Noah Webster wasn't much help. He says that a libertarian believes in free will.

Rudy Perkins uses the word "libertarian" as shorthand for "libertarian socialist." Presumably this usage is only necessary to separate himself from the tradition of authoritarian socialism, a tradition which includes social democratic reformism as well as Marxism-Leninism. As Bakunin declared: "socialism without liberty is tyranny."

Chris Gray investigates a very different concept of libertarianism, one which advocates free market economics and the curbing if not outright abolition of government. From their defense of free enterprise (i.e., capitalism), the Libertarian Party would probably conclude that "libertarian socialism" is a contradiction in terms. (An anarchist could argue, by the way, that "Libertarian Party" is a contradiction in terms).

Perhaps the only point of agreement among all these different libertarians is the observation that society as we know it, both in the "East" and "West," is not characterized by liberty, neither in its formal institutions nor in its everyday affairs.

Breaking With Libertarian Dogma:

Lessons from the Anti-Nuclear Struggle

Rudy Perkins

For the past several years the affinity group I am part of has been participating in the movement against nuclear power. Specifically, we have been working with the Boston chapter of the Clamshell Alliance. [1] When we began our involvement we had many serious criticisms of mass movements. and, in fact, largely considered ourselves 'anti-mass'. [2] Through our experience in the mass setting of the anti-nuclear movement several of us began to reconsider our attitude towards mass politics, as well as our unqualified support for a number of long-standing libertarian concepts.

We were forced to reevaluate these concepts because their application was leading to visible violation of more fundamental libertarian principles, particularly the principle of direct, participatory democracy: those affected make the decision. In general the old concepts began to appear too one-sided: to simply oppose anti-mass to mass, consensus to majority rule, local control to global management, decentralism to centralism, the small group to the large organization, was not enough. In fact, this easy antithesis was having disturbingly undemocratic consequences. These critical concepts are too important to discard, but too deficient to apply unilaterally. To rediscover their vitality, we must abandon them as dogma, and retrieve them as part of a new synthesis.

Because these lessons were learned in the context of the fight against nuclear power, I will repeatedly refer to the "anti-nuclear movement" and not "libertarian ideology" as exemplary of the dogma which must be reexamined. However, the anti-nuclear movement currently contains the most active expressions of libertarian doctrine in the U.S. All the concepts disputed here are key ingredients of the libertarian ideology prevalent both inside and outside the Clamshell Alliance, and it is often due to the efforts of other 'libertarians' that these concepts appear so strongly, and in such pernicious forms, in the anti-nuclear movement.

Through our experiences in the anti-war movement, tenants' battles, union work, food coops and other mass struggles, each of the members of our affinity group had become disillusioned with mass politics and united fronts. We were sick of the power grabbers and manipulators, the perpetual rebirth of hierarchy. We were tired of having to endure the same mistakes, and the same arguments, over and over. Tired of moving too slow because of other people's confusion or inexperience; tired of moving back towards capitalism and the state because of other people's liberalism or Leninism. We adopted an anti-mass position because we wanted to move forward alongside others with whom we already shared agreement, in a relationship of equal participation.

But anti-mass led to isolation. First, our theory was isolated from the real world and from adversaries. Unlike ideology or doctrine, theory is modified depending on results. To do this it needs concrete problems to tackle, and confrontation with contrary evidence and ideas. The mass setting of the anti-nuclear movement forced us to explain our ideas, and how they would actually work in real life. This helped us clarify our thinking, first to ourselves, then to others, and in terms that were more comprehensible and more concrete. This critique itself is a product of the mass movement dynamiting the doctrinaire and unworkable elements of our libertarianism, keeping the path clear for libertarian theory.

Second, we were isolated. We assumed that the soundness of our ideas would itself establish communication. That was mistaken. We, not just our written ideas, had to communicate, and that required the establishment of trust and friendship, a willingness to listen, and a sincere participation in the day to day work of the organization.

Of course it was important that we stated our ideas and continued to present a consistent point of view from the beginning. The confirmation of our early critiques by later events won respect for our perspectives, even if not agreement [3]. But what makes historical change is not associations of ideas, but associations of people who share the same ideas. Our ideas were having an impact on others, as their ideas were having an impact on us, but what was just as important was the developing solidarity which could eventually put common ideas into practice.

