TRTR, this section: On the deep dissing of Reason in this chpater

[Mark Kohut]

David Hume, in A Treatise of Human Nature, rejects this traditional characterisation of action and its evaluation, offering a remarkable theory in response. He defends the views that the ends or goals of our actions in all cases are given by our “passions,” not by reason, and that the practical role of reason is to figure out how to fulfil these goals. He makes the astounding declaration that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” Subsequently, Hume also rejects the analysis of morality in terms of rationality, and argues that our distinctions between virtue and vice are based on shared sentiments or feelings of approval or disapproval we experience toward persons’ characters.
From this: http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=1941
 
In Which Hume is contrasted with Kant, the philosopher of impersonal reasons for actions.......and, the philosopher who has been called by some
the foundational philosopher of Protestantism in many ways, the Protestantism so svagely found wanting in THE RECOGNITIONS. 
 
Intellectual coherence. 
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