The Bombing War

[Fiona Shnapple]

Who can ever win a war. Period. The air power of the us should not be
underestimated, either. The goal, it can be argued, is not to win a war,
but to instill terror. The us does that better than anyone still. And the
objective of bombing is not to effectively defeat an enemy, but to gain
advantage, often by keeping everyone guessing.

On Thursday, October 17, 2013, rich wrote:

> bombings, drones, what have you is one of the few bullets left for the US
> and other powers in this day of insurgencies and proxy, guerrilla wars.
> avoiding ground troops,  but as you say the efficacy of such operations is
> highly dubious. who can ever win a war solely with airpower?
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Tom Beshear <tbeshear at att.net> wrote:
>
> **
> Our military STILL has too high an opinion of bombing to force compliance,
> demoralise an opponent, etc.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Monte Davis
> *To:* 'rich' ; pynchon-l at waste.org
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 17, 2013 11:28 AM
> *Subject:* RE: The Bombing War
>
>  The Overy book is the best wrap-up to date of what has gradually become
> accepted among historians since we (and the UK) got over our Twelve
> O'Clock High <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0041996/>: that “strategic”
> bombing of Germany simply didn’t make much difference to the war, and was
> pursued mostly because (1) interwar doctrine had grotesquely exaggerated
> how accurate and effective it would be, (2) the UK and US had already
> invested in large heavy-bomber forces, and (3) there was no other way of
> striking directly at Germany from the summer of 1940 to the winter of 1945,
> and it was thought psychologically/politically necessary to be doing *
> something*.****
>
> ** **
>
> The same factors were at work in Germany’s use of the  V1 and V2, once its
> armies were in retreat and its remaining aircraft were defending them or
> the  homeland. And of course, once you accept that Allied bombing of
> Germany was as much “terror bombing” as Guernica or Rotterdam or the Blitz
> or Stalingrad had been (simply because none of them were accurate enough to
> be anything else), the V-weapons of 1944-45 are still new and scary – but
> basically more of the same, at least until their technological descendants
> get nuclear warheads..****
>
> ** **
>
> The reviewer notes the roots in British colonial campaigns. Given more
> recent events, it’s good snarky fun to recall Secretary for War Churchill
> championing bombing of Iraqi rebels in 1920 (and recommending poison gas).
> In  fact, though, the experience of the static, bloody Western Front in WWI
> – and the desire not to repeat it -- was much more important. The Germans
> emphasized fast-moving armor and tactical air to win before trench lines
> could solidify, while the UK (and to some extent the US) hoped to “leap
> over” battlefronts and knock out the factories and transport that supplied
> the armies.****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* owner-pynchon-l at waste.org [mailto:owner-pynchon-l at waste.org] *On
> Behalf Of *rich
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 17, 2013 9:49 AM
> *To:* “pynchon-l at waste.org“
> *Sub*
>
>
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