new book

[Doug Millison]

"Just as the murder of the Jews was not inevitable, it was not inexplicable,
as I will argue in the next chapter. An aspect of that discussion belongs here:
the inclination of people who take refuge in mysticism to argue that an event
of such magnitude-a "tremendum," as they sometimes call it-cannot
ultimately be explained. This retreat into mysticism is usually 
reserved for the
Holocaust, whereas all other events are deemed liable to rational explanation.
I am afraid I cannot accept that exception to the rule. The murder was
committed by humans for reasons whose sources are found in history and
which can therefore be rationally analyzed. The mystifiers, with the best of
intentions, achieve the opposite of their presumed aim, which is to achieve
identification and empathy with the victims. You cannot identify with what is
inexplicable. True, the depth of pain and suffering of Holocaust victims is
difficult to describe, and writers, artists, poets, dramatists, and 
philosophers
will forever grapple with the problem of articulating it-and as far as this is
concerned, the Holocaust is certainly not unique, because "indescribable"
human suffering is forever there and is forever being described. In principle,
then, the Holocaust is a human event, so it can be explained, because it was
perpetrated for what were unfortunately human reasons. This does not mean
that the explanation is easy. On the contrary. [....]  We now come to 
the problem of definitions. Is the Holocaust definable? Is it 
desirable to define it? After all, definitions are abstractions from 
reality and are useful only insofar as they help us to better 
understand the world around us. Any historiographical definition is 
designed to help us understand the event or events being defined. 
Because life is infinitely more complex than any definition, 
definitions, by definition, can never be fully adequate to the events 
they are supposed to define. We can but hope that they approximate 
descriptions of reality. Inevitably, our definitions are 
selective-they deal with parts of a phenomenon. That makes it even 
more important for our definitions to be as precise as possible in 
defining at least those parts of the phenomenon that they claim to 
define. And if experience shows that the definition does not fit 
reality, then the definition has to be changed, not the other way 
around. In order to define the Holocaust, it must be compared to 
other events if it is, as I have just argued, a human event. It is 
only by comparison that we can answer the question of whether it is 
unprecedented and has features not found in similar events. .... I 
will argue that Holocaust can be used in two ways: to describe what 
happened to the Jews at Nazi hands and to describe what might happen 
to others if the Holocaust of the Jewish people becomes a precedent 
for similar actions. Whichever way Holocaust is used, it and genocide 
are clearly connected; they belong to the same species of human 
action, and the differences between them remain to be seen, beyond 
the obvious one of partial versus total destruction. "

_Rethinking the Holocaust_
By YEHUDA BAUER
Yale University Press

from the first chapter which continues in its entirety at
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/b/bauer-rethinking.html

and is reviewed at
http://www.nytimes.com/books/01/01/28/reviews/010128.28dickstt.html
-- 
d  o  u  g    m  i  l  l  i  s  o  n  <http://www.online-journalist.com>