VLVL II: Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Kommunismus?

Terrance lycidas2 at earthlink.net
Mon Oct 20 04:52:00 CDT 2003


"When the State withers away, Hector." VL.28


Most, but not all of the Party members holding leadership positions in
the CIO's Left Wing Unions hid their affiliation with the blessing of
the Party. Party inroads were simply too precious to risk by going
public. Secrecy had several advantages including, minimizing friction
with the overwhelmingly non-Communist rank and file, making it easier to
function as a  pure and simple trade union.  But secrecy had
disadvantages too. Secrecy combined with the power the trade union
Communists had acquired as leaders of mass organizations also worked to
loosen the ties between the Party and the Trade Unionist. If Communists
were to lead mainstream American unions, then the union leaders had to
have the freedom to function, form alliances, and make compromises that
made real Party control largely meaningless. Ostensibly, the Party
functionaries were in charge, and consultation did take place,
particularly on major political issues, but in reality the trade union
leaders had far outdistanced them in power and respectability. The Party
was weary of interfering in internal union matters, and there was
nothing very complicated about knowing the Party line. Reading the Daily
Worker was enough to keep up with the official Communist political
positions. The Party's decision in the late 30's to abolish it
"fractions" or caucuses in the labor movement confirmed this slackening
of central discipline. Previously, strategy was centrally decided and
strict discipline was enforced in its implementation. But this narrow
kind of Leninism no longer suited either the goal of the Popular Front
or the leeway necessary for the leaders of important unions. 

see
American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957
 by Author: Joseph R. Starobin
 Harvard University Press
 06/01/1972
 ISBN: 0674022750

The loosening of the reigns between the Party and its Trade Unions
influentials resulted primarily from a shift in Soviet policy toward a
Popular Front strategy in 1935. The Seventh Comintern Congress of that
year, in addition to its call for a Popular Front with non-Communists
against Fascism, also ordered a shift in the American Communist Party's
position toward support for FDR and the New Deal. Ironically, the
decision also loosened the reigns between Moscow and New York, although
American Communists generally stayed in lock step with decisions in
Moscow anyway, to the ultimate disaster of the Party.



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