William Pynchon v. Charles Stearns, an excerpt of the court decision

[Robin Landseadel]

I am not sure if "We" has read or is familiar with Pynchon v. Stearns.  
In light of "The House of the Seven Gables" it appears that this bit  
of historical background applies directly to the content of Hawthorn's  
novel.

 From what I've read, Hawthorne was really making fictional atonement  
for his ancestors bad deeds in 'THOTSG,' replacing the family name  
with "Pyncheon." The portrait was so unflattering that Hawthorne wrote  
a letter of apology to the Pynchon family. However, there are so many  
resonances with Pynchon v. Stearns, I felt it valuable to give a taste  
of what that court case was all about. Note that the Pynchon v.  
Stearns ruling leads to modern day "Waste" laws, which have a direct  
and ultimately toxic effect on property development in the U.S. of A.  
It also has a direct relation to "The Crying of Lot 49."

There is a link at the bottom of the page for those interested in  
further exploration.
===================================================

William Pynchon Vs. Charles Stearns.

A tenant for years demised to the remainderman, to have and to hold  
during the term, reserving to the lessor the right to erect buildings  
on the demised premises, without molestation, the lessee yielding and  
paying a yearly rent, and engaging to keep the fences in repair and to  
pay all taxes; "it being understood that in case the lessor should use  
any part of the land for buildings and their appendages, a  
proportionate amount shall be deducted from the rent which the lessee  
is to pay." Held, that the term merged in the remainder, and that the  
lessee could not maintain an action of waste against the lessor.

In this country, no act of a tenant amounts to waste, unless it is or  
may be prejudicial to the inheritance, or to those who are entitled to  
the reversion or remainder.

A tenant does not commit waste by opening a way over meadow land, for  
his convenience, and digging drains by the side thereof, and carrying  
on earth for the purpose of making the way passable; or by erecting  
houses on such land, where there were none before, and digging cellars  
for them, and raising the ground about them; or by carrying quantities  
of earth upon the low and wet parts of such land; if the occasional  
breaking up of such land is a judicious and suitable mode of  
cultivating it, and if the cost of levelling would be small, and if,  
after deducting such cost, the land over which the way was made, and  
on which the houses were built, would, in case of their removal, be  
equally (or more) valuable for agricultural purposes, including  
ploughing and laying it down to grass, as if it had not thus been  
changed and built upon.

This was an action of waste, in which the plaintiff alleged that the  
defendant held two parcels of land in Springfield, as tenant for life  
— the plaintiff having the next estate of inheritance— and had  
committed sundry acts of waste thereon. Trial before Shaw, C. J. whose  
report thereof was as follows :

The plaintiff gave in evidence the last will of Edward Pynchon, proved  
May 30th 1830, by which he devised the two parcels of land described  
in the plaintiff's declaration, viz. Pond Meadow and Great Meadow, to  
his wife, Susan Pynchon, so long as she should remain his widow,  
remainder to his brother, the plaintiff, in fee: Also an assignment of  
the same parcels, by said Susan, to the defendant, for her life,  
reserving a yearly rent of thirty dollars. There was evidence tending  
to show that these parcels of land adjoined each other, and together  
extended from Main Street, easterly, to and beyond Chestnut Street.

The plaintiff relied on the four following acts of waste. 1st. That  
the defendant had destroyed fences, or permitted them to fall down or  
decay, by means of which there was danger that the abuttals and  
landmarks of the estate would be lost, or rendered doubtful, to the  
damage of the inheritance. 2d. That the defendant had laid out a  
street, or open way, across the land, from one public highway to  
another, viz. from Main Street to Chestnut Street, by which the  
character of the land was changed, to the injury of the inheritance,  
and by which there was danger that the rights of the inheritance might  
be lost or impaired. 3. That in order to fit that part of the land, so  
laid out for a street, for travel, the defendant had ploughed furrows  
or dug drains along the side thereof, and drawn in large quantities of  
earth, to raise the same, and thereby had so changed the surface, that  
it ceased to be meadow and pasture land. 4th. That the defendant had  
erected several wooden houses on the land, and had, for that purpose,  
caused some portion of the soil to be thrown out from under the sites  
of those houses, in order to form cellars under them, and to raise the  
land around them; and had thus changed the character and condition of  
the land.

