg of plutonium<br>
> around, which is bad but not catastrophic -- are much less IMHO than those<br>
> of a military misstep (with or without technology glitches) in a crisis,<br>
> which in turn are less than the chance of political leaders being as stupid<br>
> again as they were in 1914 and 1939. Which are you going to worry about<br>
> most? On the same front page as the Times story above is "Nation's Military<br>
> Anxiety Grows as Russians Gain" -- which translated to "Reagan campaign<br>
> warns that we have only 24,000 nukes to the USSR's 32,000." That bothered me<br>
> a hell of a lot more than missile propellant burning in rural Arkansas.<br>
><br>
> I said "vonBraunery" above because all this strikes me as parallel to the<br>
> periodic rediscovery, again and again over most of my lifetime, of Operation<br>
> Paperclip, Dora/Mittelwerk, and Secret Evil Nazi Mastermind WvB. As I've<br>
> argued here many times, almost everything about that story was known, or<br>
> trivially deducible from what was known, by 1950. I used to think it was<br>
> just bad journalism and publishers' PR hype to keep trotting it out as<br>
> Shocking Revelation: What von Braun and the National-Security Deep State Hid<br>
> From Us. But I've come to believe it's really a deeply rooted moral evasion,<br>
> a way of *not* thinking about how and why the USA (followed by the USSR, UK,<br>
> France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and sooner or later<br>
> Iran) spent several trillion dollars on nuclear weapons and their prompt,<br>
> reliable delivery. Similarly, while I'm all in favor of the safest possible<br>
> handling of nuclear weapons, I think too much focus on the risk that one<br>
> might go off by accident can be a way of *not* thinking about what thousands<br>
> of them have been deliberately, painstakingly, expensively *designed* to do.<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>