CoL49 Group Reading ch3 35 “among other things”

[Michael Bailey]

JT wrote:
“ Nicholas 2 !( inaccurate history Nick 2 didn’t become czar until
1896*)sends Russian fleet to SF Bay Area  to “keep Britain and France from
(among other things) intervening on the side of the Confederacy.    What
were the other things and are they relevant to story?”


Lower down in same article - elaborate elaboration -

(Tl/dr: Polish revolt against Russia drew French support from Napoleon III,
France enlisted England & Austria to “extract concessions” from Russia;
Russian fleet threat to English merchant shipping made them think twice)

(Better summary, from the article:
As we have seen, Russia launched this naval expedition primarily in her own
interest, to avoid a threatening war in which she would have to face a
superior enemy while her western provinces were in open rebellion and other
borderlands ready to revolt at the first opportune moment. We must keep in
mind, however, that the United States and Russia were traditionally on
friendly terms. As America alone had stood by Russia in 1854 during the
Crimean War, nine years later Russia was the only great power siding with
the Federal Government and quite openly expressing its friendship, although
Prussia and a few smaller European countries were also sympathetic with the
North.)


Long, detailed quote:

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1935/may/visit-russian-squadrons-1863

All this happened, as stated before, in the year 1863. Northern shipping at
that time was being severely ravaged by the commerce raiders of the
Confederacy. The exploits of these raiders equaled, if not surpassed, both
in adroitness and damages inflicted upon the Northern merchant marine of
the United States, the activities of the well-known German raider *Emden *and
her sister-ships during the World War. It has been recorded that by
November, 1864, more than 1,300 vessels flying the Union flag had been sunk
by Southern raiders, the net proceeds arising from the sale of condemned
prize property amounting to over 13 million dollars.

If we keep in mind that the Northern merchant fleet on the high seas had
been reduced during the Civil War from about 2½ million tons to a little
over 1½ million tons and was being continuously harassed by successful
attacks of the *Alabama,**Florida, *and other Confederate ships, the
arrival in New York and San Francisco of cruiser units belonging to a
friendly nation was naturally an event of great importance.

As far as the Union was concerned the political situation presented itself
as follows: England was supporting the South more or less openly by
allowing British shipyards to build ironclads and cruisers for the
Confederacy, half-heartedly interfering with the delivery of these ships
only upon the most strenuous though tactful remonstrances from the United
States Ambassador, Charles Francis Adams, whose protests, however, were not
always successful.

Let us now examine more closely the motives that prompted Czar Alexander II
to dispatch his fleets to New York and San Francisco.

In January, 1863, the latest Polish revolt had broken out openly. Due to
the intensive propaganda carried on for some time by the numerous Polish
*émigrés *in various European capitals, the rebellion quickly gained the
support of public opinion throughout Europe. In France especially the
Polish patriots were in high hopes. The adventurer-emperor Napoleon III was
favorably inclined toward their cause. His Minister of State at that time
was Count Walewski, a son of the Emperor's august uncle, Napoleon I and the
Polish Countess Walewska, who was naturally pro-Polish. Moreover it was a
political tradition of the second empire to further Polish national
aspirations in reverence to the memory of the Great Corsican who created
the independent Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

Napoleon III succeeded in persuading Great Britain and Austria to join him
in a diplomatic demonstration against Russia on the Polish question. Both
of his allies deemed the moment opportune to exact some advantages from the
Czar while the latter was preoccupied by the disturbances on his western
frontier. Prussia refused to become a party of the coalition and Bismarck,
in defiance of the German Parliament and public opinion, even offered the
Czar military assistance to quell the Polish insurrection. The Allies,
France, Austria, and England, entered into a lengthy exchange of notes with
the Russian government and the political situation became alarmingly tense.
Czar Alexander II, with open rebellion in his Polish and Lithuanian
provinces, had also to reckon with the possibility that Finland and the
Caucasus would rise in revolt at the first opportunity. Such an opportunity
would easily present itself with the arrival of joint Anglo-French fleets
and landing detachments both in the Baltic and Black Seas.