Too often anti-mass or "pure" ultraleft thinking draws the lines of solidarity in terms of agreement in language. In the anti-nuclear movement we found self-described anarchists who often had a collaborational approach towards the state, or who tolerated the existence of hierarchical power within the Alliance. We also worked alongside people who called themselves Leninists who at least had a combative spirit towards the authorities inside and outside the Alliance. These were the extremes. For the most part we have worked with people who had no precise political position, but with whom we shared a style and approach which opened channels of communication; through these channels ideas could be shared and agreement could be discovered in practice. Anti-mass theory left no meeting place in which to make this discovery.

This weakness of anti-mass thinking contributes to its inability to expand. The wider communication of libertarians with others, on the other hand, lays the groundwork for an expanding radical community- It has been effective for us to participate in a mass coalition while retaining our own autonomous affinity group which could step outside of the coalition to address other questions, or disagree with the coalition's positions. Though individual affinity groups or political organizations may want to retain their own (more demanding) criteria for participation, the community (mass movement or coalition) as a whole would have flexible criteria for participation. This flexibility would make it easier for "new" people to explore, meet, and become involved, and for "old" people to exchange ideas and discover new affinities.

Each day the solution of our social problems becomes a more immense and urgent task. It seems clear the solution will require: 1) large numbers of people in motion; 2) that these people are acting within the framework of shared libertarian communist consciousness. There is no guarantee that an expanding community based on ties formed in a mass context will blossom into such a revolutionary solution [4]. However, anti-mass practice has only led to small isolated groups with little social impact. The point is to take the best anti-mass concepts--self-organization and initiative, clearly defining your own revolutionary desires, etc.--into mass politics. We can work as "anti-mass" groupings within mass settings.

Anti-mass thinking suffers from the kind of moralistic approach that weakens most varieties of pacifism. This moralism deals with the problem by renunciation and abstention. But the evils of the mass cannot be defeated merely by abstaining from the mass, just as violence cannot be done away with simply by personally refusing to be violent. The only way to solve social problems like mass psychology or violence is to confront and eliminate the social roots of those problems. To be effective, such confrontation often involves a high risk, the risk that we ourselves will become embroiled in mass hierarchies [5], or in violence. The fear of committing political sins has kept the practice of the ultra-left (and of pacifism for that matter) quite clean, but quite ineffective. At a historical moment which has no patience, ineffectiveness may be the worst sin of all.

Consensus

Consensus, as it is now understood, is the making of decisions by unanimous agreement. Votes are not taken, and anyone may veto a course of action on moral or other grounds. This practice is dominant in the American anti-nuclear movement and in various new-age-anarchist trends, and is also widespread in various alternative economic ventures (coops, work collectives, etc.) around the country. It is the decision-making method we have always used ourselves, in the various small group projects we undertook. Its appeal is that it appears to circumvent the formalism and oppressiveness of parliamentary procedure, and theoretically makes it impossible to overrule minority opinion.

In a small group, particularly one in which a high level of trust and agreement exist, consensus is workable. In the mass setting, as Clamshell revealed, consensus is anti-democratic. Here consensus proves itself both formalistic and oppressive; when it is not disenfranchising the majority, it is silencing the minority.

First it must be recognized that in a mass organization differences in political opinion often make compromise, and therefore unanimous agreement, impossible. In the many instances of such blocked agreement in Clamshell, one of two things occurred: 1) one side would eventually back down, or 2) the decision would not be made.

In the first case, the side that backed down was usually the minority-- incredible pressure to go along was levied against them. In such instances, a vote would have been a much less grueling, and much more honest way to register and then bypass minority dissent. Occasionally the majority would withdraw, effectively subjecting the group to minority rule. This "consensual" minority rule is less democratic and more oppressive than vote-taking majority rule. In the second case, when a decision was "not made" through the official decision-making process, it was most often surreptitiously made by paid staff, coordinating committee or permanent task-committee members--minority rule by the back door.

Consensus gives the illusion of unity within a mass organization. In this way dissenting opinion, or even the existence of controversy over a given issue, was hidden from members of non-dissident Clamshell chapters. Consensus not only suggests that everyone does have the same viewpoint, but that everyone should have the same viewpoint. Consensus thereby pressures what should be a mass coalition towards existence as a party of a given ideology (in Clamshell's case, a particular brand of nonviolence ideology).

At this point we need to strengthen coalitions and partisan groupings. However, to maintain political honesty we must be clear as to which mode a given organization represents. "Coalitions" that are really partisan political groups are nothing but front groups, involving all the manipulation front groups always involve. What is necessary now is the existence of genuinely open mass movements in which political groups exchange ideas and debate ideas. Most importantly, only a mass movement will engage enough people at this time to overcome the current social inertia.

