2

2. Being and Time

Throughout his philosophical career, Martin Heidegger has argued that Western philosophy has erred in the way it has brought Being to light. Like the works of traditional philosophers, his Being and Time consistently describes the philosophical quest as one which depends upon illumination and vision. For example, Heidegger explains that one must interrogate one’s everyday conception of Being in order to discover its true ontological meaning by stating, “This ‘presupposing’ of Being has rather the character of taking a look at it beforehand, so that in the light of it the entities presented to us get provisionally articulated in their Being”^{^[1]} In this and many other statements, Heidegger defines the researcher as the one who looks and the object of his research as something which is limited by the light in which it is viewed. According to Heidegger, all viewpoints, all sources of illumination, and all phenomena are limited by their finitude.^{^[2]} However, by “clarifying” the “obscuration”^{^[3]} imposed upon a phenomenon, one can grasp its finitude authentically. Heidegger bases his philosophical methodology on his own interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology as a continuation of Greek thought. He explains that, for the Greeks, “‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the fainomenon or ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light - what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with ta onta (beings.)”^{^[4]} This preliminary methodological statement already contains the kernel of Heidegger’s critique of traditional ontology. Typically, philosophers such as Plato have distinguished the momentary appearances of a being from an invisible essence^{^[5]} which enables it to exist. Against this, Heidegger suggests that the Being of a being depends upon the way it visibly manifests itself in the light of Being. He explains that just as phenomena can show themselves as what they are, they can also show themselves as what they are not, as semblances. That is, a phenomenon can become obscured by misunderstandings such that it can no longer be seen properly. Having described the first half of the word “phenomenology,” Heidegger turns to the second. Heidegger asserts that the Greeks defined the discourse of logoV (logos) as apofainesaV (apophanasis,) a process which lets something be seen. Through this interpretation of logos, Heidegger posits all verbal discourse, especially philosophical discourse, as serving a visual function. Taken together, Heidegger defines his phenomenological method as one which clears the veils from semblances in order “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”^{^[6]}

In Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to bring to light the most primordial phenomenon, Dasein. Heidegger explains that Being should not be posited as a transcendental substance which subsists outside of human existence. Rather, he insists that human beings are Dasein, existing literally as the There [Da] where Being [Sein] occurs, where the temporal destiny of the world is enacted. Heidegger’s effort to shed light upon human existence derives from his understanding of Dasein as the Lichtung for Being. The German term “Lichtung” translates into English as “clearing,” in the sense of a clearing in the middle of a forest. Heidegger draws upon this definition especially in later writings such as his Holzweges (“ways through the woods”), when he describes the thinker as one who finds a path through the forest. Furthermore, one creates a clearing in a forest so that one can inhabit that space. Therefore, the term Lichtung seems to be correlated with Heidegger’s description of Dasein as one who dwells in Being and as one who produces a region for dwelling. Lastly, Heidegger exploits the lexical relationship between Lichtung and the term for light, Licht. Heidegger states, “To say that it is ‘illuminated’ means that as Being-in-the-world, it is cleared in itself, not through any other being, but in such a way that it is the clearing [Lichtung.]”^{^[7]} In this statement, Heidegger asserts that Dasein’s capacity to grasp itself and its world through vision does not emanate from an external source. Rather, the light which gives Dasein the possibility to do so derives from Dasein’s own character as the cleared space in which the duration of Being manifests itself. If Dasein, as the There of Being, exists as light, this would seem to suggest that Being itself is the production of light. Although, in his later works, Heidegger seems to equate the process of Truth-as-uncovering with Being, Being and Time does not yet specify the relationship which obtains between Being and light.

By locating light within Dasein, Heidegger opposes the traditional philosophical conception of truth. Western philosophers have tended to ground truth in an transcendental source of light. For example, Plato, in the Republic, argues that everyday entities derive their truth from ideas just like objects owe their visibility to the luminosity of the sun.^{^[8]} In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes argues that the natural light and the benevolent omnipotence of God provide a guarantee that an isolated subject can acquire certain knowledge about objects. Heidegger severely criticizes these models of truth for radically separating the components of truth. In particular, he argues against the notion that truth arises from the transcendental agreement which connects the true assertion of a subject with a true objective fact. Against this tradition, Heidegger argues that philosophical truth depends upon the way that Dasein, as the Lichtung of Being, discloses its own light. Heidegger states, “In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially ‘true.’”^{^[9]} More directly, Heidegger states, “Because the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein.”^{^[10]} Rather than subsisting as a transcendental quality, Heidegger asserts that Dasein produces the truth of its There through the way that it exists in its There. Dasein uncovers entities according to the way that it involves itself in the world. For example, only because a Dasein approaches the matter which collects in its belly button as lint can it ever make a true statement such as “there is lint in my belly button.” Not only does Dasein establish the truth of entities through this process of uncovering, Dasein discloses the truth of its own existence through the manner in which it approaches this existence.