The demands of the Allies became increasingly aggressive. Finally Napoleon
III dispatched a sharp note to Russia demanding immediate recognition of
Poland as an independent country. This the Russian government could not
grant but it realized at the same time that a refusal of the French demand
meant only one thing—war. The crisis approached rapidly. Russia faced a
desperate situation. Her Navy, recently reorganized, was absolutely
insignificant in comparison with the fleets of the two largest naval powers
of Europe. In case of war the seacoasts of her far-flung Empire, in the
Baltic and Black Seas and the Far East, were entirely defenseless and
exposed to blockade, bombardment, and landing of troops by her enemies. Her
only chance lay in having England quit, as in such an event the French
fleet alone would not be sufficiently large to bother Russia on all her
maritime frontiers. Thus Russia would not be forced to scatter her Army in
order to defend her various seaboard provinces. Besides, Austria would
think twice before attacking the innumerable host of "Holy Russia"
concentrated to repulse any invasion, especially as Emperor Francis Joseph
knew that Prussia would not hesitate to come to the assistance of the Czar.

Russia's problem reduced itself to the means of keeping Great Britain out
of an alliance with France and Austria. A simple and at the same time
brilliant solution was found by Admiral N. K. Krabbe, at that time in
command of the Russian Navy.

The dashing exploits of the *Alabama *and other Confederate raiders had
conclusively demonstrated that a comparatively small number of well-armed
and equipped cruisers could cause havoc among the merchant marine of their
enemy, even if their adversary had a much superior naval force. As more
than 75 per cent of the British merchant fleet at the time of the Civil War
consisted of sailing vessels, the sudden appearance of about a dozen
Russian steam-propelled cruisers both in the Atlantic and Pacific would
greatly alarm England. These cruisers, which were able to sail under canvas
when things were slow and get up steam and easily overhaul any prize they
sighted, could still evade on the huge expanse of the two oceans any
possible dragnet of the British Navy. They had a great advantage over the
German raiders of the World War inasmuch as they were not dependent to such
an extent on coaling stations, but could cruise under sail for practically
an unlimited amount of time if necessary.

The vision of a dozen of such cruiser raiders ravaging British merchantmen
on all the Seven Seas was enough to strike fear to the heart of even the
staunchest Tory, because, after all, "Britannia rules the waves" only for
her commerce, and the balance sheet of an English merchant is almost as
important to him as the Magna Charta.

Fully realizing all this, Admiral Krabbe submitted to Czar Alexander II his
daring plan.

The Russian Navy at that time commanded only about twelve vessels which
were up to date and fit for cruiser duty. He proposed that two cruiser
squadrons of approximately equal strength should be formed and dispatched
to Union ports, one from St. Petersburg and the other from Vladivostok,
with orders to arrive simultaneously in New York and San Francisco,
respectively. The success of the whole plan depended entirely upon its
being carried out both swiftly and secretly. Both fleets were outfitted for
the crossing and subsequent cruiser duty on the high seas in less than a
month. The entire personnel of the expedition was selected from unmarried
men.

The squadron that left St. Petersburg for New York was the most important
one and it was, therefore, especially necessary for this unit not to
divulge its movements as, in view of the straitened relations of Russia
with England and France, these two powers would undoubtedly prevent the
squadron from leaving the Baltic Sea. Orders were, therefore, issued to
Admiral Lessofsky, commanding this squadron, to have his ships leave
Kronstadt (the naval base of St. Petersburg) singly, as if to relieve ships
on patrol duty off the coast of Courland. Near the island of Bornholm, two
colliers awaited them and the squadron replenished its bunkers. In order to
hide his movements Admiral Lessofsky then proceeded through the seldom used
passage of the Little Belt, avoiding the main trade route of the Big Belt
where he would have been in danger of encountering British scouting
vessels. Once out of the Baltic Sea he set his course straight north and
leaving the British Isles far south turned westward for New York.

In the meantime Admiral Popoff, in command of the other squadron, had left
Vladivostok.

