Puzzling Gyros

[Andrew Dinn]

Jody Porter wrote:

> > I think you're asking rather, "what is random?" It is not a simple
> > question, Yes? Let's assume we're discussing the relationship between two
> > sequential events: Slothrop getting laid and a rocket strike. Clearly, not
> > all strikes are preceded by Slothrop scoring, Yes? But some are, No? And
> > every time that Slothrop scores a rocket's sure to follow....Maybe.
> > [snip]

Joe Varo replied:

> Hmmm...sounds like necessary vs. sufficient reasons here; Tyrone's
> getting-laid being a sufficient, but not necessary, ground for there to be
> a V-2 strike.

I think Jody is talking about induction and assuming that my criticism
was along the lines of Humean skepticism. But your comments get closer
to what I was referring to. What is it that makes something a
sufficient (or necessary) condition?

Clearly, sufficiency cannot be grounded on outcomes - that's (to
rephrase TRP) `the Monte Carlo Fallacy' taken to the limit
(mathematical pun intended). There must be an element of the
definitional, or rather a conceptual overlap, at play. However,
outcomes do come into the equation - in at least two different ways.

First, they determine how we cut the cloth of our concepts. Without a
certain conformance between expectation and outcome we find it hard to
apply our chosen concepts. Not hard because we cannot account for the
results - whether we have a result or not is *determined* by the way
we frame things by the type of account we are willing to find
acceptable. But hard because our intentions are frustrated by the fact
that we don't get results which square with our expectations. After
all we do science for a purpose, which purpose is often linked to many
other of our activities. When that purpose is foiled we frequently
ditch our current science for something else.

Second, a certain conformance in outcomes is fundamental to our
ability to *practice* science. As Dewey said `Theory is just another
practice'. Well, actually, that's a bit of an understatement. The
construction, maintenance and application of most of scientific
theories (and many of our non-scientific concepts) is dependent upon
our being able to perform a whole range of interrelated practices. So,
if our science used playing cards to perform calculations we might
find not that we got the wrong results but that we got *no results*.
Any computations we did would not be *wrong* since the criterion of
correctness is how the cards turn over. But whether those computations
could be used as the basis for decision making as sophisticated as
current science is another question.

I said to Jody he should read more carefully and he asked read who, me
or Pynchon? Well, I meant Pynchon, of course. In the relevant section
on statistics Pynchon has Roger say (wel it's not actually in speech
marks, the narrator says it on his behalf)

    It's not precognition, he wants to make an announcement in the
    cafeteria or something . . . have I ever pretended to be anything
    I'm not? All I'm doing is plugging numbers into a well-known
    equation, you can look it up in a book and do it yourself. . . .

All Roger *is* doing is performing some maths to produce some numbers
and lo and behold they correspond to the numbers you get by counting
squares. But does he understand that his `random strike' model just
happens to fit or does he think that it must fit? I think he believes
that rocket strikes ought to be random, that his concept of randomness
captures the essence of the way certain parts of the world is built.
Well, there's an interesting notion taht the world is irregular in a
regular sort of way. Now what sort of evidence could back up that
claim? And what evidence would lead you to accept or reject it?

Earlier he is described as contrasting the distribution given the
angel's-eye view and their chances as seen from down here. Jessica
asks

    "Why is your equation only for angels, Roger? Why can't *we* do
    something down here? Couldn't there be an equation for us too,
    something to help us find a safer place?"

    "Why am I surrounded," his usual understanding self today, "by
    statistical illiterates? There's no way love, not as long as the
    mean density of strikes is constant. Pointsman doesn't even
    understand that."

Roger is mouthing a platitude here. If the statistics don't fit the
results then reformalise the problem - "Oh, the mean density of
strikes must be varying" or "the rockets clearly are not falling at
random" or whatever. Get rid of these influences, though, and you can
guarantee randomness. But Pynchon knows that it is not so
straightforward.

Roger's account makes it look as though it is perfectly to be expected
that rockets end up falling according to a distribution based on a
mathematical model of `randomness'. But is it? The psy lot are
convinced that everything must be controlled somehow or other. So,
accepting a model which depends on *no control* seems incredible to
them. And seeing such regularity as the fit between the strikes and
the Poisson formula only convinces them all the more that such
outcomes must be regulated. How is this `random' process made to
follow such a uniform distribution? Roger's answer clearly does not
meet this meta-question.

None of the proffered explanations are adequate. Doubtless Roger
rationalises his presumption of `randomness' by assuming that all
sorts of forces at play in determining the destination of the rocket
smooth each other out producing a uniform probability for a given
square being hit. But such a rationale is neither necessary nor
sufficient to ensure that the measurements keep on fitting the
equation. The psi/psy lot come up with even more bizarre attempts to
rationalise the strike pattern. But in the end it is merely the fit
between the pattern and the Poisson distribution which justifies the
assumption that the rocket strikes are random and it is only justified
thus far.

Pynchon's throwing in another apparently random set of events with an
incredibly tight correlation is a brilliant means of subverting the
acceptability of this `explanation'. What would normally pass as two
totally unexceptional set of measurements taken in isolation suddenly
become an enigma. Now I can only believe that Pynchon intended such a
conjuring trick not just to highlight the gullibility of the psy/psi
foax but also to point out the dependence of scientific/mathematical
interpretations of events on unspoken presumptions. The genius is that
instead of providing boundary cases or anomalous results to question
the validity of the random model for the strikes (i.e. try ot break
the model on its own terms), instead he took two perfectly normal,
unexceptional, explicable sets of outcomes and overlayed them to
produce a moire pattern of indeterminacy, doubt and confusion. It's
like one of those Zen koans meant to break the hold of the normal, the
regular. It doesn't transgress any of the rules it just shows you that
circumstances are always capable of slipping between the cracks in
your reasoning.


Andrew Dinn
-----------
And though Earthliness forget you,
To the stilled Earth say:  I flow.
To the rushing water speak:  I am.