Turing, A.I. and ESP- part 2 of (2/2)

jporter jp4321 at idt.net
Mon Jan 3 05:24:26 CST 2000


(final part of 2/2)

Seb:

>> The best
>>argument that a machine _couldn't_ comes from considering only
>>determined machines: i.e. machines whose entire behaviour is
>>programmed in from the start.

We agree.

>> Are there not indeterminate
>>machines?  (not to mean "beyond causality", but "not predictable
>>by the programmers").  Neural nets learn, but no-one quite knows
>>how.  The idea of programming a machine with a teleology and a
>>set of "pain/pleasure", or more neutrally "correct/incorrect"
>>inputs from the environment, rather than with an explicit list of
>>operations to perform, seems to me to produce this sort of
>>indeterminacy.


Turing does describe an analog machine, and seems to indicate that the
results, i.e., the outputs, would be essentially the same as the dsm.
[There are others who have more recently claimed to have produced chaotic
analogue machines capable of performing in a non-deterministic way: e.g.,
Siegelmann, H. T. (1995) Computation Beyond the Turing Limit. Science, 268,
545-548.]  Turing himself also suggests that the best way to actually build
such a sophisticated machine, even capable of participating in the Test,
would be to use the learning/neural net model.

He seems to have believed that E.S.P., however, would still be a problem.
Although he does not mention it specifically, I'm assuming it has to do
with the need for intentionality- about the simulation of which he makes no
claims. The machine, of course, "borrows" intentionality from the life
forms involved in its creation and those involved in the test itself.
E.S.P. would seem to be a peculiar blend of irrationality and
intentionality, beyond anything less than conscious life forms, not just
with imitatable likes and dislikes, but with needs, including the need to
need, which is probably far beyond imitation.


>>So this is why I don't buy the argument:
>>
>>1) ESP questions are asking for a performance beyond the rules of
>>the game.
>>2) If humans do have ESP, then the assumption that machines could
>>not have ESP has to be supported, beyond the intuition "well,
>>that ESP, that's a human thing, right?  A MACHINE couldn't do
>>that...".
>>
>>Another thing...
>>
>>If a machine played Turing's game as well as a human, but failed
>>the ESP questions, how would we consider it?  For best results,
>>assume that all human beings are brilliant at ESP.
>>This seems like a good question because Turing's assumption
>
>
> seems
>>very obviously (to me) to be a refuge from the conclusion that
>>machines may be intelligent/human.
>>There seem to be two questions conflated in Turing's article -
>>"can a machine show intelligence?" and "can a machine show
>>humanity?".   If a machine failed the ESP questions, wouldn't the
>>questioner be justified in thinking that the (machine) respondent
>>was not a human intelligence, but still an intelligence?
>>
>>regards


I think, most of the reflexive emotional response vis a vis A.I. is easy to
understand, that is: maybe we are in fact just sophisticated machines, with
as yet, unknown elements of design, which eventually through our science
and technology, will be figured out, and even duplicated. The concept of
E.S.P., though, is not just a stand in for the spiritual, and the reflexive
emotional response it often generates among usually rational people is of a
different sort.

The concept of the paranormal, because of its surreptitious and concealed
nature, is upsetting to our notions of order- especially social order, and
the various hierarchies of priviledge that are so maintained. It is not
easily controlled. Even those who covet its "power" would seem to have a
difficult time making use of it in a dependable way. At times, it seems
more of a "wistful" luddite "pipe dream"- you can see where I'm heading...

But with Turing it was different. When I came upon his article, I was
expecting a straight up exposition on the theoretical underpinnings of A.I.
The article, albeit esoteric, is supposed to be a classic, of as much
historical importance amongst the artificial intelligence/cognitive science
people, as C.P. Snow's "Two Cultures" lecture is for those interested in
modern cultural studies. Turing's description of E.S.P., as a major
stumbling block for computers attempting to pass his famous test, caught me
flat-footed. It has to be taken seriously, especially given the careful
context in which it is found. It is not enough to dismiss it as whimsy, or
some Sokol-like poke in the eye of naive believers. It should be incumbent
on those who make such claims, given the stature of the author and no
evidence of intent offered by Turing, to not just speculate that he was
"kidding" or being "sarcastic," but to provide an explanation of why he
would interpose such an inappropriate section in an otherwise classic
paper. Such speculation, even made by "authorities"  would seem to serve
mainly the prejudices of those who offer it, and not to elucidate anything
Turing may have actually intended. Whether E.S.P. exists or not is hardly
the only point here.

But I am ranting.  Suffice it to say, that the juxtaposition of E.S.P. with
A.I. is fascinating. It encourages one to take seriously the possibility of
A.I., which may be more uncomfortable than the remote possibility of
E.S.P., for a majority of people. In Turing's time, A.I. - by any
description- was a distant dream. I think that He recognized, better than
anyone else then, that computers would someday link us together in
unimagineable ways. I think he foresaw that computers would automate many
of the repetitve tasks of his day, and begin to free up consciousness for
other things, including more and more interaction with computers
themselves.

It does not seem surprising to me, now that I think about it, that he
entertained the possibility of E.S.P. He was certainly a visionary. And
while he probably had no inkling that by the end of the century we would be
splicing genes from one species, nay, one phylum to another, or growing
pluri-potential stem cells in a petri dish and cloning sheep- let alone the
entire human genome- he certainly had first hand knowledge of powerful,
ambitious and frequently desparate men with secrets in need of keeping.
Exactly what he was privy to, and what he was not, we will probably never
know:

http://www.sciam.com/1999/0899issue/0899letters.html

jody





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