Majority rule some form) is the most appropriate decision-making form for mass organizations. It admits differences, and makes them transparent so that ideas and political tendencies can be visibly tested, proven or disproven. Individuals can thereby judge ideas for themselves, and discover their own affinities for various strategies and people. The search for true unity can replace the false pretense of pre-fabricated unity.

In the anti-nuclear movement, as in certain libertarian camps, an unfortunate fear of the confrontation of ideas has become entrenched. (It parallels a similar avoidance of confrontation and struggle against

existing corporate/state power.) Majority rule is disliked because amongst the two, three or many courses of action proposed, only one is chosen; the rest are "defeated". Consensus theoretically accommodates everyone's ideas. In practice this often led to:

* a watered down, least-common-denominator solution or

* the victory of one proposal through intimidation or acquiescence, or

* the creation of a vague proposal to placate everyone, while the plan of one side or another was actually implemented through committees or office staff.

In other words, within the anti-nuclear movement ideas are in competition and some do win, but under consensus the act of choosing between alternatives is usually disguised. Because the process is often one of mystification and subterfuge, it takes the power of conscious decision away from the organization's membership.

In its reaction to competition and majoritarian tyranny, the libertarian ideology of "dissolve power"/ "power to none" has resulted in power to the acquisitive, or else a general paralysis. It takes only a few mass meetings run under consensus to see this. Since power is control over the social and physical environment, the point is really not the abolition of power but the collectivization of power, that is, democracy that has the ability to act.

A further, and critical, problem with current "consensus" is that its process is so cumbersome, so subject to logjams, that precise and timely instructions (an "imperative mandate") are rarely given to coordinating delegates. As a result representatives are created, persons who make upper level decisions on their own initiative, because they are not directed and circumscribed by the decisions of the base.

The discussion of consensus vs. majority rule is important to the libertarian movement. The time will come again when power is assumed by the councils, assemblies, and town meetings. This is our direct democracy, but what will be its actual mechanics--Premature use of consensus will only stifle this democracy, transferring rule back to the bureaucrats and closed board rooms. If consensus is ever to be used by masses of people, the preconditions of trust and conscious unity of purpose must be achieved first.

Local Control

Local control was the holy-of-holies we found most difficult to question, particularly in the anti-nuclear movement. Yet, unmistakably, the doctrine of local control was used to put power in the hands of a few, when many people were involved.

Our affinity group began to have doubts about localism long before the June 24th Seabrook demo, because we repeatedly saw a few Seabrook area residents use their "local" credentials, or even the threat of the silent "local opinion" to unduly influence decisions which would effect thousands of non-local people. After people in the Seacoast (New Hampshire) chapter of Cam and a few other area residents made a deal with the state for a legal rally June 24th (1978) without consulting the Clamshell Membership, many more Clam members began to question an unqualified endorsement of local control. If a local community wants to build a nuclear plant, or allow a nuclear plant to be built, is their decision to be respected? If a local community's opposition to a plant will only take certain limited, state-sanctioned steps against nuclear construction, does all other opposition have to confine itself to such steps?

Obviously opposition movements are strongest when they are firmly based on a non-provincial and determined local opposition. But the destructive impact of modern technology is no longer confined by town, state, or national borders. To allow the question of a nuclear plant to become the "private property" of local residents, when so many more people are affected, violates our more basic desire for participatory democracy.

Admittedly there is a problem here in two conflicting implications of "those affected make the decision": 1) those most affected have the most say; 2) the decision should be made by all those affected. In our case, a solid shield of localist ideology allowed Seacoast people to have not just the most say, but the only say. Worse, the relationship between the Seacoast and the rest of the Alliance was never clarified. The resulting ambiguity was quite convenient for those who wanted to maintain the illusion of equal decision-making power, while being able to periodically assert the right of final say when things were not going their way. [6]

A related problem with the doctrine of local control is the existence of provincialism and narrow sectional interests. Libertarianism was once known for its vigorous internationalism and global perspective. Yet, a strict localism is just nationalism writ small. All the destructive competition and inequalities generated by nationalism may be less devastating under autonomous localities, but they will not be eliminated.

We need to combine that desire for a life lived on a human and comprehensible scale, which represents the core truth of localism, with a new internationalist consciousness [7]. This consciousness may eventually rest on a material base of life and production which is mostly centered on a local basis, but in part globally coordinated.

