Discovering Literature: Romantics and Victorians
Kai Frederik Lorentzen
lorentzen at hotmail.de
Sun May 18 03:10:58 CDT 2014
On 17.05.2014 16:31, Monte Davis wrote:
> "The whole Romantic sham, Bernard! It's what happened to the
> Enlightenment, isn't it? A century of intellectual rigour turned in on
> itself. A mind in chaos suspected of genius. In a setting of cheap
> thrills and false emotion."
>
> Hannah, in Stoppard's "Acadia"I
>
> On May 17, 2014 5:26 AM, "Dave Monroe" <against.the.dave at gmail.com
> <mailto:against.the.dave at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> http://www.bl.uk/romantics-and-victorians
>
> http://www.openculture.com/2014/05/the-british-library-puts-online-1200-romantic-and-victorian-literary-treasures.html
>
>
"One of the theses advanced by Carl Schmitt in his *Political
Romanticism
<http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=6760&ttype=2>*
(MIT Press, 1986, tr. Guy Oakes; German original first appeared in 1919
as *Politische Romantik*, 2nd ed. 1925) is that romanticism is a form of
occasionalism. As Schmitt puts it, “Romanticism is subjectified
occasionalism.” (PR 17) In this set of notes I attempt to interpret and
develop this thought. I will take the ball and run with it, but I won’t
quit the field of Schmitt’s text. Before proceeding, a preliminary point
about metaphysics needs to be made.
1. Metaphysical commitment is unavoidable. (PR 17) Every person assumes
some metaphysical stance or other, tacitly or expressly, whether or not
he is conscious of assuming it. That is to say: he takes something or
other to be ultimate or absolute or foundational or finally
authoritative. For some this is God, but for others it is “humanity, the
nation, the individual, historical development, or even life as life for
its own sake, in its complete emptiness and mere dynamic.” (PR 17)
Secularization is the process whereby God is replaced by some such
mundane ersatz. But the replacement of God by the individual, say, or by
the revolution, does not alter the fact that something is being taken as
absolute, as an ultimate focus and locus of meaning. The only question
is whether this is something transcendent or something immanent (worldly).
Someone who attempts to reject every absolute soon finds himself
affirming one willy-nilly. To say, “I accept nothing whatsoever as
absolute!” is to accept as absolute the rejection all absolutes. After
all, a relativized rejection of all absolutes would be one that
countenances circumstances in which absolutes would be affirmed. To
claim that all is a matter of perception or perspective, that there are
no absolute truths or absolute moral standards, is to posit some
principle of perspectivism or relativism as an absolute principle. A
relativized or perspectivized perspectivism undercuts itself.
2. Romanticism is a metaphysical attitude that places the individual
subject at the center. The romantic does not free himself from divine
control in order to submit to some temporal power such as the state; his
attempt is to free himself from every external power. Romanticism puts
the individual human being in the place of God.
3. God stands to the world as creator to creature. Divine creating is
causing in a preeminent sense, a causing to exist, a bringing into being
/ex nihilo/. But the human individual is in no position to create the
world out of nothing. At best, he can operate upon the world and change
it in minor ways. He can bring about changes in what exists, but cannot
bring about what exists. But even this is hard work and so does not
interest the romantic. You see, this fellow is a bit of a slacker. To
operate upon the world effectively, to cause real changes in it, one
must understand its causal structure, its nomological order and
intrinsic intelligibility. One must study hard science. I cannot
manipulate worldly realities for my use and benefit unless I understand
their intrinsic properties. To work upon the world, I must understand it
workings (/Wirkungen/ = effects) and these have causes.
The romantic, however, substitutes /occasio/ for /causa/. (PR 16-17). He
does not want to work upon the world. That would require submitting to
the world and its laws. The romantic would rather play God and create
something /ex nihilo/. That’s easier, more fun, and more ‘creative.’ He
must be creative at all costs, and original to boot! Originality is a
high value among the romantically inclined just so long as it is
understood that he is the /fons et origo/. The source that interests him
is not rooted in reality but rooted in him. He takes originality to be
connected with novelty. What he wants is the new, not the true. Truth
implies correspondence to a pre-given reality possessing an intrinsic
intelligibility demanding his intellectual submission. The romantic,
however, prefers dominance over submission. But he would dominate the
world, not by working on it – which is hard work and requires an
understanding of the world’s intrinsic workings – but by telling
stories, painting pictures, and the like, with the world as the mere
occasion of the telling and the painting, etc.
So the romantic subject treats the world as an occasion, an opportunity,
for his romantic productivity. For the romantic, things cease to be what
they are, substantial mind-independent unities, acting and being acted
upon in a world governed by causal laws; they become instead starting
points for endless novels. (PR 20)
It helps to recall that ‘romantic’ refers us back to /Roman/, novel. The
romantic, then, takes worldly data as mere occasions for his
fictionalizing and poeticizing. Incapable of making the world, he makes
up stories about it and enjoys the experiences he conjures up by so
doing. Fabricating and fictionalizing, the romantic finds an ersatz for
/creatio ex nihilo/.
4. Schmitt’s idea, then, is that to understand romanticism one must
understand it as a species of occasionalism. But what exactly is
occasionalism? Classically, occasionalism is a theory of causation in
which secondary causes – causes in the natural world – are mere
occasions of divine activity. It is a theory according to which God is
the only genuine or productive cause and every thing else that looks
like a cause is but an ‘occasional cause,’ a mere condition of the
exercise of divine activity. Suppose a bolt of lightning hits a tree and
the tree explodes into flame. If you believe in the efficacy of natural
events, then you say that the bolt of lightning *caused* the tree to
burn. But if you are an occasionalist like the Muslim al-Ghazali
<http://www.epistemelinks.com/Main/Philosophers.aspx?PhilCode=Algh>or
the Christian Malebranche
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/malebranche/>, you interpret the same
appearances in a different way: you say that there are two
spatiotemporally contiguous events with one occuring before the other,
but that there is no worldly connection between the two other than
spatiotemporal contiguity and temporal successiveness. Thus there is no
causing on the world’s ‘horizontal plane’ that links the two events. The
exploding into flame is not brought about by the bolt of lightning
contacting the tree; the former is brought about by God ‘vertically’ on
the occasion of the lightning strike.
Classically, then, occasionalism is at once both a theory of causation
and a theory of how God is related to the world: God commands all the
power and the world commands none. Theologically, this fits nicely with
Islam’s emphasis on the radical transcendence, unity, and omnipotence of
Allah. Omnipotence here means not only that God can do everything that
is (metaphysically) possible to do; but also that God actually does
everything that gets done. All doing is divine doing, appearances
notwithstanding.
Schmitt’s idea can be understood in part as follows. The romantic adopts
a metaphysical stance in which the individual human subject is the
center, the final authority, the ultimate arbiter of the good, the true,
and the beautiful. The individual subject takes over the role of God.
The romantic subject must be creative and original at all costs. Since
he cannot create the world /ex nihilo/, he creates fictions /ex nihilo/.
He withdraws aesthetically from the world and its demands and enters a
private world in which he is the “master builder in the cathedral of his
own personality.” (PR 20) Worldly realities are thus demoted to the
status of mere occasions of his romantic productivity."
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/12/carl-schmitt-on-romanticism-as-a-form-of-occasionalism.html
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