ATDTDA 724-747 Italy

[Glenn Scheper]

Part 6 of 9.

A highly imaginative flufancial exposition by Seismit Doda, who announced a 
surplus of 2,400,000, paved the way fora Grist Tax Reduction Bil],which Cairoli 
had taken over from the Depretis programme. The Chamber, though convinced of the 
danger of this reform, the perils of which were incisively demonstrated by 
Sella, voted by an overwhelming majority for an immediate reduction of the 
impost by onefourth, and its complete abolition within four years. Cairolis 
premiership was, however, destined to be cut short by an atte~npt made upon the 
kings life in November 1878, during a royal visit to Naples, by a miscreant 
named Passanante. In spite of the courage and presence of mind of Cairoli, who 
received the dagger thrust intended for the king, public and parliamentary 
indignation found expression in a vote which compelled the ministry to resign.

The treaty of San Stefano had led to the convocation of the Berlin Congress, and 
though Count Corti was by no means ignorant of the rumours concerning secret 
agreements between Germany, Austria Con~ss. and Russia, and Germany, Austria and 
Great Britain, he scarcely seemed alive to the possible effect of such 
agreements upon Italy. Replying on the 9th of April 1878 to interpellations by 
Visconti-Venosta and other deputies on the impending Congress of Berlin, he 
appeared free from apprehension lest I Italy, isolated, might find herself face 
to face with a change of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and declared 
that in the event of serious complications Italy would be too much sought after 
rather than too niuch forgotten. The policy of Italy in the congress, he added, 
would be to support the interests of the young Balkan nations.

Wrapped in this optimism, Count Corti proceeded, as first Italian delegate, to 
Berlin, where he found himself obliged, on the 28th of May, to join reluctantly 
in sanctioning the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the 8th of 
July the revelation of the Anglo-Ottoman treaty for the British occupatiofi of 
Cyprus took the congress by surprise. Italy, who had made the integrity of the 
Ottoman empire a cardinal point of her Eastern policy, felt this change of the 
Mediterranean status quo the more severely inasmuch as, in order not to strain 
her relations with France, she had turned a deaf ear to Austrian, Russian and 
German advice to prepare to occupy Tunisia in agreement with Great Britain. 
Count Corti had no suspicion that France had adopted a less disinterested 
attitude towards similar suggestions from Bismarck and Lord Salisbury. He 
therefore returned from the German capital with clean but empty hands, a plight 
which found marked disfavour in Italian eyes, and stimulated anti-Austrian 
Irredentism.

Ever since Venetia had been ceded by ~ Austria to the emperor Napoleon, and by 
him to Italy, ~ after the war of 1866, secret revolutionary committees had been 
formed in the northern Italian provinces to prepare for the redemption of Trent 
and Trieste. For twelve years these committees had remained comparatively 
inactive, but in 1878 the presence of the ex-Garibaldian Cairoli at the head of 
the government, and popular dissatisfaction at the spread of Austrian sway on 
the Adriatic, encouraged them to begin a series of noisy demonstrations. On the 
evening of the signature at Berlin of the clause sanctioning the Austrian 
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an Irredentist riot took place before the 
Austrian consulate at Venice. The Italian government attached little importance 
to the occurrence, and believed that a diplomatic expression of regret would 
suffice to allay Austrian irritation. Austria, indeed, might easily have been 
persuaded to ignore the Irredentist agitation, had not the equivocal attitude of 
Cairoli and Zanardelli cast doubt upon the sincerity of their regret.

The fall of Cairoli, and the formation of a second Depretis cabinet in 1878, 
brought no substantial change in the attitude of the government towards 
Irredentism, nor was the position improved by the return of Cairoli to power in 
the following July. Though aware of Bismarcks hostility towards Italy, of the 
conclusion of the Austro-German alliance of 1879, and of the undisguised 
ill-will of France, Italy not only made no attempt to crush an agitation as 
mischievous as it was futile, but granted a state funeral to General Avezzana, 
president of the Irredentist League. In Bonghis mordant phrase, the foreign 
policy of Italy during this period may be said to have been characterized by 
enormous intellectual impotence counterbalanced by equal moral feebleness. Home 
affairs were scarcely better managed. Parliament had degenerated into a 
congeries of personal groups, whose members were eager only to overturn cabinets 
in order to secure power for the leaders and official favors for themselves.

The administration of finance was as chaotic as the condition of parliament. The 
2,400,000 surplus announced by Seismit Doda proved to be a myth. Nevertheless 
Magliani, who succeeded Seismit Doda, had neither the perspicacity nor the 
courage to resist the abolition of the grist tax.

Notwithstanding this prospective loss of revenue, parliament showed great 
reluctance to vote any new impost, although hardly a year previously it had 
sanctioned (3oth June 1879) Depretiss scheme for spending during the next 
eighteen years 43,200,000 in building 5000 kilometres of railway, an expenditure 
not wholly justified by the importance of the lines, and useful principally as a 
source of electoral sops for the constituents of ministerial deputies.