As to all that part of the land, nearest to Main Street, called Pond  
Meadow, the defendant denied the right of tho plaintiff to maintain  
this action, on the ground that the plaintiff, on the 13th of July  
1839, had taken of the defendant a lease thereof during the life of  
the aforesaid Susan Pynchon, so that the defendant had ceased to be  
tenant for life, and the plaintiff had become tenant for life,  
entitled to the possession; and that the relation of tenant for life  
and remainderman no longer subsisted between the parties. The lease  
was given in evidence, [a copy of which is set forth in the next case,  
post. 313,] and the execution thereof admitted. The judge sustained  
the defendant's objection, and instructed the jury that, as to that  
part of the land, the action could not be maintained.

As to the alleged acts of waste, on the other parcel of land, the  
defendant made several answers: As to removal or decay of fences, and  
the loss of boundaries, he denied the fact; and the evidence was left  
to the jury, with directions not excepted to. As to the other alleged  
acts of waste, the defendant denied that they amounted to waste. And  
the jury were instructed that the opening of a way through the land,  
from one highway to another, was not waste. As to the subverting of  
the soil, and carrying on earth to raise it, and as to the plaintiff's  
digging out of a part of the soil for cellars of houses, and raising  
the soil about the houses, evidence was offered, and, though objected  
to, was admitted, tending to show that it was a useful and beneficial  
mode of husbandry, on similar meadow ground, occasionally to break it  
up and cultivate it, and again lay it down to grass; that as the soil  
in question was low and wet, the carrying of earth thereon would  
benefit it, and make it worth more for agricultural purposes, than if  
it had not been done; that it would cost but little to level it and  
fit it for cultivation. Whereupon the jury were instructed, that if  
breaking up meadow land, occasionally, was. a judicious and suitable  
mode of husbandry, the changing of the surface of the soil from  
meadow, by breaking up and cultivating it, was not waste; that if the  
cost of levelling would be small, and if, after deducting such cost,  
the land, over which the road had been built, and on which the houses  
had been erected, would, in case of their removal, be equally (or  
more) valuable for agricultural purposes, including ploughing and  
cultivation, and fitting and laying it down to grass, as if it had not  
thus been changed and built upon, then the laying out and filling up  
of the road, and removing the soil, for the building of houses, and  
the erection of houses thereon, did not constitute waste.

The jury were also requested to say, (if they should find that the  
estate would be of less value for agricultural purposes, supposing the  
buildings to be all removed,) whether it would, on the whole, be  
equally or more valuable to the owner of the inheritance, on the  
hypothesis of the buildings' remaining thereon at the determination of  
the life estate.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and, on being inquired  
of, stated that they were of opinion, that the estate would be worth  
more to the owner of the inheritance, for agricultural purposes, even  
if the houses were taken off, than if the acts of the defendant, in  
raising and filling up the road, and digging the soil for building,  
had not been done.

Verdict to be set aside, and a new trial granted, if any of the  
foregoing instructions, unfavorable to the plaintiff, were wrong.

D. Cummins 6f F. Cummins, for the plaintiff. The change of meadow into  
arable land, or of arable land into meadow or pasture, is waste. So of  
the alteration of the character of land, though it become more  
valuable by the alteration. The course of husbandry is thereby  
changed, and also the evidence of the estate. Co. Lit. 53 b. Dyer, 37  
a. 2 Bl. Com. 282. 3 Wooddeson, 28, 29. Lord Darcy v.Pynchon v.  
Stearns. . .

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