NP Re: Semiotics (why a text can just be anything you want it to be)

Sean Mannion third_eye_unmoved at hotmail.com
Sat Dec 17 18:15:28 CST 2005


Sorry 'bout that, just really bad editing on my part. In this instance I am 
concentrating on the idea of illocutionary intention as such an example of 
where an encoder has grounds of control over how the sign is interpreted. If 
the sign is interpreted correctly, then a transmission of perlocutionary 
intention follows, thus transmitting the sign's imperative force.

You're right in this sense, of course -- strictly speaking the author (who I 
would take here to be whatever governing party applies) has no control over 
the behaviour of the reader, but we cannot be in any doubt that the reader 
understands either the intentions of the author or of the meaning of the 
sign, and I'd argue that this is a significant degree of control over the 
way that a reader responds to a sign.

I'm illustrating this to the point to the degree that the above example was 
presented.



cheers,
Sean



>From: jbor at bigpond.com
>To: pynchon-l at waste.org
>Subject: NP Re: Semiotics (why a text can just be anything you want it to 
>be)
>Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 09:45:11 +1100
>
>On 18/12/2005 Sean Mannion wrote:
>
>>if we can say that the intentions of the sign and the shape of a sign's 
>>meaning are recognised by an actor/reader (even if it is just to simply 
>>ignore them), then the original point that an encoder cannot enforce any 
>>significant control over what a decoder does with a sign-vehicle is wrong
>
>Actually, this is quite wrong. The "No Smoking" sign isn't solely 
>descriptive. It's imperative. The author's intention was that the sign 
>would stop smokers from smoking in a vicinity (and, concomitantly, 
>advertise to non-smokers that the venue is smoke-free, augment the 
>directives of staff, comply with government regulations, validate 
>subsequent legal action against transgressors etc), not just that people 
>would read and understand the words. Ultimately, however, the author 
>(interesting to think about who is the actual "author" of the sign here 
>also) of the sign has no *control* over how a particular reader responds -- 
>whether he or she lights up or not, tells others to put out their 
>cigarettes, reports them to a staff member, whether he or she leaves the 
>venue, writes to the authority responsible for the rule, or whether he or 
>she defaces or rips the sign down, or how a staff member or law enforcement 
>officer responds to the sign in a specific context (i.e what the individual 
>reader *does* with the sign). Meaning can't be so conveniently divorced 
>from purpose.
>
>Quite apart from that, spurious recourse to signs and recipes as examples 
>in no way validates a Theory of authorial privilege in the construction of 
>literary meaning.
>
>best
>





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