But it is primarily communist consciousness itself which will dissolve the contradiction between local and global interests by harmonizing a plurality of local desires within certain universally recognized parameters. (Some might choose methane power, some might choose wind-power, but no one would choose nuclear power.)

Decentralism

Decentralsim closely parallels localism in its desire to keep things close at hand and small enough so that everyone can understand, participate in, and control, what is going on. But in Clamshell's

practice we saw decentralism give people control over situations with such limited options, that it was defeating its purpose.

The general democratic reaction to the problems of the top-heavy organizational structure, and the centralized mass demonstrations was one of: "Let the affinity groups do what they want, when they want." The first time approach was tried out after June 24th was in the series of "wave actions" against the Seabrook plant in fall '78. Day after day, or week after week, each locality was to send its little group to demonstrate or do civil disobedience at the plant [8]. These wave actions were the outcome of the organization's unspoken awareness that it could not pull off a unified action at that time, combined with many Clams longstanding fear of the power of thousands of people assembled in one place, at one time, with one purpose [9].

It was clear the corporate/police apparatus was very capable of handling hundreds of these waves, provided they did not all come at once. But they could only all come at once if a mutually agreed upon date and plan made their coordination possible. Through decentralism each affinity group gained control over the details of its own arrest, but any chance of controlling the social/natural environment through a direct action occupation of the plant was completely lost.

Our affinity group, at first excited by the potential leeway the "wave" format would give to Boston to organize a several thousand person occupation, soon drew back to its old and hard-learned lesson: In Clamshell, as elsewhere, anything can be turned into its opposite. De-centralism, which we had believed to be empowering, was in the absence of radical intent (consciousness) only fragmentary and weakening.

We had been suspicious of decentralism as an ism, a principle presumed liberatory in all situations without any need for constant critical review [10]. Now we moved our suspicions out into the open: "Decentralism or centralism?" was not the right question. The question once again boiled down to one of control, i.e., power. How could we assert control over the larger environment (i.e. Seabook) and maintain collective control over the tool for that assertion (i.e. our organization)?

Put in these terms it was "no longer" necessary to back off from a large-scale occupation because it was "centralized". The question was: What structures and what type of thinking and feeling (consciousness) would maintain collective participation, comprehension and control of a large-scale occupation? Put another way, we needed to create a context in which thousands of people could coordinate their efforts, yet still retain the ability to take individual or group initiative. This could have been done at Seabrook June 24, if only in a mechanical way, by arranging common information sharing centers, publicity, and logistics, while allowing regional or political groupings to carry out the type of occupation action they felt would be most effective at different portions of the plant site.

The crisis provoked by the Harrisburg accident brings even more clearly into focus the crucial need to abandon an a priori decentralism. Nuclear power has always been more than a local issue, and this accident potentially brings a decision on all nuclear plants onto the national and global agenda. Yet already many antinuclear activists insist that we must concentrate on our own local plant, in our own little demonstrations. Antinuclear educational work needs to be decentralized and diffused throughout our local communities as never before. But the time calls sharply for the anger and strength of those-who-are-already-convinced to be centralized on a few national targets in such a way as to maintain a national crisis over nuclear power. It will be a strong indictment of current "libertarian" practice if de-centralism and localism are allowed to dissipate the fury and solidarity which could, if allowed to coalesce, radically transform this moment.

The Small Group

We encountered the anti-nuclear movement's use of the small group in two forms: the breaking up of large meetings into small groups for discussion and the alleged basing of activity on more-or-less permanent affinity groups. Again a familiar story appeared: a practice said to empower the individual turned out to be very instrumental in maintaining the status quo, fragmenting collective energy, and leaving control in the hands of a few. We ourselves remain organized as an affinity group, and believe that a proliferation of strong affinity groups would help people reappropriate power. However the assumptions that the small group is always preferable to large groups, or that affinity groups are always the best formation for activity, need to be reconsidered.

Many times in meetings a large group assembly would be broken into small groups, just at the point in the discussion when the flare of tempers indicated that the crux of a serious matter was about to surface. Since the consensus process could not resolve the extreme differences present in a mass organization, political conflict had to be hidden or dissipated. The small group was an ideal way to dissipate key political issues. The small discussion groups were always geared towards cooling out and venting feelings, and were never given clear decision-making power. The time consumed in this powerless process, and in consensus wrangles, usually guaranteed no clear decision was made by the chapter in time to prevent the decision from devolving onto the coordinating committee, the paid staff, etc.

