Pynchon and postmodernism

[jbor]

on 17/10/04 11:12 AM, Keith McMullen wrote:

>> If it helps, think of it as a hypothesis. If you are certain that
>> there is
>> one single reliable epistemology then it should be a simple task to
>> supply
>> the refutation and the proof.
> 
> Not sure about this logic.
> 
> Also, there is no refutation and proof for the certainty that there is
> NOT a reliable epistemology.

The two negatives in this sentence make it a little ambiguous, but I think
it's more or less the same complaint that Judith Chambers makes about
"applied poststructuralist criticism" in her review of Maltby's and
Berressem's books. 

It's important to keep in mind that deconstruction (which is an interpretive
strategy) and poststructuralism (a movement of thought in the human
sciences) are offered as critique and analysis rather than as some
totalising epistemology. Framing it in terms of a totalising epistemology is
a move usually made by opponents, in order to demonstrate that it is
self-contradictory. Of course, its exponents have already acknowledged this
(e.g. reflexivity, aporia, anti-rationalist etc), and can only shrug their
shoulders. From that point onwards the debate invariably descends into
semantics and ad hominem.

I think if you want to combat the specific or general implications of
poststructuralism/deconstruction/postmodernism you do need to engage with
specific examples. If it can be demonstrated that there is an
epistemological system which holds universally "true" then the critique of
logocentrism flies out the window. However, saying that the hypothesis that
there can be no reliable epistemology is incorrect because it's an
epistemology in itself is an empty semantic move. Coming from the point of
view of someone who believes that there CAN be a reliable epistemology it's
also illogical, if not hypocritical.

best