The successful synchronization of the movements of the two squadrons
starting from points a continent apart and with the distance to their
respective ports of destination varying many thousands of miles was a
remarkable achievement for those days, especially if we realize that at
that time there were no telegraph or railroad communications between St.
Petersburg and Vladivostok and the order to Admiral Popoff had to be
dispatched by special courier who traveled many weeks in order to deliver
it. The order to Popoff contained among others the instruction to place his
ships at the disposal of the Federal admiral should the English or French
fleet attack the city of San Francisco but to remain neutral as long as the
bombardment was concentrated on the military fortifications only.

A surprised Europe learned one day from arriving American newspapers that a
Russian cruiser squadron had cast anchor in the harbor of New York and that
a few days later another Russian fleet had passed the Golden Gate. These
newspapers also brought accounts of the enthusiastic reception of the
Russians by the American people.

The impression created by these events on the governments and public
opinion of the three Allies was tremendous. It now appeared that while the
two mightiest naval powers of the time were threatening the coasts of the
Russian Empire, the Czar had turned the tables on them and his fleet was
menacing England and France from the rear. Having evaded their
watchfulness, the Russian squadrons now occupied, especially with regard to
England, such a commanding and invulnerable position that the Allies were
forced to change their policy abruptly. All speculations as to advantages
of actions against Russia's unprotected coasts momentarily faded before the
possibility of the colossal losses which the Russians could inflict upon
the sea trade and colonies of England and France. Russia's game was won.

The first power of the coalition to sense the unsteadiness of the
situation—the possibility of England withdrawing from the Alliance—was
Austria. She not only hastened to compromise with Russia but expressed her
willingness to co-operate in the quelling of the Polish revolution. A sharp
note which England already had dispatched to St. Petersburg was hurriedly
stopped in Berlin and soon England abstained completely from further
interfering with Russian affairs. Left alone, Napoleon III tried to "save
his face" by suggesting a congress to discuss the Polish question but this
proposal found no response either in Austria or England. A few weeks later
Alexander II issued an Imperial Rescript regarding foreign interference in
the Polish situation couched in such phrases that had it been published
before the arrival of the Russian fleet in America, it would have meant
immediate war with the Allies. Nothing happened now, however.

Both Russian squadrons stayed in America for almost a year and were
recalled only after the Polish rebellion had been definitely crushed and
when the ultimate success of the North was clearly visible and any danger
of England's intervention in the Civil War had vanished.

After the end of the Civil War, the American government, learning of the
attempt on the life of Czar Alexander II sent to St. Petersburg a special
naval detachment consisting of the monitor *Miantonomoh *and steamer
*Augusta *with a delegation to congratulate the Emperor on his deliverance
from danger and to express to Russia the appreciation of the United States
for the help Russia rendered to preserve the unity of the American people
by sending her Beet to America.

The question, whether England's entry into the war on the side of the
Confederacy at this critical moment of the struggle would have been crucial
to the North is a matter of speculation for authorities on military
operations. It is undisputable, however, that it would have created a most
precarious situation for the Union Government and seriously jeopardized its
chances for victory.

It was, of course, for various reasons that England decided to remain
neutral, but the presence of Russian cruisers both in the Atlantic and
Pacific played undoubtedly a major part in influencing British statesmen to
adopt that policy.

As we have seen, Russia launched this naval expedition primarily in her own
interest, to avoid a threatening war in which she would have to face a
superior enemy while her western provinces were in open rebellion and other
borderlands ready to revolt at the first opportune moment. We must keep in
mind, however, that the United States and Russia were traditionally on
friendly terms. As America alone had stood by Russia in 1854 during the
Crimean War, nine years later Russia was the only great power siding with
the Federal Government and quite openly expressing its friendship, although
Prussia and a few smaller European countries were also sympathetic with the
North.

The services Russia thus rendered the United States undoubtedly influenced
Congress in 1867 to agree to the purchase of Alaska upon request from Czar
Alexander II. Alaska at that time was considered a barren wasteland.