The small groups also helped preserve the status quo by isolating radical ideas. First, the number of people who would hear a given individual's ideas could be limited. Since the radicals were often in the minority, this worked to the liberals' favor. Second, the significance and size of a radical minority could be downplayed: two dissidents in each of ten groups of ten had less impact than twenty dissidents in a meeting of a hundred.

The main virtues of small group discussion--emotional support, the chance for everyone to speak many times, the examination of ideas in a non-competitive environment--would have been very useful as an on-going organizational process. But the partisans of the small-group repeatedly used the process to disrupt the debate and decision which should have been the function of the general meetings. Such a small-group ideology is consciously anti-confrontational and anti-political, and hence, wittingly or not, protects the organization's dogma, and the hidden hierarchy which tends to develop in all mass groups.

The affinity group theoretically provides an ideal context for individual/collective initiative. Flexible and outspoken, it should keep power over the organization's actions in the hands of those who make up those actions. Yet this requires enough cohesion and trust amongst the affinity group members that they can intervene as a bloc in a situation that is going against their desires. This cohesion can only result from long-term political discussion and collective projects, and the deepening of friendship.

What the anti-nuclear movement has called "affinity groups" were groups of ten or twenty strangers thrown together for a 6-hour non-violence counseling session in preparation for some civil disobedience event. Such groups were essentially united by their acceptance of a discipline (code of behavior) imposed from above. The non-violence trainers had decided how the affinity groups were to respond to each contingency, the job of the members was to help each other cool out in crisis and act the way they were supposed to. Initiative was encouraged to the extent it made the centrally predetermined plan execute smoothly, but not to the extent that the action became the living, collective creation of all the participants.

Even the genuine on-going affinity groups (which have an active existence between the mass events) sometimes create barriers to discussion and collective power. For example: the Boston chapter used to meet as a whole in general meetings that often crackled and sparked from political contention. These meetings served as a gathering place, a reaffirmation of community amongst several hundred anti-nuclear activists. Ideas that might have been the private property of a few individuals or an affinity group were thrown out for everyone to consider.

In the absence of an expedient decision-making procedure, the meetings became endurance contests, repetitious and boring. Rather than dealing with the presence of completely conflicting viewpoints (say by explicitly defining the Alliance as a pacifist organization rather than a mass coalition), and/or finding an effective means of settling conflicts, the chapter chose to avoid the real problems by doing away with the general meeting. In its place is a "coalition" of affinity groups loosely coordinated by a biweekly meeting of reps from the active affinity groups. Even fervent proponents of this decentralist scheme now admit it has somewhat reduced the sense of community and interaction between the affinity groups. Lately, the meetings have drifted back toward being general assemblies. In essence the ability of a large number of people to feel as a whole, talk as a whole and act as a whole, was being limited by relying on affinity groups alone. Consequently, the effective social power of the Boston chapter was being weakened.

Finally, an organization based on affinity groups alone is difficult for new people to enter. Existing affinity groups are understandably reluctant to take in people at

random, and it is often difficult for new people to form their own groups. The anti-nuclear movement's dual structure of affinity groups within open-membership organizations partially solves this problem.

In general, it is probably best to consider the affinity group's relation to larger groupings as being somewhat similar to the individual's relation to the collective: neither can be held as a principle over the other.

The desire for freedom and the collective power to determine the nature of our daily lives cannot be codified or held still. The theory we evolve to help us realize our power must know how to distinguish the essentials, and how to deal with experience. The concepts we create as tools for achieving our freedom must be agile and alert. For, more than ever, we live in a hall of mirrors; fidelity to the certainties of the past is no longer any guarantee. Yet, forward is still forward, only now, we may find our own image stands in the way.

Postscript

This essay was written in the late winter/early spring of this year when the anti-nuclear movement was between one phase and the next. The spread of "grassroots" civil disobedience-oriented organizations initiated by Clamshell's example was more or less complete. Yet the massive upsurge of activity to follow Three Mile Island had not yet begun.

This period of relative calm was a good time to try to sum up the lessons of our involvement in the movement to that point. The publication of this essay, now six months later, is somewhat out of phase with the main debates emerging in this new period of anti-nuclear activity. In a sense the preceding discussion is one which should already have taken place.

