V-2 - Chapter 9 - The world is all that the case is

[Robin Landseadel]

		I think I'd like to go back home
		And take it easy
		There's a woman that I'd like to get to know
		Living there

		Everybody seems to wonder
		What it's like down here
		I gotta get away from this day-to-day running around,
		Everybody knows this is nowhere.


		Mondaugen remained up in his turret, working diligently at his
	code, taking occasional breaks to stand out alone on the roof and
	wonder if he would ever escape a curse that seemed to have been
	put on him one Fasching: to become surrounded by decadence no
	matter what exotic region, north or south, he wandered into.

Somehow White flight from the inner city comes to mind, someone's  
personal demons following them wherever they go, things one realizes  
one can't honestly continue to blame on "them."

	 It couldn't be only Munich, he decided at some point: nor even the  
fact
	of economic depression. This was a soul-depression which must
	surely infest Europe as it infested this house.

Is the statement "The World is all that is the case" an attempt to  
drive away "irrational" forces, the encroachment of the intellectual  
wilderness? And does it drive away angels as well as demons? Ariel as  
well as Caliban? Is that the source of the "Soul-Depression?" The De- 
Enchantment of the world?

		One night he was awakened by a disheveled Weissmann, who
	could scarcely stand still for excitement. "Look, look," he cried,
	waving a sheet of paper under Mondaugen's slowly blinking eyes.
	Mondaugen read:

		DIGEWOELDTIMSTEALALENSWFASNDEURFUALRLIKST

		"So," he yawned.

		"It's your code. I've broken it. See: I remove every third letter
	and obtain: GODMEANTNUURK. This rearranged spells Kurt
	Mondaugen."

		"Well, then," Mondaugen snarled. "And who the hell told you
	you could read my mail."

		''The remainder of the message," Weissmann continued, "now
	reads: DIEWELTISTALLESWASDERFALLIST."

		''The world is all that the case is," Mondaugen said. ''I've heard
	that somewhere before." A smile began to spread. "Weissmann, for
	shame. Resign your commission, you're in the wrong line of work.
	You'd make a fine engineer: you've been finagling."

		"I swear," Weissmann protested, hurt.

One way I look at this scene is --  "Louis, I think this is the  
beginning of a beautiful friendship" -- as Rick walks into the end  
titles. It's like W & M are sharing a college joke, a little  
sophomoric prank, a little social glue to carry them over to the next  
novel, which is already in progress. The engineer and the warlord team  
up here, apparently agreeing on one thing:


	2. The Early Wittgenstein
	2.1 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
		Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was first published in German
	in 1921, and then translated — by C.K. Ogden, with F. P. Ramsey's
	help — and published in English in 1922. It was later re-translated
	by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. Coming out of Wittgenstein's
	Notebooks, written in 1914-16, and correspondence with Russell,
	Moore and Keynes, and showing Schopenhauerian and other
	cultural influences, it evolved as a continuation of and reaction to
	Russell and Frege's conceptions of logic and language. Bertrand
	Russell supplied an introduction to the book claiming that it  
"certainly
	deserves … to be considered an important event in the philosophical
	world." It is fascinating to note that Wittgenstein thought little of
	Russell's introduction, claiming that it was riddled with
	misunderstandings. Later interpretations have attempted to unearth
	the surprising tensions between the introduction and the rest of the
	book (or between Russell's reading of Wittgenstein and
	Wittgenstein's own self-assessment) — usually harping on Russell's
	appropriation of Wittgenstein for his own agenda.

		The Tractatus's structure purports to be representative of its
	internal essence. It is constructed around seven basic propositions,
	numbered by the natural numbers 1-7, with all other paragraphs in
	the text numbered by decimal expansions so that, e.g., paragraph
	1.1 is (supposed to be) a further elaboration on proposition 1, 1.22 is
	an elaboration of 1.2, and so on.

	The seven basic propositions are:


	Ogden translation:

	1. The world is everything that is the case.
	2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
	3. The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
	4. The thought is the significant proposition.
	5. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.
	    (An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
	6. The general form of truth-function is [p, ξ, N(ξ)].
	    This is the general form of proposition.
	7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.


	Pears/McGuinness translation:

	1. The world is all that is the case.
	2. What is the case — a fact — is the existence of states of  
affairs.
	3. A logical picture of facts is a thought.
	4. A thought is a proposition with sense.
	5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
	    (An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
	6. The general form of a truth-function is [p, ξ, N(ξ)].
            This is the general form of a proposition.
	7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.


		Clearly, the book addresses the central problems of philosophy
	which deal with the world, thought and language, and presents a
	"solution" (as Wittgenstein terms it) of these problems which is
	grounded in logic and in the nature of representation. The world is
	represented by thought, which is a proposition with sense, since
	they all — world, thought, and proposition — share the same logical
	form. Hence, the thought and the proposition can be pictures of the
	facts.

		Starting with a seeming metaphysics, Wittgenstein sees the
	world as consisting of facts (1), rather than the traditional,  
atomistic
	conception of a world made up of objects. Facts are existent states
	of affairs (2) and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of
	objects. Objects can fit together in various determinate ways. They
	may have various properties and may hold diverse relations to one
	another. Objects combine with one another according to their logical,
	internal properties. That is to say, an object's internal properties
	determine the possibilities of its combination with other objects; this
	is its logical form. Thus, states of affairs, being comprised of  
objects
	in combination, are inherently complex. The states of affairs which
	do exist could have been otherwise. This means that states of affairs
	are either actual (existent) or possible. It is the totality of  
states of
	affairs — actual and possible — that makes up the whole of reality.
	The world is precisely those states of affairs which do exist.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/

Now, I won't deny that this is all a bit above and beyond my pay  
grade, but intransigent collector of pointless trivia that I am, can't  
help but note the passing presence of "Mad Dog" Bertie in this  
footnote that I've attached to our endless diatribe. There's the  
suggestion of some major intellectual battleground shared by Russell  
and Wittgenstein, though it smells a lot like questioning what the  
meaning of the word "is" is, just like Slick Willie did so many moons  
ago.

Anyone out there with more philosophical kama sutra oil for this  
little lovefest is welcome to join in, I'm going back a few pages and  
watch civilians get bombed.

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	It's too dark
	To put the keys
	In my ignition,

	And the mornin' sun is yet
	To climb my hood ornament.

	But before too long I might
	See those flashing red lights
	Look out, mama,
	'cause I'm comin' home tonight.