Ukraine War Analysis

David Morris fqmorris at gmail.com
Mon Mar 21 12:18:37 UTC 2022


https://twitter.com/kofmanmichael/status/1505596135867662336?s=21

Thoughts on the current state of the war and where things might be heading.
About 2 weeks ago I suggested that Russian forces have ~3 weeks before
combat effectiveness becomes increasingly exhausted. I think that's
generally been right, but we're not quite there yet. Thread. 1/

The war has broken down into what could imperfectly be called three fronts,
and Russian advances have stalled out along two of them. Around Kyiv RU
forces are trying to consolidate positions, but I don't think they can make
an assault on the city. Kyiv is far from encircled. 2/

In the southwest there was a fitful advance around Mykolaiv towards Odesa
that had little chance of success given the paucity of forces employed.
This has been set back by a UKR counter offensive. I expect little progress
there for either side and more of a shifting front. 3/

This means we're not going to see an amphibious landing at Odesa, or a
Russian march to Transnistria, anytime soon (if ever). At least not in this
phase of the war. However, Russian advances towards Kryvyi Rih do threaten
UKR lines of communications west of the river. 4/

The area to watch in the coming week is the Russian attempt to encircle UKR
forces in the JFO. A slowly progressing pincer movement from the north and
south (using Nathan Ruser's map). This is where UKR forces could be in a
precarious position. 5/

Since inception the Russian military effort has lacked focus. Too few
forces, on too many axes of advance, some competing with each other. I
think in the next two weeks they are likely to concentrate on UKR forces in
the east and the battle for Mariupol. 6/

I suspect unrealistic political aims & timetables have driven an unsound
mil strategy. Kyiv, Odesa, Donbas, etc. There's a desperation to show
progress. Increasingly it looks as though the Russian mil is focusing on
the Donbas, and maintaining along other fronts. 7/

Depreciating combat effectiveness sets the stage for either a significant
operational pause along most fronts or a ceasefire. This does not
necessarily imply a political settlement, but a period to reorganize,
consolidate, and resupply. An end to the first chapter of this war. 8/

I think Moscow is searching for something it can use to declare a victory.
Taking the Donbas, and having leverage to attain concessions from Kyiv is
probably what they're looking to accomplish at this point. This is at best
a guess. 9/

Much depends on what Putin knows and thinks about the course of the war,
and whether he feels pressured at home. Our impression of the war & reality
on the ground might be quite different from his. Its not clear he
understands what the prospects for Russian success are. 10/

Naturally there is uncertainty about the state of Russian armed forces
along different parts of the battlefield, its bound to be uneven, and we
know even less about the state of Ukrainian forces. 11/

The next chapter in this war could prove even uglier as it will likely turn
into a war of attrition, with greater bombardment of civilian areas. Here I
am more concerned about the future evolution of this conflict, despite the
remarkably poor Russian performance thus far. 12/

Generally, I don't see how any military success can add up to something
that constitutes a political victory for Moscow. If there is another phase,
Russian forces will probably try to compensate for poor performance by
inflicting greater destruction. 13/


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