Hayes, Industry and Ideology

[Terrance]

Dave Monroe wrote:
> 
> ... which is, as I recall, a rather less damning account than that given
> in Pynchon's likely source on all things IG Farben, Richard Sasuly's IG
> Farben (New York: Boni & Gaer, 1947), but damning nonetheless.  There
> isn't a bibliography to the book, all bibliographic information is
> contained in relevant footnotes, and the indexer apparently didn't feel
> it necessary to index references to such research materials (all
> frustrating cost-cutting measures on the part of CUP, no doubt), and I
> haven't yet come upon any reference to Sasuly, but I'm hoping Hayes
> somewhere along the line addresses him.  Gave the first ed. (1987) of
> this a cursory run-through a while back, but I just don't recall.  Will
> report back ...

Hitler threatened the fundamental assumptions of the
strategy of capitalist reproduction that Farben's leaders
had derived from decades of experience in highly changeable
industry: that economic success required political peace,
both foreign and domestic, and predominance at the cutting
edge of technological development. To preserve both, the
concern (IG Farben) opposed the Nazi führer, then let itself
be drawn into uneasy and uneven cooperation with him between
1933 and 1939, then began to share in his crimes once his
victories and defeats undid the world in which their
assumptions had taken shape. 

Thanks for suggesting this book, it is a very different book
than Sasuly's, but as you say, "damning nonetheless." 
Hayes' book is the story of the reforging of an industry
(world cartel) mentality in an ideological furnace, 
powered, in part, by slave labor, and genocide. Thanks also
for the Holton article, it fits right in here and right into
the current discussions about history/art/fiction/facts. 

BTW, IG Farben's business mentality, culture, was very
"ideal American," very similar to the way Walt Disney
(fighting with his brother) ran his business, the freedom
and autonomy given to creators, to inventors, to innovators,
the subordination of the bottom line to the best and
brightest and the long term.  This is not the reputation of
American business I know,  but it is the case. American
business, its growth sectors, not its old giants, is not
about the bottom line and quarterly reports to greedy
stockholders. One thinks of post WWII Japan, her Miracle and
her current troubles, and Iraq,  built on the American ideal
model, but unable to sustain it because of ideological and
political conflict not present in the U.S. The German model,
IG Farben's model, looked to America, it was able to
overcome the Depression and the restraints of its treaties
(Versailles), but the factions, like Japan's current
factions (LDP having lost for the first time since WWII)
would all give in to Hitler. 


http://www.mesharpe.com/65603098.htm   

Carl Bosch said, "IG Farben is not here to give big profits
to stockholders. Our pride and our duty is to work for those
who come after us to establish the process on which the will
work."  IG Farben emphasized creativity, decentralization,
initiative, teamwork. Though it was no means egalitarian,
its ethos distrusted the concentration of power and the
Superman. 

Disney said, I want to build a permanent organization that
will allow fro continual and expanding work. Money is
important indirectly; experimentation comes first. Quality
is the thing we have striven most to put into our pictures." 

Like Disney, IG Farben was run by middle class men for the
most part, typical professional types, protestants and Jews.
In 1932, seven Jews sat on the Aufsichtsrat. 

In 1913, Freidrich Berguis discovered a process for
liquefying coal. This discovery would change the shape of IG
Farben and the world. 

Farben poured tons of money into this. They thought that the
world's petroleum sources were approaching depletion and
that motorization would drive up demand for fuel. But they
were wrong. They very wrong. Oil was abundant and the price
of gasoline dropped steadily. Between 1925 and 1929 the
price of gasoline was shaved by a third and by 1931 it had
dropped 70%. Farben put 426 million reichmarks into this
business and lost 152 million (around $36 million U.S.
1929). But the IG Farben's productions had not gone
unnoticed by the big chemical companies in Europe nor in the
States. Joining them were ICI (Pynchon's Icy eye), Allied
Chemical, and of course the greatest giant of the all,  
Standard Oil Of New Jersey (Marvy's Standard Awl or perhaps,
Mrs. Farben?). Had Standard Awl not supported Farben's
venture they would have lost 300 million and perhaps they
would have abandoned them. Together they formed
International Cartels and protected their domestic markets
while they exploited the unprotected and lucrative markets
outside the cartel,  particularly the Asian markets--China. 

http://students.washington.edu/gar2chan/CMU428/

In 1929, Farben cut it losses by selling all of its German
rights to hydrogenation of fuel to Standard for $35 million
in Stadard stock. Title to the patents were shifted to the
new Standard IG Corporation and in 1930 the formed JASCO.
1931 they teamed up with Royal Dutch and ICI in the
International Hydrogenation Patent Agreement, restricting
Farbens business in Hydrogenation to Germany. By 1932 there
were ten Jews on the board and IG Farben continued to fund
the various factions and oppose Hitler,  but for the first
time 1933, Farben made a contribution to the Nazi party.