In addition to arguing that Dasein exists as the only entity in which Being manifests itself, Heidegger further asserts that it is the only one which has the capacity to understand Being. Just as disclosure provides a source of light for Dasein and perhaps for Being itself, this activity of understanding acts as the ground of vision. Heidegger explains, “In its projective character, understanding goes to make up existentially what we call Dasein’s “sight.” ... [The expression ‘sight’] corresponds to the “clearedness” which we took as characterizing the disclosedness of the “there.” In giving an existential signification to “sight,” we have merely drawn upon the peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets beings which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in themselves.”^{^[11]} Just as Heidegger follows traditional philosophers by grounding truth in light, he similarly asserts that the self establishes all of its relationships with the world through sight. Opposing the spectatorial tradition, Heidegger contends that the existential capacity of understanding does not merely observe beings which independently subsist in the world. Rather, Dasein always directs its vision back at its own disclosedness. In the above citation, Heidegger states that Dasein’s vision “corresponds” to its disclosedness, but does not specify the nature of this correspondence. However, he also explains, “With the disclosedness of the “there,” this sight is existentially; and Dasein is this sight equiprimordially...” ^{^[12]} This seems to suggest that, for Heidegger, Dasein’s vision is existentially equivalent to the light in which it can see. Like Aristotle who proposed that knowledge was produced from the unity of the knower, the knowing, and the known, Heidegger describes truth as something which is produced through a knowing by a knower who is also the known. This conception of truth and understanding grounds Heidegger’s phenomenological methodology. Because Heidegger, as a Dasein, is a source of the light of disclosure and can light up the truth through understanding, he can question the true meaning of Being and of Dasein. He can bring the Being of Dasein to light precisely because Dasein exists as light.

Heidegger’s most important deviation from the spectatorial tradition derives from the correlation he always draws between Dasein’s vision and its self-assertion. Throughout the history of Western philosophy, many — if not all — thinkers have correlated knowledge and power. For example, many of the arguments in the Republic rest upon the parallels which Plato draws between the individual faculty of reason and political sovereignty. Similarly, Descartes’ effort to secure a stable foundation for thought seems to be driven by his desire to overcome the external contingencies which threaten his knowledge with impotence. Although these philosophers implicitly associate knowledge and power, most of them also argue that the quest for truth is an almost spiritual activity in which the knower detaches itself from worldly struggles for power. Heidegger’s epistemological paradigm, however, seems to follow Nietzsche’s correlation of perspectives and wills to power by intimately connecting the truth and the power of the individual Dasein.^{^[13]} In contrast to traditional epistemology which attempts to posit an external source of light, Heidegger argues that Dasein’s self-illumination, its disclosedness, acts as the medium where truth is established, where phenomena manifest themselves, and ultimately where the activity of Being itself takes place. Dasein clarifies or obscures its disclosedness through the way that it develops its understanding of itself. Since Descartes, philosophy has discussed understanding as a process through which an isolated knower achieves its awareness of the world external to it. Whereas the Cartesian model defines understanding as the activity of a detached, if not disinterested, spectator, Heidegger defines it as the way in which Dasein engages and asserts itself in the world. Heidegger defies Cartesian epistemology by defining understanding as the way in which Dasein cares for the possible ways that it can exist, its potentiality-for-Being. He explains, “Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of.”^{^[14]} Understanding is not merely one activity among many, but rather the foundation for all of Dasein’s activities. For Heidegger, Dasein’s understanding of its possibilities is the very basis of its existence and the most primordial characterization of its Being. “Possibility as an existentiale is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically”^{^[15]}

The language which Heidegger uses when he discusses understanding demonstrates the connection which he makes between knowledge and power. Throughout Being and Time, his usage of visual metaphors tends to double with terminology connoting a virile thrust or grasp. In the quote cited above, Heidegger states, “In its projective character, understanding goes to make up existentially what we call Dasein’s “sight.””^{^[16]} The spectatorial paradigm posits a viewer who observes phenomena from a detached perspective. In contrast, Heidegger asserts that understanding acts as an engaged vision which “projects” [Entwerfen] or “throws” [werfen] the possibilities of Dasein into the future. Through this understanding, Dasein asserts its power in and over the world, existing for-the-sake-of its own potentiality-for-Being, giving it the freedom to choose its own Being. Heidegger characterizes Dasein’s existence as the past, present, and future temporality of its self-projection. He states, “Any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities.” In addition to describing understanding as projection, Heidegger discusses it as a grasp. According to Heidegger, Dasein grasps the possibilities it projects and projects the possibilities it grasps. As with projection, Heidegger explicitly assimilates vision and this grasp. Whereas traditional philosophers tend to describe the self’s relation to the world as a visual perspective, Heidegger’s term for Dasein’s relationship towards Being, comportment [Verhalten, from halten, to hold,] suggests that this visual orientation doubles as a virile grasp which appropriates what it sees. Furthermore, Heidegger states, “The idea of grasping and explicating phenomena in a way which is ‘original’ and ‘intuitive’ is directly opposed to the naiveté of a haphazard, ‘immediate,’ and unreflective ‘beholding.’”^{^[17]} In this statement, Heidegger directly contrasts the understanding which grasps with the visual paradigm of Cartesian epistemology. Authentic Dasein does not stand back to observe phenomena, but rather engages itself in the possibilities which it discloses to itself. By seizing these possibilities in its own manner and projecting itself upon them, Dasein brings its ownmost potentiality-for-Being to light. Heidegger asserts, “The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence we call “transparency.” We choose this term to designate ‘knowledge of the Self;’ in a sense which is well understood so as to indicate that here it is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the “Self,” but rather of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing so with understanding.”^{^[18]} Against Descartes, Heidegger insists that selfhood should not be considered an Archimedian point of certainty or an Albertinian point of perspective. Rather, Dasein’s existence articulates itself through the manifold relationships it constitutes.

