Atdtda22: [43.4i] You have merely undergone, 624

[Paul Nightingale]

[624.16-20] "You must not feel alone in this, Herr Traverse. No! You have
merely undergone a small perturbation of the Co-conscious aggravated by
chloral abuse ..."

According to the OED "co-conscious" was first used by William James in 1903.

The conjunctive relation that has given most trouble to philosophy is the
co-conscious transition, so to call it, by which one experience passes into
another when both belong to the same self. About the facts there is no
question. My experiences and your experiences are 'with' each other in
various external ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours pass into yours in
a way in which yours and mine never pass into one another. Within each of
our personal histories, subject, object, interest and purpose are continuous
or may be continuous. Personal histories are processes of change in time,
and the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced. 'Change'
in this case means continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition. But
continuous transition is one sort of a conjunctive relation; and to be a
radical empiricist means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all
others, for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if a
hole be made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical
fictions pour into our philosophy. The holding fast to this relation means
taking it at its face value, neither less nor more; and to take it at its
face value means first of all to take it just as we feel it, and not to
confuse ourselves with abstract talk about it, involving words that drive us
to invent secondary conceptions in order to neutralize their suggestions and
to make our actual experience again seem rationally possible. 

What I do feel simply when a later moment of my experience succeeds an
earlier one is that though they are two moments, the transition from the one
to the other is continuous. Continuity here is a definite sort of
experience; just as definite as is the discontinuity-experience which I find
it impossible to avoid when I seek to make the transition from an experience
of my own to one of yours. In this latter case I have to get on and off
again, to pass from a thing lived to another thing only conceived, and the
break is positively experienced and noted. Though the functions exerted by
my experience and by yours may be the same (e. g., the same objects known
and the same purposes followed), yet the sameness has in this case to be
ascertained expressly (and often with difficulty and uncertainty) after the
break has been felt; whereas in passing from one of my own moments to
another the sameness of object and interest is unbroken, and both the
earlier and the later experience are of things directly lived. 

From: William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, Longmans, Green, 1912,
47-49.

Cf. Merle's take on film, "contemplating the strange relation these moving
pictures had with Time, not strange maybe so much as tricky, for it all
depended on fooling the eye ..." etc (451).