VLVL re Vietnam

[pynchonoid]

Cursor.org says:
"It's time to be blatant," writes Ralph Omholt in the
military-insider newsletter, DefenseWatch.  "The US
Military is getting desperate in Iraq."  He describes
a radical change of tactics that "return[s] to the
strategies and tactics used in the Vietnam War" and
"subtly betray the administration's worst fears --
that Iraq is becoming another Vietnam."
and links to Omholt's article at
<http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=321&rnd=493.0715604161909>

A new book,

Fredrik Logevall. The Origins of the Vietnam War.
Seminar Studies in History Series. Harlow: Longman,
2001. vi + 156 pp. Maps, chronology, documents,
bibliography, index. $16.00 (paper), ISBN
0-582-31918-8. 

reviewed at
<http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=304391073889034>
offers background that some Vineland readers may find
useful:

[...] Logevall divides the war's origins into four
parts. He begins by leading readers through the French
colonial experience and the factors that led to their
defeat in 1954. The French were attracted to Indochina
by the mutually reinforcing aims of empire and
financial gain. French colonial rule proved harsh and
when Vietnamese efforts to secure political reforms
failed, nationalist parties and small groups of rebels
staged an unsuccessful uprising. The emergence of Ho
Chi Minh and the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930
proved particularly problematic for the French.
Logevall characterizes Ho as possibly the most
misunderstood historical figure of the twentieth
century. Joining a recent historical debate, Logevall
argues that Ho was more of a nationalist than a
Communist, offering a document outlining the
foundation of the Vietminh as evidence (pp. 13). To
counter the Vietminh, the French created a puppet
regime, portraying the war as one between free
Vietnamese and Communists. This was exactly how the
Truman administration saw the struggle. Ignoring no
fewer than eight requests for assistance from the
Vietminh, Truman instead stepped up military aid to
the French. In time, the Vietminh found military
support from the Soviets and the Chinese, defeating
the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954.
Despite Congressional reluctance to assist the French
any further, President Dwight Eisenhower and his
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles saw Vietnam as a
vital regional domino and chose to set the stage for
American involvement in the wake of the French
surrender. 

 With the French experience established, Logevall
turns to the Geneva Agreement and its failure to bring
peace to the region. Despite international wishes for
a neutralist or Titoist government in Vietnam,
Eisenhower and Dulles subverted the 1954 Geneva
accords and set the stage for a Cold War showdown.
Fearing American intervention, Ho settled for a
partitioned country and an election slated for July
1956. The election, of course, never materialized. As
Logevall notes, the Americans knew a loser when they
saw one and their man Diem was particularly skilled at
alienating those he led. Turmoil quickly set in across
the south as Diem alienated non-Catholics and balked
at land reforms. By 1960, the northern Communists had
created the National Liberation Front to back
disaffected southerners. In northern eyes, Vietnam was
one country and Diem's refusal to hold the 1956
elections led Ho to seek reunification by other means.


 By the time John Kennedy received his first
presidential briefings on Vietnam, a major insurgency
was underway. Yet opportunities for a negotiated
settlement remained. As Logevall argues, the North
Vietnamese remained interested in a negotiated
settlement during this period, noting that one of
their core aims was the avoidance of a direct military
conflict with the Americans. The tragedy here was that
peace advocates, whether in Washington, Hanoi, or
other major capitals, proved unwilling to press for a
resolution (pp. 51). For his part, Kennedy was
determined to defend South Vietnam, choosing a middle
path between negotiations and escalation. Central to
understanding Kennedy, Logevall argues, was his
determination to preserve American credibility in the
wake of the Bay of Pigs, Vienna, and the Berlin
Crisis. Logevall argues that the question in Kennedy's
inner circle was not whether, but rather how, to
commit American resources to the region (pp. 45).
Kennedy chose to follow Eisenhower's lead, remaining
opposed to diplomacy until terms could be dictated to
Hanoi. Despite the intrigue over what Kennedy might
have done had Oswald missed, Logevall finds little
evidence to suggest that Kennedy would have withdrawn
from Vietnam (pp. 56). 

 On that infamous November day in 1963, the burden of
Vietnam was delivered to Johnson on an assassin's
bullet. And what a burden it would become. Logevall
argues that Johnson found little support for war
outside his cabinet room doors. Democratic Party
leaders, the media, and much of the world community
failed to see any Western security interests at stake
in the jungles of Vietnam. But LBJ saw the situation
differently; all options on his desk presupposed the
need to stand firm. In his mind, the Great Society was
tied to a hard-line anti-communist policy and he was
determined to preserve an independent South Vietnam.
Accordingly, he ignored any advice that involved a
negotiated settlement. Logevall argues that, despite
having a viable option to wash his hands of Vietnam in
1964, Johnson instead quietly approved a two-phased
escalation plan designed to bring Hanoi to its knees.
Johnson, Logevall contends, knew that the basing of
American fighter-bombers on South Vietnamese soil
would lead to the introduction of combat forces to
protect the airfields. The communist attack on Pleiku
in February 1965 raised the stakes. Logevall suggests
that this attack need not have been a major turning
point, that decisions made could have been undone (pp.
76). But instead, Johnson sent his jets north,
hardening Hanoi's resolve. This was just as well, for
while the North Vietnamese may have been open to
negotiations, Logevall argues that the Johnson
Administration never truly was. Johnson was committed
to a military solution, and in the end got his ground
war in Asia and with it all the ingredients of a
Shakespearian tragedy. By the summer of 1965, the
fissures that would shatter Lyndon Johnson's
presidency in 1968 were readily apparent: the sickly
South Vietnamese ally, the international clamor for a
negotiated settlement, and a growing number of
American elite sick of the whole thing. [...]





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