Because Dasein receives the disclosure of its possibilities from the throw [wurf] of its projection [entwurf], it experiences this self-disclosure as its thrownness [Geworfenheit] in its There. Whereas Heidegger defines understanding as a seizure of possibilities, he states that a thrown state of mind “assails” [uberfallen]^{^[19]} Dasein. Whereas Heidegger describes projection as Dasein’s virile grasp, he consistently describes thrownness as Dasein’s existential submission or surrender to the world. Heidegger explains this submission in his discussion of the moods which reveal Dasein’s thrownness. “Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us.”^{^[20]} In thrownness, Dasein becomes receptive to the possibilities which it discloses to itself. Just as Dasein asserts its thrust towards its future through its self-projection, it receives this thrust submissively as its having-been-thrown in the past into a factical set of circumstances. As a state of surrender which opens Dasein to influences, thrownness presents Dasein with the possibility of either affirming the potency of its own projections or succumbing and becoming utterly lost in its absorption in the world.

Heidegger’s analysis of thrownness as a existential condition of receptivity rather than assertiveness seems to be correlated with his description of it as a source of darkness. Although thrownness discloses the Being of Dasein in a certain light, an impenetrable shadow surrounds this light. He explains “In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be”^{^[21]} In contrast to his descriptions of understanding, Heidegger here discusses thrownness in the passive voice. Through this existential condition, Dasein receives the imperative of its own existence which it must accept. Beyond this bare fact, Dasein can not divine what the source of this existence might be. Heidegger continues, “The pure ‘that it is’ shows itself, but the “whence” and the “whither” remain in darkness.”^{^[22]} Therefore, the passiveness of thrownness seems to disclose the limit of Dasein’s capacity to visually understand Being. Heidegger asserts that Dasein does not perceive its own mood, but rather finds itself in a mood.^{^[23]} Not only does thrownness deny Dasein of its visual agency, this condition subjects it to the gaze of the world. Heidegger explains, “The mood brings Dasein before the ‘that-it-is’ of its ‘there,’ which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma.”^{^[24]}

Along with the detached viewer, the spectatorial model posited the world as an objective, subsistent reality for the knower to contemplate. Therefore, Heidegger’s notion that understanding does not merely observe the world, but rather involves Dasein in it, requires that he rethink the Being of this world. Heidegger explains that Dasein approaches the world of its thrown There through the concern which it feels for the entities manifested in this There. He states, “The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly it is encountered — as equipment.”^{^[25]} This statement demonstrates how Heidegger’s critique of traditional epistemology correlates with his novel approach to ontology. Against the notion that entities exist independently as things-in-themselves or through the transcendental forms which ground their Being, Heidegger asserts that the existence of entities is defined through and as Dasein’s access to them. “The kind of Being which equipment possesses — in which it manifests itself in its own right — we call “readiness-to-hand””^{^[26]} According to Heidegger, Dasein approaches entities as “ready-to-hand”, as already referred to the power of its grasp. A modality of visual understanding, circumspection, guides Dasein’s seizure of the Being of entities. Heidegger explains, “[Using and manipulating things] has its own kind of sight by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the ‘in-order-to.’ And the sight which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection [Umsicht.]”^{^[27]} Through the vision of circumspection, Dasein subordinates these entities to the function which they can serve. Dasein discloses these ready-to-hand entities by letting them be involved in its world as things which it can use for-the-sake-of realizing its own potentiality-for-Being. For example, Dasein frees the existence of a door because this portal already refers to Dasein’s capacity to go through it. Furthermore, Heidegger explains that Dasein does not only perceive isolated pieces of equipment, but rather sees how all entities are referred towards a totality of tools which ultimately refer to their serviceability for Dasein. Because the appearance of entities ultimately depends upon how Dasein has projected its understanding of its possibilities, Heidegger defines the Being of the totality of the world as that which Dasein can seize for its own purposes

Heidegger explains that Dasein can grasp this world through circumspection because it has already disclosed this world through its interpretation. Heidegger explains that interpretation is the underlying character of understanding itself. Dasein articulates its understanding of its thrown condition through its interpretation of its There. Heidegger discusses interpretation using the terminology both of vision and of the grasp of power. According to Heidegger, interpretation is grounded upon a threefold structure of a fore-having, a fore-seeing, and a fore-conception which appropriates, views, and grasps the interpreted entity in advance. Similarly, he states, “As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities. This Being-towards-possibilities which understands is itself a potentiality for Being and it is so because of the way these possibilities, as disclosed, exert their counter-thrust upon Dasein ... This development of understanding we call “interpretation.””^{^[28]} Through interpretation, Dasein appropriates the possibilities which have been disclosed to it by receiving the thrust of its thrownness in order to project itself, by using its submission to the world in order to promote its own self-assertion. Heidegger similarly explains, “To say that “circumspection discovers” means that the ‘world’ which has already been understood comes to be interpreted. The ready-to-hand comes explicitly into the sight which understands.”^{^[29]} By stating that this world has already been understood, Heidegger implies that the disclosed light which grants Dasein the possibility of understanding has itself been projected by a previous understanding. Heidegger explains how interpretations light up the world of concern by establishing signs. He states, “The peculiar character of signs as equipment becomes especially clear in ‘establishing a sign.’ This activity is performed in circumspective fore-sight out of which it arises and which requires that it be possible for one’s particular environment to announce itself for circumspection at any time by means of something ready-to-hand and that this possibility itself should be ready-to-hand.”^{^[30]} The disclosure of Dasein’s thrown world of circumspection depends upon the way that it has projected its interpretation of the world. Dasein’s foresight sets up signs which function as ready-to-hand pointers which let other ready-to-hand entities become accessible to the grasp and vision of Dasein.