In no modern country is error or incompetence on the part of administrators more 
swiftly followed by retribution. than in Italy; both at home and abroad she is 
hemmed in ~ / by political and economic conditions which leave un/s a. little 
margin for folly, and still less for mental and moral insufficiency, such as had 
been displayed by the Left. Nemesis came in the spring of 1881, in the form of 
the French invasion of Tunisia. Guiccioli, the biographer of Sella, observes 
that Italian politicians find it especially hard to resist the temptation of 
appearing crafty. The men of the Left believed themselves subtle enough to 
retain the confidence and esteem of all foreign powers while coquetting at home 
with elements which some of these powers had reason to regard with suspicion. 
Italy, in constant danger from France, needed good relations with Austria and 
Germany, but could only attain the goodwill of the former by firm treatment of 
the revolutionary Irredentist agitation, and of the latter by clear 
demonstration of Italian will and ability to cope with all anti-monarchical 
forces.

Depretis and Cairoli did neither the one nor the other. Hence, when opportunity 
offered firmly to establish Italian predominance in the central Mediterranean by 
an occupation of Tunisia, they found themselves deprived of those confidential 
relations with the central powers, and even with Great Britain, which might have 
enabled them to use the opportunity to full advantage. The conduct of Italy in 
declining the suggestions received from Count Andrssy and General Ignatiev on 
the eve of the RussoTurkish Warthat Italy should seek compensation in Tunisia 
for the extension of Austrian sway in the Balkansand in subsequently rejecting 
the German suggestion to come to an arrangement with Great Britain for the 
occupation of Tunisia as compensation for the British occupation of Cyprus, was 
certainly due to fear lest an attempt on Tunisia should lead to a war with 
France, for which Italy knew herself to be totally unprepared. This very 
unpreparedness, however, rendered still less excusable her treatment of the 
Irredentist agitation, which brought her within a hairs-breadth of a conflict 
with Austria.

Had the blow thus struck at Italian influence in the Mediterranean induced 
politicians to sink for a while their personal differences and to unite in 
presenting a firm front to foreign nations, the crisis in regard to Tunisia 
might not have been wholly unproductive of good. Unfortunately, on this, as on 
other critical occasions, deputies proved themselves incapable of common effort 
to promote general welfare. While excitement over Tunisia was at its height, but 
before the situation was irretrievably compromised to the disadvantage of Italy, 
Cairoli had been compelled to resign by a vote of want of confidence in the 
Chamber. The only politician capable of dealing adequately with the situation 
was Sella, leader of the Right, and to him the crown appealed. The faction 
leaders of the Left, though divided by personal jealousies and mutually 
incompatible ambitions, agreed that the worst evil which could befall Italy 
would be the return of the Right to power, and conspired to preclude the 
possibility of a Sella cabinet. An attempt by Depretis to recompose the Cairoli 
ministry proved fruitless, and after eleven precious days had been lost, King 
Humbert was obliged, on the i9th of April 1881, to refuse Cairolis resignation.

The political conditions of Europe favored the realization of Italian desires. 
Growing rivalry between Austria and Russia in the Balkans rendered the 
continuance of the League of the Three Emperors a practical impossibility. The 
AustroGerman alliance of 1879 formally guaranteed the territory of the 
contracting parties, but Austria could not count upon effectual help from 
Germany in case of war, since Russian attack upon Austria would certainly have 
been followed by French attack upon Germany. As in 1869-1870, it therefore 
became a matter of the highest importance for Austria to retain full disposal of 
all her troops by assuring herself against Italian aggression.

it became imperative for Bismarck to assure himself that Italy would not be 
enticed into a Francophil attitude by any concession Gambetta might offer. As 
usual when dealing with weaker nations, the German chancellor resorted to 
intimidation. He not only re-established the Prussian legation to the Vatican, 
suppressed since 1874, and omitted from the imperial message to the Reichstag 
(17th November 1881) all reference to King Humberts visit to Vienna, but took 
occasion on the n9th of November to refer to Italy as a country tottering on the 
verge of revolution, and opened in the German semi-official press ~ campaign in 
favor of an international guarantee for the independence of the papacy.

Bismarck nevertheless continued his press campaign in favor of the temporal 
power until, reassured by Gambettas decision to send Roustan back to Tunis to 
complete as minister the anti-Italian programme begun as consul, he finally 
instructed his organs to emphasize the common interests of Germany and Italy on 
the occasion of the opening of the St Gothard tunnel. But the effect of the 
German press campaign could not be effaced in a day. At the new years reception 
of deputies King Humbert aroused enthusiasm by a significant remark that Italy 
intended to remain mistress in her own house; while Mancirfi addressed to Count 
de Launay, Italian ambassador in Berlin, a haughty despatch, repudiating the 
supposition that the pope might (as Bismarckian emissaries had suggested to the 
Vatican) obtain abroad greater spiritual liberty than in Rome, or that closer 
relations between Italy and Germany, such as were required by the interests and 
aspirations of the two countries, could be made in any way contingent upon a 
modification of Italian freedom of action in regard to home affairs.

Yours truly,
Glenn Scheper
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