We Are All Ukrainians Now

[David Morris]

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/07/we-are-all-ukrainians-now-a77915

We Are All Ukrainians Now
Helping Ukraine defeat Russian aggression helps the West reach its security
goals.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has united Western states and societies in
outrage. But after a hundred days of war, some analysts now strike a
different note. They argue
<https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-russia-war-nato-eu-us-alliance-solidarity/>
that
Western and Ukrainian interests differ, and that the West should choose the
former. Wary of moral fervor, they warn
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/>
against
getting swept up “in the mood of the moment.” Instead, they argue that a
quick end to the war is imperative. They advocate a settlement they believe
will restore stability by satisfying the major powers — and that Ukraine
should be pressured
<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-war-russia-putin-end/629890/>
to
accept this.

This position has the virtue of clarity and honesty. After all, the first
duty of governments, including Western ones, is to protect the country. The
West has prioritized national interests over moral concerns many times —
most recently, in abandoning its two-decade commitment to Afghanistan. If
more support for Ukraine poses serious threats to Western security, then
seeking a compromise peace would be a rational, if ruthless, policy.


The real question, then, is not whether the West should incur risks for the
moral cause of supporting Ukraine. It is whether supporting Ukraine is in
the West’s own interests. What are the risks and benefits of doing so?

The overriding concern of those who want to accommodate Russia rather than
increase support for Ukraine is fear of nuclear war. But almost everyone
who has studied this closely judges the risk to be low and deterrable
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/31/nuclear-risks-over-ukraine-are-slim-real-heres-what-nato-can-do/>.
If Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is driven by his concern for legacy, he is
unlikely to contemplate actions that could lead to the end of Russian
history.


Avoiding escalation is never an absolute priority. If it were, the West
should not try to thwart the ambitions of any nuclear adversary, and would
have behaved very differently in the many crises of the Cold War. The risks
of escalation must be weighed against the consequences of avoiding it.
While the former have been much discussed, the latter have not. What are
the implications for Western interests of agreeing a compromise beneficial
to Russia and pressing Ukraine to accept it?

First, it would leave Russia stronger. If Russia secures control over the
whole of the Donbas, it will likely annex it as it did Crimea in 2014 and
present these gains as irreversible. Control of Ukraine’s southern
coastline would give Russia a chokehold over Ukraine and its exports
<https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/ukraines-rising-role-grain-exports-complicates-impact-crisis-2022-01-26/>,
leaving it well placed to force concessions
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-26/putin-ties-grain-exports-to-demand-that-sanctions-on-russia-go?sref=fCrVhgAM>
on
other issues, including the lifting of sanctions. A compromise peace would
also ease the unprecedented strain on Putin’s regime by allowing it to
claim victory at home.

Second, it would neither satisfy Russia nor stabilize the region. There is
no sign that Russia has abandoned the goal of subjugating all of Ukraine.
Kremlin sources have reiterated
<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/05/27/we-ll-grind-them-down-in-the-end>
this,
as has General Vladimir Shamanov, a big beast
<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/563/> in military politics who
played a brutal role in both Chechen wars and was chair of the State Duma
defense committee until last December. He recently stated
<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5369169> that Ukraine’s “demilitarization”
would take 5-10 years under a regime “not soiled with these neo-Nazis.”
There is no prospect of a genuine settlement while the Putin regime remains
intact — only a breathing space before Russia resumes aggression.

Third, Russia would draw the lesson that it can beat the West in a contest
of resolve by exploiting the threat of nuclear escalation. Since the Putin
regime now sees itself locked in a war against the West, it will be
encouraged to use this threat in other times and places. Other states, too,
would conclude that the West can no longer respond effectively to flagrant
violations of basic norms. This would embolden the West’s adversaries,
alarm its allies, and *erode international order*.
What is the alternative? Accommodationists are right that a long war
carries risks. The way to end it more quickly is not to compromise with
Russia but to defeat it. This means, at a minimum, that Russia is no better
off in any respect, significantly worse off overall, and unable ever to
attempt another invasion of Ukraine. This is turn requires that the West
escalate its military support to Ukraine and its sanctions on Russia, and
quickly.

“The West faces an inescapable choice: either a negotiated outcome that
strengthens Russia, weakens Ukraine, harms Western security and undermines
the rules-based order; or a fully-resourced commitment to help Ukraine
defeat Russia’s invasion.”