Vlad, Ios, and Leon

calbert at tiac.net calbert at tiac.net
Fri May 11 14:09:48 CDT 2001


The enclosed will shed more light on the troika:


The Testament of Lenin

    By the stability of the Central Committee, of which I spoke before, 
I mean
    measures to prevent a split, so far as such measures can be 
taken. For, of
    course, the White Guard in Russkaya Mysl (I think it was S. E. 
Oldenburg) was
    right when, in the first place, in his play against Soviet Russia he 
banked on the
    hope of a split in our party, and when, in the second place, he 
banked for that
    split on serious disagreements in our party.  

    Our party rests upon two classes, and for that reason its 
instability is possible,
    and if there cannot exist an agreement between those classes its 
fall is
    inevitable. In such an event it would be useless to take any 
measures or in
    general to discuss the stability of our Central Committee. In such 
an event no
    measures would prove capable of preventing a split. But I trust 
that is too
    remote a future, and too improbable an event, to talk about.  

    I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a split in the near 
future, and I
    intend to examine here a series of considerations of a purely 
personal
    character.  

    I think that the fundamental factor in the matter of stability -- from 
this point of
    view -- is such members of the Central Committee as Stalin and 
Trotsky. The
    relation between them constitutes, in my opinion, a big half of the 
danger of that
    split, which might be avoided, and the avoidance of which might 
be promoted,
    in my opinion, by raising the number of members of the Central 
Committee to
    fifty or one hundred.  

    Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has 
concentrated an
    enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always 
knows how to
    use that power with sufficient caution. On the other hand, 
Comrade Trotsky, as
    was proved by his struggle against the Central Committee in 
connection with the
    question of the People's Commissariat of Ways and 
Communications, is
    distinguished not only by his exceptional abilities -- personally he 
is, to be sure,
    the most able man in the present Central Committee -- but also by 
his too
    far-reaching self-confidence and a disposition to be too much 
attracted by the
    purely administrative side of affairs.  

    These two qualities of the two most able leaders of the present 
Central
    Committee might, quite innocently, lead to a split; if our party 
does not take
    measures to prevent it, a split might arise unexpectedly.  

    I will not further characterize the other members of the Central 
Committee as to
    their personal qualities. I will only remind you that the October 
episode of
    Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, accidental, but that it 
ought as little
    to be used against them personally as the non-Bolshevism of 
Trotsky.  

    Of the younger members of the Central Committee, I want to say 
a few words
    about Bukharin and Pyatakov. They are, in my opinion, the most 
able forces
    (among the youngest) and in regard to them it is necessary to 
bear in mind the
    following: Bukharin is not only the most valuable and biggest 
theoretician of the
    party, but also may legitimately be considered the favorite of the 
whole party;
    but his theoretical views can only with the very greatest doubt be 
regarded as
    fully Marxist, for there is something scholastic in him (he never 
has learned, and
    I think never has fully understood, the dialectic).  

    And then Pyatakov -- a man undoubtedly distinguished in will and 
ability, but
    too much given over to administration and the administrative side 
of things to be
    relied on in a serious political question.  

    Of course, both these remarks are made by me merely with a 
view to the present
    time, or supposing that these two able and loyal workers may not 
find an
    occasion to supplement their knowledge and correct their one-
sidedness.  

    December 25, 1922  

    Postscript: Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable in 
relations
    among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of 
General
    Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to 
remove Stalin
    from that position and appoint to it another man who in all 
respects differs from
    Stalin only in superiority -- namely, more patient, more loyal, 
more polite and
    more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc. This 
circumstance may seem an
    insignificant trifle, but I think that from the point of view of 
preventing a split
    and from the point of view of the relation between Stalin and 
Trotsky which I
    discussed above, it is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle as may 
acquire a decisive
    significance. "

http://www.ex.ac.uk/Projects/meia/Trotsky/Archive/1926-lenin.htm

Too bad Vlad couldn't prevail over Ios.....


love,
cfa 




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