Semiotics (why a text can't just be anything you want it to be)

John Doe tristero69 at yahoo.com
Sun Dec 18 17:45:52 CST 2005


Sean, you're the only person on this topic that knows
what the fuck he's talking about...I suggest all the
nutless nippleheads steeped in Hip Lit Crit take a
thoughtfull ingestion of everything you wrote; your
points are ( though manufestly much more lucidly
elaborated ) exactly what I've been trying to make
people "see" about what is ACTUALLY going on in their
brainwashed minds when they "read a 'text'"...

Tanks fer da contibution,

Martin of da Bambino Family Crew


--- Joel Katz <mittelwerk at hotmail.com> wrote:

> semiotics, you see, is a very 'strong' language in
> the context of weblists 
> -- while a very 'weak' one in terms of seeing a
> naked breast other than your 
> mother's.
> 
> 
> >From: "Sean Mannion"
> <third_eye_unmoved at hotmail.com>
> >To: pynchon-l at waste.org
> >Subject: Re: Semiotics (why a text can't just be
> anything you want it to 
> >be)
> >Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 21:55:57 +0000
> >
> >"with the division of labor, the person encoding
> the sign would not likely 
> >be present when it is read. The reader may decide
> civil disobedience is 
> >desirable. I might or might not support their
> decision, though I'm not 
> >normally somebody who disregards signs (having
> learned that it's usually 
> >more trouble than it's worth)"
> >
> >This is neither here nor there; the very fact that
> the individual 
> >recognises their own response to the sign as
> 'disobedient' is a tacit 
> >acknowledgment that there is a specific
> interpretation of that sign 
> >intended - and furthermore, this acknowledgment of
> their own response as 
> >opposite of the response required from the sign
> shows an understanding of 
> >both the meaning of that sign and it's connection
> to intention; there is 
> >therefore no dispute regarding either the meaning
> of the sign (and hence 
> >the possibility of meaning itself), or any
> demonstration that authorial 
> >intention is somehow 'priviledged' (the
> actor/reader understands the 
> >intention of the sign well enough simply by
> understanding language to be 
> >able to define their behaviour against it).
> >
> >The introduction of the concept of 'division of
> labour' has no real worth 
> >here. Neither does further example - if we can say
> that the intentions of 
> >the sign and the shape of a sign's meaning are
> recognised by an 
> >actor/reader (even if it is just to simply ignore
> them), then the original 
> >point that an encoder cannot enforce any
> significant control over what a 
> >decoder does with a sign-vehicle is wrong; because
> in at least one 
> >essential way (as above) the encoder's intention is
> being met by the 
> >decoder simply by understanding the use of words.
> >
> >
> >"In fact, could it be that there are 2 main reasons
> why somebody would not 
> >be interested in the meaning intended in a sign? To
> wit, a) they are fonder 
> >of another meaning b) they just do not get the
> meaning (or both)"
> >
> >But a) you'd better have a reasonable justification
> for being 'fonder' of 
> >that other meaning - if that other meaning isn't
> demonstratably contained 
> >within any conventional use of the sign, or if you
> can't establish a 
> >logical and referential chain between this piece of
> linguistic phenomena 
> >and the meaning you've extracted from it, then
> you're really just building 
> >a house of cards. The linguistic object must be
> capable of transmitting the 
> >level of meaning you think is there; so predicating
> the overall meaning of 
> >an entire novel from a handful of obscure reference
> or several pages worth 
> >of prose is going to be considerable hard task. If
> that meaning is there, 
> >and it is that evident, then the likelihood of it
> being transmitted by a 
> >conscious author get considerably higher.
> >b) 'not getting the meaning' is not the synonymous
> with 'not being 
> >interested in the meaning intended in the sign'.
> The former is a lack of 
> >interpretation, the latter is a wilfull
> misinterpretation.
> >
> >
> >"in pictorial form, if between the circle of
> intended meaning, the circle 
> >of attention by the receiver there's no
> intersection subsequent discourse 
> >is an empty circle?"
> >
> >I'm not really all that sure of what you're talking
> about here. I suspect 
> >that you're asking if the range of the receiver
> doesn't intersect with the 
> >range of meaning intended by the author then
> subsequent discourse by the 
> >receiver is meaningless. I can't really add or
> subtract anything to what I 
> >put in that paragraph of my email that this relates
> to in order to make it 
> >any clearer. Iif I am not able to understand the
> meanings of individual 
> >words and propositions of sentences used by an
> encoder, then I am not able 
> >to make any interpretation of the ideas presented
> that would reflect any 
> >kind of meaning.
> >
> >First of all, let's not complicate things by
> introducing a pictorial form - 
> >words will do. I think the main problem is again
> the way that you're 
> >characterising language. By viewing the author's
> range and the receiver's 
> >range as seperate orders that *might* overlap,
> you're missing the point 
> >that they already overlap by the use of a common
> language that has some 
> >form of consensus meaning (whether overt or covert)
> and conventions for 
> >use. This is a first order prequisite for any kind
> of meaning to be debated 
> >in the first place.
> >
> >
> >"I do not know all the conventions, and sometimes
> do not agree with them 
> >(that being a small subset in Pynchon for me,
> unless I am very wrong about 
> >my interpretation)"
> >
> >It's not a matter of whether or not you agree with
> a convention -- if you 
> >recognise it's presence then you have to recognise
> that it's there with 
> >good reason; it has a function to perform,
> >it's application in a text will suggest something
> to us in itself and/or 
> >will point to a larger meaning
> >(p.s. I find it hard to think of how someone saying
> 'down with 
> >stream-of-consciousness narrative!' or 'death to
> intertextual reference!' 
> >would alter either the fact that it's there in the
> text for all to see or 
> >what it contributes to meaning). But again, if you
> admit to the concept of 
> >convention, then you do have to abandon the idea of
> discrediting the 
> >presence of authorial intention. It stops being an
> argument of absolutes 
> >and starts being a argument of scales and degrees,
> and in this case (as 
> >Jbor said earlier in this thread) neither
> opposing-end position of the 
> >argument is tenable. A whole range of people might
> arrive at different 
> >connotations from a single instance of literary
> creation in language or 
> >through convention, but ultimately that instance
> was consciously or 
> >unconsciously chosen because of it's range  -- like
> Pound said, "great 
> >literature is simply language charged with meaning
> to the utmost possible 
> >degree".
> >
> >
> >"Expending the time and energy to read a book is
> indicative of a desire to 
> >participate in that manner, no? Nihilist, rather
> than liberalistic, is what 
> >I would call the rejection of all such control. 
> Yet, the ability to reject 
> >control is important - otherwise, who would dare to
> read "Mein Kampf"?"
> >
> >Firstly, It's not a desire, it's a demand, and the
> necessity of being able 
> >to read demonstrates this.
> >Secondly, no, the premise that "...an encoder is
> ultimately incapable of 
> >enforcing any significant control over what the
> decoder does with a given 
> >sign-vehicle" is liberalistic in the sense that, as
> a 
=== message truncated ===


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