Dasein’s proximity to the world of its concern tends to cause it to obscure its Being. Through signs, Dasein circumspectively orients itself towards the equipmental totality of its involvement as a spatial “region” for its dwelling. Heidegger describes Dasein’s circumspective absorption in this region as a state of delusion. He explains, “[There is an] existentially positive character of the capacity for delusion. It is precisely because we see the ‘world’ unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day.”^{^[31]} When Dasein is thrown into a world according to its particular mood, it discloses a particular set of factical circumstances to itself. The delusory character of the world necessarily arises from the temporality through which it is revealed. Because Dasein manifests its world through the process of becoming its potentiality-for-Being,^{^[32]} the entities within it do not display a permanent, everyday appearance.^{^[33]} Whereas Dasein can understand these entities authentically in their temporary, ready-to-hand character, it can also grasp them as semblances which subsist permanently in a region of space. When it does so, it loses itself in its world by defining its own There in terms of the entities which it discloses in its own environment.

According to Heidegger, Dasein’s existential character of fallenness tends to cause it to conceal its own Being from itself. Because Dasein’s There derives from its having-been-thrown in the past, it finds itself thrown into a particular set of “factical” circumstances in the present. Heidegger explains, “There is a Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the “falling” of Dasein. This term does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the ‘world’ of its concern. This “absorption in...” has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of das Man. Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self and has fallen into the ‘world.’”^{^[34]} When Dasein falls into a factical situation, it tends to evaluate itself in the terms dictated by that situation. Rather than understanding the world as it relates to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, Dasein becomes absorbed in worldly entities and in the discourse of the anonymous public, das Man. According to Heidegger, fallen Dasein tends to lose itself in the demands of the present, ignoring the legacy which it inherits from its past as well as its projection into the future. Heidegger therefore calls this mode of fallenness “everydayness” because, in it, Dasein experiences existence as an eternal present in which every day seems to be the same as every other. Losing itself in the everyday, Dasein tends to fall away from its ownmost potentiality-for-Being and submerge itself in inauthenticity.

Dasein’s temporal experience of everydayness causes it to view its There in the light of the world. Heidegger explains “The phenomenon of falling does not give us something like a ‘night view’ of Dasein ... Far from determining its nocturnal side, it constitutes all Dasein’s days in their everydayness.”^{^[35]} According to Heidegger, the eternally present day of everydayness causes Dasein to fall into inauthenticity because it shines a consistent, unchanging light on entities. He explains that, due to the influence of tradition, everyday Dasein discloses Being in a manner that covers it over. He states, “...Everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by [the concept Being.] In this way, that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence that if anyone continues to talk about it he is charged with an error of method.”^{^[36]} He further asserts, “When tradition becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence.”^{^[37]} In these statements, Heidegger insists upon the obscurity of the meaning of Being,^{^[38]} arguing that authentic Dasein must confront its fundamental strangeness to understand it. In everydayness, however, the pallid illumination of self-evidence lights up Being for everyone as if it were unremarkable and obvious. Furthermore, by criticizing the notion of “clarity,” Heidegger equates this superficial light with the Cartesian emphasis on clear and distinct perception. Rather than actually enabling people to authentically understand Being, the light which Cartesian philosophy sheds blinds individuals to the ontological meaning of Being and of Dasein itself.

Heidegger asserts that Dasein’s everyday involvement with das Man prevents it from authentically viewing its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. He explains that, within the There of Dasein, it encounters other unique Daseins through the visual modalities of considerateness and forbearance [Rücksicht und Nachsicht.] Dasein’s everydayness, however, tends to obscure this vision. “This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the Others’ in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more.”^{^[39]} In its everydayness, Dasein treats other Daseins inconsiderately, failing to respect their individuality. Instead, Dasein views the world as constituted by a homogeneous mass of people. Rather than attending to its own possibilities, Dasein becomes a spectator to life, watching over the ways in which it differs from das Man. By doing so, Dasein allows itself to become swallowed up in this mob mentality. When it loses itself in its identification with das Man, Dasein lets das Man regulate the ways in which it can view its world. Heidegger explains that das Man makes Dasein see its possibilities in the modality of averageness. He states, “Das Man prescribes one’s state of mind and determines what and how one ‘sees’”^{^[40]} Therefore, “We have the same thing in view, because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said.”^{^[41]} According to Heidegger, Dasein’s involvement with das Man causes it to adopt das Man’s standards for evaluating its world and its existence. Das Man dictates to Dasein the way in which it can view its world. Inevitably, it mandates a viewpoint which any anonymous person can take over, a perspective which Dasein has not seized as its ownmost.

Heidegger insists that this average way of seeing monitors Dasein in order to prevent it from projecting any of its unique and exceptional possibilities “In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore.”^{^[42]} Das Man effectively obscures Dasein’s Being from itself by disclosing possibilities ambiguously. “When, in our everyday Being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding and what is not”^{^[43]} According to Heidegger, the public mode of disclosure covers over possibilities with facades, making them appear as if they are well-understood phenomenon when they are actually mere semblances. “Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not; or else it does not look so, and yet at bottom it is.”^{^[44]} Therefore, das Man’s average seizure and interpretation of possibilities prevents Dasein from viewing these possibilities clearly. Not only does das Man control the way in which phenomenon are disclosed, it also determines the way in which Dasein approaches its world. By losing itself in its everydayness, Dasein learns to view the world inauthentically. “Care becomes concern with possibilities of seeing the ‘world’ merely as it looks ... Curiosity has become free, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty”^{^[45]} According to Heidegger, just as everydayness hides authentic possibilities as semblances, everyday Dasein dims down its power of sight so that it can not view any possibilities authentically. Rather than seizing and projecting its possibilities as its ownmost, everyday Dasein develops the attitude of a disengaged spectator who merely observes the world as it passes by.

