absoultely relative

[Mark David Tristan Brenchley]

On Sat, 24 Mar 2001, Terrance wrote:

> Dave Monroe wrote: 
> 
> 
> >I don't think Pynchon "himself," those Pynchonian
> >texts, even attempt an (ultimately impossible)
> >absolute relativism, which is what I've bene reading
> >you as suggesting.  I do think he, and, more so, they,
> >make things very, very, difficult, very, very
> >complicated (that "problematization,"
> >"deconstruction," whatever thing), but ... 
>  
> 
> 1. The relativist asserts that there are incompatible moral
> beliefs in  different cultures, and this diversity refutes
> the existence  of  absolute ethical standards. 
> 
> 2. Since every moral system is strictly relative to its
> particular culture, none can be called objectively  better
> or worse than another. 
> 
> And from this, it  follows is that it makes no sense at all
> to
> assert that, 
> 
> for  example, sodomizing young boys  or circumcising young
> girls is "really" wrong
> if  one judges from a position outside the society that
> condones
> the  practice. 

	This is not necessarily so. One can criticize either of these by
appealing to the individuals within those particular societies. We might
ask whether they want such a thing, and may request our assistance in
putting a stip to these misdemeanours...

> 
> The problem with this position as I see it is: 
> 
> 1. The relativist is here making two claims: 
> 
> A. a factual claim 
> 
> B. a philosophical claim
> 
> Now the factual claim is that societies do in 
> fact exhibit very different moral systems
> 
> And the philosophical claim  is that, when faced with moral
> diversity, no objective  criteria exist to judge between
> them
> 
> 
> The factual claim rests on very complex and ambiguous 
> evidence. 
> 
> The simple presence of moral discrepancies, most commonly in
> sexual  behavior, is not support,  because the apparent 
> differences in codes of conduct  do not necessarily prove 
> that fundamental moral beliefs differ.
>  
> Similar moral principles can take different behavioral forms
> in  different social and environmental conditions. 
> 
> Moral diversity can  also be explained by differing opinions
> about the facts of  what  constitutes happiness, obedience
> to god(s) or social harmony.
> 
> The scale of moral variation has often been overemphasized. 
> 
> 
> If one looks over the "major civilizations" in the Orient
> and the West, one finds a striking degree
>  of unanimity about ultimate moral beliefs,
> though these sometimes  take local forms due to local social
> differences. 
> 
> 
> 
>  Even if we accept the radical divergence of moral
> systems,  it is equally possible that some criteria may
> exist to assess them ethically.
> 
>  Most relativists quickly become absolutist 
> when it comes to pet moral principles, like sodomizing boys
> or circumcising girls. 
> 
> They  implicitly accept that criteria for judging different
> moral  behavior do exist. Such relativists don't really
> believe  that all  moral  beliefs are culture-specific, only
> the mistaken ones.
> 
> A consistent  relativist, on the other hand, must say that
> the statement "circumcising girls is  wrong" means
> "circumcising girls is not part of my moral universe" and
> completely  avoid the use of "wrong" outside his own ethical
> domain. 
> 
> The  inability of virtually all relativists to do this is an
> indication  that it's an untenable position. 
> 
> The objectivist who believes  there are fundamental 
> moral principles that apply to all
> humanity  has a similar problem. 
> 
> If a consistent objectivist says that
> "sodomizing boys is  wrong" and means that "sodomizing boys
> is absolutely and
> objectively wrong for all humanity at all times,"  then he
> must face the fact that
> individuals who  break a moral rule do so because
> 
> either  don't believe it,
> 
> they  misunderstand its true import 
> 
> they disregard it
> 
> they suffer from some  mental aberration or social
> conditioning. 
> 
> Can that individual be  "blamed" for breaking an objective
> moral law?
> 
> This then requires us  to distinguish between two things: 
> 
> was an action right or wrong  by objective standards? 
> 
> can the violator be charged with a  moral breach? 
> 
> Even when we judge that an action is
> morally wrong in fact, we must then start the slippery
> business of  deciding if the  violator ought to have known
> it was wrong. 
> 
> Recent comments here concerning Plato have caused me to
> wonder if one of my silly persona
>  ever studied him or if I just dreamed that I was
> studying to  become a jesuit  to repress my oedipal drive. 
> 
> Plato's Republic should be read for what it is. 
> 
> Plato was in a very real sense and moral philosopher. 
> technology, the mind, psychology, politics, these were all
> moral considerations for Plato. He was in a more modern
> sense, a "moral cognativist." His contribution was to
> analyze why the mind fails to see objective moral standards
> and thus  does wrong in ignorance. 
> 
> After Plato, perhaps the most powerful, non religious
> alternative to simple absolutist or  relativist positions is
> Kant's. 
> 
> But Kant requires us to  recognize the autonomy of the
> will, capable of acting as a law to  itself independent 
> of any object of volition. 
> 
> In a kingdom of ends, where no human is ever to be treated
> as a means to some goal, but is  always an end in itself, we
> are always to  act in such a way that the  maxim guiding our
> choice of
> action  can  simultaneously become  universal law applicable
> to all
> sentient beings. 
> 
> That immediately  puts an end, if one understands the
> consequences of an autonomous  will, to sodomizing boys 
> and circumcising   girls and a Hell of a lot of other things
> as well.

Bollocks.

	Frankly, Kant's whole philosophy is fundamentally flawed. The
notion of the categorical imperative, for example, is no morally binding
law for the very reason that one can always ask why we should follow it.
Secondly, Kant's assertion that all human beings are ends not means, dioes
not entail that it is immoral not to treat them as such. I may for
example, have to kill one person in order to save one hundred. In such
situations (ie. problems where there are genuine moral dilemmas) Kant's
philosophy is inadequate in providing a solution. I might add that this is
the guy who, despite forbidding murder, argued for the right of capityal
punishment

I could go on (and I will should the replies start coming in, though bear
in mind I'm playing catch up), but I'm tired.
'night

Mark