Math as God

[Page]

Thanks, Jordan. You are correct. LW did consider the unsayable to be mystical (T L-p 6.45). But it is a very particular sense of mysticism. I am not sure how to read your last comment, but if you mean that the mystical exists whether or not we can sensibly express it, I am not sure you are correct. If it were sayable, it would be "in the world," and necessarily not mystical. Or do you mean something else by "express it?" I do think LW is important to TRP, possibly the later W. more than the earlier W. 

Anyone have any ideas? I'm struggling.

Page

----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jordan Harp 
  To: pynchon-l at waste.org 
  Sent: Monday, November 19, 2007 1:52 PM
  Subject: Re: Math as God


  You're right here, but the Tractatus does evince Wittgenstein's mysticism.  It's in a proposition just prior that says something like "There are things that can be known that cannot be said." That is the mystical, and it's there whether or not one can sensible express it. 

  Jordan


  On 11/18/07, Page <page at quesnelbc.com> wrote:
    Thanks for the nice summary of Hegel. However, Schuyler (your reference
    below) makes a mistake in his reading of the Tractatus. He refers to
    proposition 7--the final proposition of the Tractatus, "Whereof one cannot 
    speak, thereof one must remain silent"--and claims it evinces Wittgenstein's
    mysticism. We cannot speak about things like aesthetics or ethics because
    sentences one cannot map on to the world of facts--proposition 1 of the 
    Tractatus, "The world is everything that is the case"--is, literally
    nonsense (non-sense). The nonsense is based on Wittgenstein's logical
    atomism, not on his purported mysticism.

    If you really want to make your brain hurt, contemplate (the fact that) one 
    of the propositions of the Tractatus (sorry, I do not have the reference in
    front of me) is the claim that anyone who understands the Tractatus will
    realize that every proposition in it is false.

    [Two stories about Wittgenstein. At some point Russell asked G.E. Moore what
    he thought of Wittgenstein's intelligence. Moore replied, "I think he is
    [roughly] exceedingly bright. Russell: Why? Moore: Because he is the only
    student at my lectures who looks puzzled; On another occasion Russell asked 
    Moore if he thought L.W. was a genius. Moore replied that he did but that
    Cambridge ought to give him a Ph.D. anyway.]

    Page

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: < robinlandseadel at comcast.net>
    To: <pynchon-l at waste.org>
    Sent: Friday, November 16, 2007 3:09 PM
    Subject: Math as God


    > Please bear with me as I explain Hegel's philosophy. 
    > Excuse me, stumbled on this while searching for an answer to:
    > "Well, What Dooooooo you believe in---MR.. RUSSELL!?!?!?
    >
    > RUSSELL, WITTGENSTEIN, AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
    > Grant Schuyler 
    >
    > Please bear with me as I explain Hegel's philosophy.
    >
    > Hegel thought that Geist (German, "mind" or "spirit"; thought of not only
    > as a mental faculty or abstract force but almost as a person) had advanced 
    > through the successive cultures of history growing more and more
    > conscious, self-conscious, and rational. This process had culminated in
    > Geist's realization as what Hegel called the Absolute Idea (Geist in 
    > another guise, perhaps as God). God or the Absolute Idea had realized
    > itself as the best contemporary, that is, the best 1820s European,
    > philosophy and political culture. By implication, the philosophers, 
    > philosophy, and political and cultural systems of Hegel's time were the
    > best that had ever existed, the realization of complete liberty, and the
    > goal of all history. And the philosophic method of the philosophers of 
    > Hegel's time -- reason (Verstand), was somehow superior (it was implied)
    > to the method of thinking used by ordinary people and scientists. In
    > contrast to philosophical reason, these lesser beings used the (by impl! 
    > ication
    > inferior) mental faculty most philosophers since Locke call understanding
    > (Vernunft).
    >
    > "A tidy system it was," said Russell in 1959. "Once we [Moore and himself] 
    > applied rigorous logic to Hegel, he became fragmentary and puerile."
    >
    > Having rejected Hegelian absolute idealism, Russell looked for a new basis
    > on which to have the absolutely certain knowledge of the world that Hegel 
    > had believed his philosophic system delivered.
    >
    > Russell thought that one might discover the basis of certainty in
    > mathematics
    >
    > http://home.ca.inter.net/~grantsky/wittgenstein.html
    >
    >
    >
    > --
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    > 18/11/2007 5:15 PM
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    >






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