Heidegger’s discussion of das Man’s distortion of Dasein’s visual possibilities doubles as a discussion of das Man’s power over Dasein. Heidegger asserts that, in its everydayness, Dasein does not exist as its own Self, but rather as a “they-Self” [Man-selbst] which is thoroughly mastered by das Man, “the ‘nobody’ to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another.”^{^[46]} As with his analysis of Thrownness, Heidegger describes Dasein’s relationship to das Man using terms such as “surrender” and “submission.” He asserts that this mob mentality dominates Dasein’s very mode of existence by mandating a publicly acceptable way for it to act. By doing so, das Man snatches away Dasein’s sovereign power to project its possibilities as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger explains that, when one Dasein interacts with another, it can dominate the Other by leaping in for it. “This kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. In such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him.”^{^[47]} This description of leaping ahead anticipates Heidegger’s analysis of das Man’s effect upon Dasein. According to him, “the real dictatorship of das Man”^{^[48]} dominates Dasein by seizing its unique possibilities away from it and converting them into possibilities which anybody could undertake. Das Man disburdens Dasein of its own responsibility for its own potentiality-for-Being by making it complacently accept the public status quo.

According to Heidegger, das Man exerts its domination over Dasein’s possibilities by imposing its public interpretations through its public discourse. Although Heidegger’s later work discusses the positive ways in which Being manifests itself through language,^{^[49]} Being and Time consistently demonstrates Heidegger’s suspicion of speech. Throughout this work, Heidegger subordinates linguistic expression to visual understanding. He defines communication as “letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by giving it a definite character. That which is shared is our Being towards what has been pointed out. ... That which is put forward can be passed along in ‘further retelling.’ There is a widening of the range of that mutual sharing which sees.”^{^[50]} For Heidegger, discourse functions as a means by which a unique optical perspective can be rendered publicly accessible. Through it, Dasein can share its understanding of its Being with other Daseins. Although Dasein, as an entity who exists as Being-with-Others, must necessarily share its visions, this sharing also opens up possibilities for distortion. Heidegger continues, “However, what has been pointed out may become veiled again in further retelling.”^{^[51]} By allowing its understanding of its ownmost possibility-for-Being to be influenced by Others, Dasein risks losing sight of its own choices. By referring to das Man as a dictatorship, Heidegger implies that it exercises its power through its dictation, through its speech. According to him, its “blind and isolated categorical assertions” prevent Dasein from disclosing its own possibilities to itself.

Heidegger asserts that the public sphere most severely distorts Being by interpreting it as a set of independent, self-subsistent entities. Heidegger expands upon this idea in his distinction between the categorical and the existential. He states, “Because Dasein’s character of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them “existentialia “ ... When used ontologically, this term [kathgoreisqai: categorical] means taking a being to task, as it were, for whatever it is as an entity — that is to say, letting everyone see it in its Being.”^{^[52]} In this statement, Heidegger distinguishes two characterizations of beings and two modes of understanding Being. He insists that, because Dasein’s existential projection constitutes its Being, it can only be understood in existential terms. Conversely, other beings can be defined categorically according to their distinct characteristics. Categorical thought originates from Dasein’s Being-with Others. Heidegger explains that Dasein encounters other Daseins through the work world which they have in common. He asserts that das Man effectively distracts Dasein’s vision from its ownmost possibilities and focuses it upon the beings within the common work world. As mentioned before, Heidegger defines Dasein as the clearing which is itself the source of light in its There. However, Heidegger claims that “Dasein is inclined to fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light.”^{^[53]} According to this statement, everyday Dasein veils its existential status by allowing itself to be defined by the entities which it itself manifests. It does so by giving these entities the definite character of present-at-handness. Heidegger explains, “If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully. When concern holds back [Sichenthalten] from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into ... the mode of just tarrying alongside. ... This kind of Being towards the world is one which lets us encounter beings within-the-world purely in the way they look [eidoV], just that.” By adopting the public viewpoint that the world consists of subsistent, present-at-hand beings, Dasein conceals its own concerned involvement in the world. That is, Dasein obscures the fact that the world of entities ultimately refers back to its own projection of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Whereas Heidegger states that understanding Dasein always has a certain comportment [Verhalten] towards Being, he argues that, just like Descartes affirms his power by withholding judgment, “tarrying” Dasein holds itself back [Sichenthalten] from the world.

According to Heidegger, everyday Dasein refrains from properly seizing the world around it as ready-to-hand by viewing the world as having an existence independent of its own projection. Although these entities, as present-at-hand, still refer back to the grasp of Dasein, Dasein avoids employing them to promote its own possibilities. By viewing and grasping the world as merely present-at-hand, Dasein misunderstands the temporal structure of its own existence. As cited above, Heidegger states that discourse “lets someone see with us what we have pointed out by giving it a definite character”^{^[54]} He expands upon this notion of defining the character of entities in his discussion of Descartes’ analysis of substance. “Such entities are those which always are what they are. Accordingly, that which can be shown to have the character of something that constantly remains (as remanens capax mutationum,) makes up the real Being of those entities of the world which get experienced. That which enduringly remains, really is.”^{^[55]} Everyday Dasein conceives of Being as constituted by a set of self-subsistent objects whose Beings are independent from Dasein’s existence and are grounded by distinct, eternal essences. By analyzing Being as present-at-hand, Dasein concludes that Being is something which has a permanent substance and which manifests itself in a fixed manner during every present moment. According to Heidegger, this obscures the fact that Dasein’s Being exists as a dynamic becoming in which it projects its possibilities into the future.

