Social Text
Roy Gordon
royg at semantic.com
Sat Jun 1 02:47:28 CDT 1996
Andrew Clarke Walser wrote:
>
> As Jean points out, jargon can give a gloss of profundity to
> utter nonsense -- among those, obviously, who do not wish to utter
> nonsense.
> In AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, David Hume
> distinguishes between impressions, which come from the senses, feelings,
> and will, and ideas, which come from impressions. Hume condemns language
> that lacks any root in the empirical -- that drifts free of impressions
> AND ideas. His objections, intended for theology, apply equally well
> to the sort of prose Sokal mocks.
> Nevertheless, when I hear writers characterized as unreadable, I
> cannot help but remember that snub of GRAVITY'S RAINBOW by the Pulitzer
> Committee. Do the allies of Sokal really stand up for substance, or do
> they ask that words be windows, and resent anyone who attempts to stain
> the glass?
Had they but categorized their writings as fiction...
The difference that I see is that, I believe, "Sokal and his allies" regard
this (obscurantism, unending jargon, etc.) as a property of the disciplines
as practiced and not that of just particular individuals within them.
(Witness the octopus parodies that have recently appeared here.)
When I was in graduate school in analytic philosophy in the early 70s
Wifrid Sellars, whom I doubt many on this list have heard of, was the star
of the stars in this highly regarded department. His writings were also
(deservedly) criticized as being difficult and obscure, a problem that
bothered him and that he acknowledged in one of the prefaces to his books.
I spent considerable time with his stuff and found it very rewarding, but
even so, there were certainly elements I didn't understand. Despite the
maddening complexities and slipperiness of the concepts in the field, most
others were more successful in their attempts to write clearly, a virtue
that was defnitely encouraged and for which people received positive
reinforcement (based on my seven years in graduate school and three
teaching).
-- roy
Here's some more specifics in case anyone is interested:
One not so uncommon technique in order to gain clarity, was the attempt to
explicitly set out the key premisses and conclusions of arguments in a very
semiformal manner. Often times, the process was interative, the extracted
premisses and conclusions undergoing revisions in the aid of clarifying
them. This was known as "chisholming away", after Roderick Chisholm, one
of its more frequent practitioners. Even an introductory textbook by
Cornman and Lehrer used this technique extensively. I don't mean to
mislead, this was more the exception than the norm, but hardly unknown,
and, I believe, was not unrepresentative of a common attitude towards
explicitly attempting clarity. (Btw, being able to extract from someone
else's writings a set of premisses and conclusion was quite difficult (at
least for me!) but when done well it all seemed so obvious!)
Another instance:
Three people I knew had articles accepted by Philosphical Review, one of
the leading journals at that time. (I have no idea what its status is
today.) The editors communicated with each several times, each time asking
for clarification of confusions, apparent gaps in argumentation, and so on
in the submitted articles. One person commented to me that one of his
revisions apparently satisfied the editors, but that he didn't really
understand until months later what they had been complaining about. His
conclusion: "They were right."
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