Snappycrossdresser

[Paul Mackin]

On Sun, 2004-10-17 at 11:33, Paul Nightingale wrote:
> > 
> > What kind of work would deconstructing the supernatural be for a
> > postmodernest? That was something the Enlightenment did and without
> the
> > help of post-structuralism. If P is the kind of postmodernist he is
> > often assumed to be wouldn't he be on the side of at least mildly
> trying
> > to counteract the rationalism of modernism by introducing some modicum
> > of enchantment back into the world?
> > 
> Are you therefore equating something called 'the postmodern' with
> something called 'the premodern'? 

Not equating--things never go back to where they were--but perhaps
recalling what may have been lost, even though it can never be regained
in anything like an earlier form, nor would anyone want that. 

> Given that we can't undo knowledge,
> how then does this version of the postmodern deal with rationalism: is
> it, eg, antirationalist or nonrationalist? 

Neither, but perhaps an antidote for the state of the world after
rationalism got done with it.  (personally I'm a rationalist myself and
was only suggesting what Pynchon might to toying with)


> It seems to me that the
> antifoundationalism that is often characterised as, so to speak,
> fundamental to postmodernist methodologies simply denies the primacy
> given to one kind of rationalism over another. It asks who will get to
> define what is and isn't rational at any given time:

At the risk of interrupting you in mid-sentence I think you have just
indicated something crucial. Foundationalism was defunct well before
post-structuralism came along. The muddle arose in assessing the degree
of the damage inflicted by the latter on rationalism and meaning itself.
Some deconstructionalists seemed to have it that the damage was fatal.
Others couldn't disagree more. They might call that dire approach
neo-positivist.


   
>  as observed here
> many times, Pynchon's work asks how we know something (aka 'how we come
> to occupy the position of a reading subject').

I'll admit I've never really understood you on this. Perhaps I need to
try harder.

>  To define X as (belonging
> to the realm of the) supernatural is simply to deny the knowledge base
> that supports (the allegedly, but by definition, irrational) belief in
> X. As I see it, the supernatural (or even a "modicum of enchantment")
> isn't an ingredient in a postmodern recipe: to define/label something as
> supernatural is to occupy a position defined as rational(ist).
> 

Seems to me it could be part of postmodernism. I thought I might go back
and reread Jameson's little essay on the theory of postmodernism in an
effort to place Pynchon somewhere meaningful. I think I've been assuming
he might be subsummed (partially anyway) into the the first position J
takes up, the anti-modernism, pro-postmodernism stance, in particular
with the populous impulse of which J's examples would be Jencks and
Venturi. One thought might be that Pynchon is the literary equivalent of
postmodern architecture. Tacking a little theological speculation into
the crevices might not be a bad addition. I don't know much about
architecture, however.


More generally, my feeling is that we don't really have a satisfactory
understanding of how language and meaning work. Structuralism was a
start but never really told us much. Post-structuralism was no doubt a
valid enough critique as far as it goes. But how language works is still
mostly in the realm of the unknown, as is the nature of consciousness
itself. IMHO.