V.V. (3) "Young Stencil the world adventurer"

[Lorentzen / Nicklaus]

jbor schrieb:

> For both men it is
> self-justification, a variety of narcissism (or perhaps a deliberate
> anti-narcissism) or navel-gazing, which motivates these interminable
> expositions-of-self. If Benny is phenomenological man, living just in the
> present in order to escape both the experiences of the past and the
> potential responsibilities of the future; then Stencil is somehow the
> opposite, where the past and the future have assumed such potentially
> gargantuan significance that considerations of the self in the immediate
> present have been all but engulfed.

  "the first (and primary) function of mind is the perceptual (and 
  participatory) function of the mind. the second (and secondary) function of 
  mind is the conceptual (and abstract, analytical, or interpretive) function of 
  mind. 
   the first (or primary) function of mind is the natural and naturally 
  intelligent perceptual awareness (or natural feeling-awareness) of arising 
  conditions, without any necessarily accompanying effort to separate from them. 
  the second (or secondary)function of mind is the conceptual awareness of 
  arising conditions (and of verbal thoughts or abstract analytical concepts 
  themselves), and it is necessarily associated with an effort to separate (or 
  withdraw) from arising conditions (whether they are gross, subtle, or causal) 
  and to exceed (or strategically escape from) arising conditions, because it is 
  always associated with an effort to know  a b o u t  (or to abstract, analyze, 
  and interpret) arising conditions.
   the perceiving mind knows whatever it perceives. what it perceives, exactly 
  as it is perceived, is what it knows. perception, prior to verbal, abstract,  
  and interpretive thoughts, is  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  conditional 
  knowledge.
   the conceptual mind knows whatever it thinks. whatever it thinks, whether or 
  not the thought is informed or confirmed by perception, is what it knows. 
  conception (or conceptual thought), loosely or not at all associated with 
  perception, is  a b s t r a c t  conditional knowledge.   
   ... the activities of the conceptual function of mind generally serve a   
  useful purpose in the common world, which is the communication and development 
  of conventional knowledge and practical invention. even so, all conceptual   
  knowledge is an abstraction, the purpose of which is to give conditional   
  beings (or knowers) power over themselves, their objects, their environments, 
  and other conditionally manifested beings. therefore, if this function of mind 
  is not kept in right perspective (subordinate to participatory mind and the   
  wisdom of reality), the motives of power and control tend to dominate mind   
  itself (and, therefore, the total body-mind and the total collective society, 
  or social culture, of conditionally knowing beings).
   secondary mind, or conceptual (and, typically, verbal) thought, must be 
  diciplined, if it is to be effective in its proper sphere. likewise, it must 
  be understood, kept in right perspective, and, at will, freely set aside when 
  the analytical and interpretive function is not presently necessary or useful.
   you must realize the natural (and inherent) ability to set aside the 
  secondary or conceptual function of mind, or else you will be dominated by a 
  compulsive and obsessive effort to think conceptually (by dissociating from 
  perception), to seek knowledge about, to interpret, and to separate from (or  
  to strategically dominate, or even to strategically escape from) the perceived 
  conditional worlds.
   you must enjoy the natural, inherent, moment to moment ability to merely 
  perceive, to feel, to be with, and to wholly participate in the phenomenal 
  conditions of your psycho-physical existence, or else you will not truly 
  understand what arises conditionally, nor will you transcend the limitations 
  of conditional existence."

                        (avatar adi da: the dawn horse testament, pp. 233-5)

 be perceiving you: kai 

> I think that ultimately we might find
> both reflexes to be merely different sides to the same coin -- the loss of
> the human as an adjunct of attempting to avert the essential meaningless of
> existence.