Death of Derrida: Do real Pynchonians mourn or par-tay?

[Paul Mackin]

Since Searle's name has come up I thought p-listers might be interested
in recalling Searle's critique of an example in Jonathan Culler's book
of


"where Culler and Derrida show us how deconstruction is supposed to
work. Culler's paradigm example, the one he presents to show how the
various characterizations and operations of deconstruction "might
converge in practice" (p. 86), is what he describes as Nietzsche's
deconstruction of causality.

        Suppose one feels a pain. This causes one to look for a cause
        and spying, perhaps, a pin, one posits a link and reverses the
        perceptual or phenomenal order, pain…pin, to produce a causal
        sequence, pin…pain. "The fragment of the outside world of which
        we become conscious comes after the effect that has been
        produced on us and is projected a posteriori as its 'cause"' [p.
        86].


So far this does not sound very deconstructive of anything. Culler
thinks otherwise, and to get an idea of the deconstructionist style of
argument it is worth quoting his commentary at some length:

        Let us be as explicit as possible about what this simple example
        implies…. The experience of pain, it is claimed, causes us to
        discover the pin [his italics] and thus causes the production of
        a cause [my italics]. To deconstruct causality one must operate
        with the notion of cause and apply it to causation itself [p.
        87].
Thus one is "asserting the indispensability of causation while denying
it any rigorous justification" (p. 88). Furthermore,

        the deconstruction reverses the hierarchical opposition of the
        causal scheme. The distinction between cause and effect makes
        the cause an origin, logically and temporally prior. The effect
        is derived, secondary, dependent upon the cause. Without
        exploring the reasons for or the implications of this
        hierarchization, let us note that, working within the
        opposition, the deconstruction upsets the hierarchy by producing
        an exchange of properties. If the effect is what causes the
        cause to become a cause, then the effect, not the cause, should
        be treated as the origin. By showing that the argument which
        elevates cause can be used to favor effect, one uncovers and
        undoes the rhetorical operation responsible for the
        hierarchization and one produces a significant displacement [p.
        88; my italics].
I believe that far from demonstrating the power of deconstruction,
Culler's discussion of this example is a tissue of confusions. Here are
several of the most glaring mistakes.

1. There is nothing whatever in the example to support the view that the
effect "causes the production of a cause" or that the effect "causes the
cause to become a cause." The experience of pain causes us to look for
its cause and thus indirectly causes the discovery of the cause. The
idea that it produces the cause is exactly counter to what the example
actually shows.

2. The word "origin" is being used in two quite distinct senses. If
"origin" means causal origin then the pin is the causal origin of the
pain. If "origin" means epistemic origin, how we go about finding out,
then the experience of pain is the origin of our discovery of its cause.
But it is a simple confusion to conclude from this that there is some
unitary sense of "origin" in which "the effect and not the cause should
be treated as the origin."

3. There isn't any logical hierarchy between cause and effect in the
first place since the two are correlative terms: one is defined in terms
of the other. The OED, for example, defines "cause" as "that which
produces an effect" and it defines "effect" as "something caused or
produced."

4. Contrary to what Culler claims, nothing in the example shows that
causation lacks any "rigorous justification," or that any "significant
displacement" has come about. Our common sense prejudices about
causation deserve careful scrutiny and criticism, but nothing in
Culler's discussion forces any change in our most naive views about
causation."


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On Sat, 2004-10-09 at 14:09, jolly wrote:
> I say chug some cheap american brew and belch:  BON CHANCE, BON RAT
> 
> Searle might join in---
 
(cut in the interest of not exceeding the 10,000 character limit)