In the final chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger seems to claim that the misinterpretation of time lies at the root of all misunderstanding of Being. He asserts that “temporality is estatico-horizonally constitutive for the clearedness of the There,”^{^[56]} meaning that time, as the horizon of meaning of Being and of Dasein, constitutes the light in which Dasein discloses itself. However, he claims everyday Dasein interprets time as some familiar ready-to-hand or present-at-hand thing. Heidegger invents a mythic narrative to explain how Dasein’s knowledge of this internal temporal light-source has been obscured. He states, “Everyday circumspective Being-in-the-world needs the possibility of sight (and this means that it needs brightness) if it is to deal concernfully with what is ready-to-hand within the present-to-hand. ... In its thrownness Dasein has surrendered to the changes of day and night. ... The ‘then’ with which Dasein concerns itself gets dated in terms of something which is connected with getting bright, and which is connected with it in the closest kind of environmental involvement — namely, the rising of the sun.”^{^[57]} Because Dasein’s Being, its existential self-projection, depends upon its vision of possibilities, it relies upon the light which illuminates these possibilities. Although Heidegger argues that this light ultimately emanates from Dasein’s status as a Lichtung, it receives this disclosedness in its thrownness. It therefore does not experience this light in its self-assertion, but rather as something to which it has surrendered itself. Submitting itself to the world, concerned Dasein tends to interpret itself in terms of the world, and tends to interpret its own temporal illumination as dependent upon the ready-to-hand sun. For Heidegger, this misinterpretation of the sun serves as the paradigmatic example of Dasein’s interpreting itself in the reflected light of the world. Furthermore, by viewing the sun as a substitute for the temporal clearedness which discloses existential possibilities, he opposes an entire philosophical tradition which, starting with Plato, interpreted the sun as the source of theoretical intelligibility.

According to Heidegger, das Man veils the essence of temporality even further by converting it into something which is present-at-hand. With the ready-to-hand interpretation of temporality, Dasein interprets the sun as it refers to its own possibilities. For example, farmer Dasein interprets daybreak as the time to feed his livestock and Mexican Dasein interprets high noon as the time to take a siesta. The public realm, however, veils the personal relevance of this temporal light. Heidegger states, “The dating of things in terms of the heavenly body which sheds forth light and warmth, and in terms of its distinctive ‘places’ in the sky, is a way of assigning time which can be done for ‘Everyman’ at any time in the same way.”^{^[58]} The public interpretation of temporality distances Dasein even further from Dasein’s Being. By making time a generalized commodity, das Man posits it as an external thing which Dasein can observe from the outside rather than something upon which Dasein projects its very existence. Anticipating his essays on technology, Heidegger finally warns, “For the ‘advanced’ Dasein the day and the presence of sunlight no longer have such a special function as they have for the ‘primitive’ Dasein on which our analysis of ‘natural’ time-reckoning has been based; for the ‘advanced’ Dasein has the ‘advantage’ of even being able to turn night into day.”^{^[59]} Heidegger suggests that, through a perverse technological alchemy, the public realm of modernity has distorted the authentic interpretation of temporal clearedness through its invention of time pieces which do not depend on sunlight, and also, it seems, through its invention of mechanical lighting systems. The modern interpretation of time has completely veiled the temporal self-illumination of Dasein by disclosing time as merely a series of measurable and datable moments which subsist independently of Dasein’s Being.

To overcome the distortions of das Man, Heidegger insists that Dasein must engage in a violent struggle for the truth of its Being. For example, describing his methodology, Heidegger states, “The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode of phenomenon is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology.”^{^[60]} Not only does Heidegger correlate the quest for truth with a grasp, this grasp requires a violent exertion of Dasein’s power. Because das Man has totally concealed phenomena as being merely present-at-hand, authentic Dasein must fight against das Man’s interpretations and discover the meaning of its own possibilities. Heidegger asserts that Dasein must grasp truth violently to clarify its vision from the viewpoint mandated by das Man. “Common sense concerns itself, whether ‘theoretically’ or ‘practically’ only with beings which can be surveyed at a glance circumspectively What is distinctive in common sense is that it has in view only the experiencing of ‘factual’ beings, in order that it may be able to rid itself of an understanding of Being. It fails to recognize that beings can be experienced ‘factually’ only when Being is already understood, even if it has not been conceptualized. Common sense misunderstands understanding. And therefore common sense must necessarily pass off as ‘violent’ anything that lies beyond the reach of its understanding, or any attempt to go out so far.”^{^[61]} Das Man views beings superficially as entities which have an actual identity rather than as possibilities which exist for-the-sake-of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger asserts that das Man resents Dasein’s effort to seize existence as its own and interprets this as violence. He explains that das Man attempts to lull Dasein into a tranquil acceptance of the status quo in order to cover up the anxiety which Dasein feels for its existence. Furthermore, this public realm levels off all genuine possibilities by asserting that any unique and authentic projection could have been accomplished by anyone. Therefore, Dasein must break violently with the complacent averageness which das Man inculcates, bravely asserting its own authenticity. Heidegger states, “Existential Interpretation will never seek to take over any authoritarian pronouncement as to those things which, from an existentiell point of view, are possible or binding. ... Does not the violence of this projection amount to freeing Dasein’s undisguised phenomenal content,”^{^[62]} In this statement, Heidegger seems to distinguish two forms of violence. His reference to “authoritarian pronouncements” seems to be a covert critique of das Man’s mode of interpretation. That is, das Man dominates Dasein’s understanding of phenomena through the public discourse it authors and through the definitions which it pronounces. It makes its interpretations binding by fixing the identity of entities as things which are distinct and permanent. Heidegger contrasts this repressive violence with the violence which liberates possibilities for Dasein’s projection of its potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger speaks of this self-realization as “the possibility that Dasein may choose its own hero.”^{^[63]} This statement conjures the image of authentic Dasein as the masculine protagonist in a Greek tragedy who struggles courageously against the brutality of the elements and the cowardice of other men. For Heidegger, authentic Dasein is the one which seizes entities as possibilities rather than as things and which defeats the hegemony of das Man. It is the one which struggles against the obfuscations of the world and of the public in order to be true to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.

