Was Reading and discussing Pynchon's texts

[Michael Joseph]

Jbor, In my brief response, I have copied some of your more substantive
statements, but discarded what I felt was tangential or unintentionally
insulting. If I have eliminated something you feel important, my
apologies.

Basically, the discussion we were having centered on the question of
whether someone who believes that everything is a matter of interpretation
has the right to criticize an interpretive position with which they do not
agree--even a position that holds some things are not subject to
interpretation. I noted that, once one accepted the relativism of all
positions, one was no longer free to claim access to objective criteria,
that he/she relinquished the right to appeal to rationalist authorities.
Incidentally, I am not claiming the rationalist/relativist problem as my
own insight, but the problem arises independently of Foucault and Derrida
and literary theory, or what is being identified here as literary theory.
I was curious to know on what basis you were asserting the superiority of
your position vis=a-vis V.'s.


So, I had written earlier:

According to your POV, all is mere subjective response. But, having
asserted that, haven't you forfeited the right to criticize V's POV or any
POV by denying any basis for that right in an objective, rationalist,
standard?

On Sat, 7 Jun 2003, you (Jbor) responded:

> No, because I'm not operating under that type of "I'm
> right, you're wrong"
> paradigm. I can accept that conflicting POVs co-exist in the world; in fact,
> that's one of the bases of my own POV.
>
To which I (Michael) *now* respond:

The question wasn't whether other points of view existed. Onee would have
to be insane to deny they exist. At issue was to what degree one can
accept their validity.


My headnote:

(I'd previously brought in the tu quoque argument, the standard
affirmation of the equality of irrational arguments, as a means of
illustrating on what (relativistic) grounds one could dismiss ostensibly
less irrational beliefs. I then pointed out that, whereas you were bound
by it to accept V.'s position, he was not bound to accept yours, but even
his rejection of your position did not free to you reject his.)

I wrote:

> > You do not believe in the
> > solidity of the "what," and therefore deny to V. his belief. You cannot
> > get V. to sign on to the Tu Quoque argument and relinquish his belief,
> > Jbor, because he does not meet the preconditions. *He* has not agreed that
> > all is mere interpretation.
>
To which you responded on June 7:

> That's OK. If that's his understanding (i.e. interpretation) of the reading
> process, that's fine too.

To which I now reply:

His understanding "(i.e. interpretation)" [sic] has nothing to do with it,
and you either know that and are rather cunningly avoiding that fact, or
you are changing the terms of the discussion because you cannot address
them otherwise. We are alluding here to a precritical, intuitive,
apprehension of coherence. It's like an experience of beauty, which has
nothing to do with interpretation.

You wrote on June 7:

> Once we've moved out of the realm of empty semantics,

Reply:

Philosophical dispute is only empty when you fail to understand it. I
would have thought your theory of interpretation would include that.

You wrote on June 7:

. . . and into the tin tacks of responding to an actual text [gratituitous
insult deleted] then that's when your attack

I reply:

[defense, you mean]


You wrote on June 7:

finally stumbles off feebly and collapses into the ditch

I now reply: [I was going to strike this hyperbole, but then considered it
might be an attempt at humor, so I leave it for your clarification.]


You wrote on June 7:

It's impossible to offer a non-interpretive "analysis"  of a text.


Reply:

Pausing only briefly to appreciate the irony that you are not getting
"into the tin tacks of responding to an actual text," by which I guess you
mean 'literary' text, but are actually broadcasting what you would
describe as "empty semantics," I want to emphasize that here the fuzzy
schizziness of your position becomes manifest, and it was this schizziness
I initially sought to interrogate. While repeating that POV is always
provisional, you feel entitled to make provincial statements about what is
impossible. There is no rational basis for you to do this, to say what is
impossible. You can only justify it (as you keep doing) by saying that
your POV is your POV, or "Meta-POV," but this, I think, is usually defined
as solipsism.

On June 7 you concluded your note by writing:

> But, as I've said, there's actually nothing wrong in the practice of . .
. : it doesn't mean I need to agree with them, however.

And now I conclude:

Of course not; and who cares if you agree? The discussion was never about
agreement. The discussion was about why you chose to assert the presumed
superiority of your position, and how you defended it. In fact, you have
been content to repeat, essentially, that you are justified because you
feel free to interpose your point of view. Your argument seems to be, my
interpretation is that my interpretation is superior to V.'s
interpretation because I say so, although it's also my initerpretation
that no interpretation is actually superior. Well, if I disagree with the
utility and force of this argument, at least I understand why you describe
it as "empty semantics."


Michael



   > best
>
> > This is your crisis of integrity and you can't
> > dodge it by shifting it onto V. (whom, I hope you would agree, already has
> > a heck of a lot on his plate.)