Due to the political orientation of its widening base of support, the fear of alienating that support, and the sudden interest of liberal politicians, the anti-nuclear movement's electoral and reformist tendencies have grown recently. For many, however, Three Mile Island proved the absolute unreliability of governmental channels and showed that our strategy must be one of extralegal direct action. Direct action moves beyond the symbolic quality of civil disobedience and raises new questions for the movement. For libertarians within a large direct action movement the problems of: democratically coordinating widespread efforts, coalition work and the extent and nature of compromise, "leadership" (having significant influence without blocking democratic participation), and strategy and tactics (e.g., level of militance) will be some of the new challenges.

The October 6th Seabrook occupation called by the Coalition for Direct Action at Seabrook is the first attempt by the American anti-nuclear movement to begin a non-symbolic nuclear site occupation aimed at directly preventing further construction. The possibility of "a living example of community democracy" (October 6th handbook) built outside of and against the wishes of the authorities is one that should excite everyone in the libertarian left. The Seabrook occupation offers an excellent environment for libertarian communist concepts to be tested further and to grow.

Those interested in finding out more about this occupation should send for the October 6th handbook. (Order from Boston Clamshell, 595 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139-51.25 for single copies.)

NOTES

1. Our participation in Clamshell has been stormy, to say the least. Early disputes with the liberal, socialist and new-age-anarchist leadership led to an angry departure and criticism of the Alliance. (See, e.g., Fifth Estate, Aug. '77.) With assurances (from a few anyway) that the Alliance had become more democratic. and that left-wing and direct-action ideas were no longer suppressed, we rejoined the Boston local at the end of 1977. A thorough critique of Clamshell's current practice is not possible here. Suffice it to say that we encountered many of the same problems as before. However, this time we were able to discover friendship and a working unity with most of the members in Boston.

2. Mass movements are characterized by the heterogeneity of politics of their participants.

They are usually based on unity around one or a few demands, of ten of an oppositional nature (anti-war, antinuclear, etc.). As such their unity is basically determined by outside forces and circumstances, not by a collectively-held, positive vision of the future.

Anti-mass is an approach to creating revolution based on the "primacy of the collective," small groups whose members have the "same politics and the same method of struggle." "The collective does not communicate with the mass. It makes contact with other collectives. What if other collectives do not exist? Well, then it should talk to itself until they do. Yes. By all means, the collective also communicates with other people, but it never views them as a mass--as a constituency or audience. The collective communicates with individuals in order to encourage self-organization." (Anti-mass) The collective communicates with others not to get them to loin a mass movement, or even to loin the collective, but rather, to help them form their own collectives.

For a full discussion of mass and anti-mass, see the pamphlet Anti-mass: methods of organization for collectives from Anti-mass, Box 31352. San Francisco. CA 94131

3. We had constantly claimed the organization was not democratic and was in fact dominated by several small power groups. We asserted that between this leadership's tendencies and the organization's own unofficial ideology, the Alliance supported direct action in words only, and had a strong orientation toward reconciliation with the state and the utilities. The June 24th deal vividly confirmed these criticisms.

4. In suggesting that coalition work now could help pave the way for revolutionary change. I am obviously departing from the spontaneist view that all "preparation" for revolution will only end up as counter-revolutionary, that the crisis of capital will itself summon forth communist consciousness. Charlie Gamble and I tried to lay out some of the weaknesses we saw in spontaneism in a letter published in part in Synthesis (Philadelphia Solidarity. P.O. Box 13011, Philadelphia. PA 19101).

5. Obviously there are many, many problems with mass organizations. These do not disappear due to any change of heart on the part of people who were formerly anti-mass. Delving into them adequately goes beyond the scope of this essay.

6. I should make it clear that Seabrook residents are rarely involved in Clamshell's internal workings.

Those who exercise "local control" are a small group of activists who live in various towns in the New Hampshire seacoast area, who claim to understand and speak for the "locals."

7. At the recent German demonstrations against the Gorleben nuclear waste project, several days after the partial meltdown at Harrisburg, the demonstrators chanted, "We all live in Pennsylvania!" (New York Times, 1 April 1979)

8. which constrained the wave actions (since Boston considered having a large contingent). As the actions were being organized the June 24th guide lines (no running, no breaking through police lines, no damage of the utility's property, no movement after dark, in any confrontation: sit down, and so on) were reimposed, guaranteeing ineffectiveness.

9. Contrary to reports in Open Road, these actions were not initiated by "Clams for Democracy," though a number of CFD and other radical people

participated.

10. In an unrelated moment, someone in Boston Clamshell commented, "People want decentralism? They must be pleased with the automobile; it's the most decentralized transportation system around..."