According to Heidegger, Dasein establishes its authenticity by properly caring for its own Being. As mentioned before, Dasein does so by becoming transparent to itself. “The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence we call “transparency.” ... [This is a matter] of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing so with understanding.”^{^[64]} In this state of transparency, Dasein’s status as the one who sees and as the one who is lighted coincide. Dasein understands itself by understanding the totality of all the existentials which articulate its existence. Transparent Dasein must visually understand that it exists as the illuminated There where its Being visually projects itself towards its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being. It must understand that it has been thrown into a world of beings and has fallen into an everyday set of factical circumstances, but that it can authentically seize upon the possibilities manifested in its thrown, fallen world. According to Heidegger, Dasein must therefore understand that, ultimately, it exists as the freedom to project authentic possibilities and to will its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Dasein becomes transparent to itself by authentically confronting the possibility of its death. Heidegger states, “[Anticipatory resoluteness is] the understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein’s existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments.”^{^[65]} Heidegger asserts that the possibility of death is the possibility of Dasein’s Being which belongs exclusively to it, which relates to nothing outside of it, and which can not be taken away from it. Heidegger explains, “This possibility of representing breaks down completely if the issue is one of representing that possibility-of-Being which makes up Dasein’s coming to an end, and which, gives to its wholeness.”^{^[66]} This statement describes death as the paradigmatic example of that which can not be represented. Heidegger distrusts representation because it detaches Dasein from its world, positing Dasein as a subject and the world as a set of objects, a notion embraced by Cartesian epistemology. Furthermore, representation conceals Dasein’s involvement in its possibilities by allowing other Daseins to view a possibility which only Dasein itself should be able to see. Heidegger continues, “No one can take the Other’s dying away from him ... By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it ‘is’ at all.”^{^[67]} Doubling his terminology of vision with that of the grasp, Heidegger asserts that das Man’s incapacity to represent death correlates with it’s inability to leap in for Dasein to take away this possibility from Dasein. Because no one can die someone else’s death, Heidegger insists that this mortality absolutely individualizes each Dasein.

Although death may strike Dasein at any moment, everyday Dasein attempts to cover over this possibility by fleeing from its inevitability. Heidegger explains that, in this flight, Dasein falls into the public world of the present which is dominated by das Man. Through its interpretation of death, das Man makes Dasein tranquil about the anxiety it feels for its death and denies Dasein the heroic courage it requires to face up to this anxiety. Das Man attempts to represent death theoretically as an objective and familiar event which is possible for everyone and therefore for no one in particular. The public realm views death from the perspective of the everyday present as something which will occur at some datable point in the future. Heidegger opposes this view by saying, “Das Man covers up what is most peculiar in death’s certainty — that it is possible at any moment”^{^[68]} In this statement, Heidegger seems to locate the origin of everydayness in das Man’s covering of death. Heidegger explains that this possibility of death is already disclosed each time Dasein discloses itself within its There. Therefore, Dasein can authentically relate to death only by becoming aware of the constant anxiety that it feels for its mortality. Heidegger continues, “Everyday concern makes definite for itself the indefiniteness of certain death by interposing before it those urgencies and possibilities which can be taken in at a glance, and which belong to the everyday matters which are closest to us.”^{^[69]} According to him, das Man conceals the imminent futurity of death by distracting Dasein’s visual attention from this most lucid possibility and towards the entities which inhabit the world of its concern.

Heidegger asserts that an authentic confrontation with death enables Dasein to break from the domination of das Man and become transparent to itself. He contends that the possibility of death differs from and grounds other possibilities. He states, “The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all. ... It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing. ... In accordance with its essence, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, picturing to oneself the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility. Being-towards-death, as anticipation of possibility, is what first makes this possibility possible, and sets it free as possibility”^{^[70]} Death, for Heidegger, is the possibility that Dasein’s projection of its ownmost possibilities will be rendered impossible. However, this possibility of impossibility makes it possible for Dasein to project its possibilities. By accepting this as its ownmost possibility, Dasein clarifies how it exists towards and through its possibilities. Because Dasein can experience the possibility of death, but can never experience the actuality of its own death, death effectively makes the notion of possibility independent from the notion of actuality. The notion of actuality functions as the terminus of potentiality which fulfills a possibility, but which also destroys the power of this possibility by fulfilling it. Heidegger demonstrates that, with death, possibility already contains its own finitude within itself. By arguing that the Being of possibilities does not depend on what actual, present-at-hand result they achieve, Heidegger preserves the independent power of possibilities. Heidegger explains that, by accepting its Being-towards the finitude of its possibilities, Dasein can authentically understand that its existence is oriented towards their terminus, the futurity towards which it projects its possibilities. Heidegger employs this notion that a possibility contains its own termination to critique everydayness. For Heidegger, everydayness represents a comportment in which one avoids committing oneself to either the birth or the finitude of authentic possibility. Heidegger states that “Everydayness is that Being which is ‘between’ birth and death.”^{^[71]} In Being and Time, death seems to figure as the night which puts an end to all of the days in which Dasein can disclose its being to itself and project its lighted possibilities. In the superficial light of the everyday, das Man refuses to gaze upon the darkness of death. Conversely, Dasein’s authentic confrontation with death wrenches it away from the everyday domination of das Man and from its everyday absorption in the world of beings.

Heidegger explains that Dasein becomes transparent to itself by listening to the call of its conscience. In this call, the Dasein who has become anxious about its imminent futural death appeals to itself as the one who has fallen in the present among das Man. Heidegger asserts that Dasein tends to flee into the tranquillity of the environment provided by das Man in order to conceal the precariousness of its existence. This call reorients Dasein’s vision. Heidegger states that Dasein must look away from its everyday experiences with entities and with others in order to confront the uncanniness of the nothingness which threatens its existence with its finitude. Heidegger explains how this anxious confrontation differs from everyday encounters with entities. “[Anxiety] does not have any need for darkness, in which it is commonly easier for one to feel uncanny. In the dark there is emphatically ‘nothing to see,’ though the world itself is still ‘there,’ and ‘there’ more obtrusively.”^{^[72]} Even though anxiety does not require any factical darkness, Heidegger seems to suggest that the sight of existential darkness, like the vision of the Dionysian abyss, discloses the true Being of Dasein’s There. Not only does this vision of darkness eradicate the pacifying light with which das Man reveals the everyday existence of entities, it indicates that Dasein’s status as the illuminated There of Being doubles as its status as the darkened There of Being.

Just as Heidegger describes anxious Dasein as submerged in darkness, he also describes Dasein as submissive to the anxious voice of its own conscience. Because this domination comes from itself, it liberates Dasein from the domination of the discourse of das Man. This conscience does not only dominate, it discloses the nothingness which is “so close that it is oppressive.”^{^[73]} As well as being beyond Dasein’s vision, the nothingness which conscience discloses lies beyond its power. Heidegger states, “The Self which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis. In being a basis — that is, in existing as thrown — Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus “Being-a-basis” means never to have power over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up. This “not” belongs to the existential meaning of “thrownness.” It itself, being a basis, is a nullity of itself”^{^[74]} Heidegger explains that, because Dasein has been thrown into its There, it exists on the basis of a nullity. That is, it has been thrown into a factical situation which it has not chosen. Heidegger asserts that Dasein’s power to project its existence therefore depends upon it being unable to control the circumstances upon which it projects. Whereas everyday Dasein, influenced by das Man, pretends that it can encompass everything within its power and its vision, this abyss of nothingness discloses that which lies outside of its possibilities. Whereas das Man asserts that it has already mastered all possibilities, this nullity discloses to Dasein that it can not seize all possibilities as its own; that, in grasping one possibility, it must forsake all of the others. Accepting this nullity enables Dasein to become free for authentically choosing and projecting a potentiality-for-Being which is its ownmost.

By resolutely disclosing the nullity which makes it anxious for its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein acquires the vision and power to project itself authentically. Heidegger explains, “If Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, Dasein understands itself in its own superior power, the power of its finite freedom, so that in this freedom, which ‘is’ only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so, and can thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed.”^{^[75]} In its resoluteness, Dasein becomes so transparent to itself that it understands the mortality which dominates its existence and the nullity which grounds it. It understands that it has been thrown into a world and therefore submitted to it. It sees that it has fallen into a world dominated by das Man and therefore become lost in it. Rather than attempting to eradicate the inevitable facts of its submission, Dasein appropriates its submission authentically and thereby becomes its own master. By dominating itself, authentic Dasein prevents either the world of entities or of das Man from fully controlling it. Even though Dasein is surrendered to a set of factical circumstances which are beyond its power, it can still assert its sovereignty by discovering the possibilities within its world which promote the self-assertion of its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being. Authentic Dasein acquires a visual capacity to perceive such possibilities. Heidegger explains, “When resolute, Dasein has brought itself from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the ‘moment of vision’ as regards the Situation which has been disclosed.”^{^[76]} Heidegger describes the moment of vision as the authentic mode of experiencing the ecstasis of the present. He utilizes it to critique the inauthentic vision of the present, curiosity, which causes Dasein to fall into the everyday world of das Man. According to Heidegger, curious Dasein looks at appearances in order to make them present, thereby forgetting its heritage and awaiting future novelties. Rather than being absorbed by well-lighted, present-at-hand entities, Dasein, in its moment of vision, becomes fascinated by the obscurity of its null basis, enabling it to encounter its ownmost possibilities and opening it up to authentic temporality. Heidegger states, “Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural .. which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its thrownness and be in the moment of vision for its time.”^{^[77]} Dasein discloses its present authentically in a moment of vision in which it understands both the heritage and the futural possibilities which lie within the factical situation of its present. In the moment of vision, therefore, Dasein can take over its thrown There authentically by choosing and acting upon the possibilities which it seizes as its ownmost.

Throughout Being and Time, Heidegger associates Dasein’s thrownness from the past with its submission. Dasein masters this submission authentically by understanding its ownmost possibilities as those which have been handed down to it historically. Heidegger explains that, because everyday Dasein tends to disperse itself into the many entities with which it concerns itself, it must create a unity to bring itself together and to embrace the totality of its existence. Dasein understands this unity in a moment-of-vision during which it willingly submits itself to its heritage by seizing upon a possibility which it has inherited from the past. He states, “Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self ... this loyalty is a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can have - of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence.”^{^[78]} By describing historical possibility as an authority, Heidegger indicates that the mandates of history dominate Dasein, but do so in a way which fundamentally differs from the domination exercised by das Man. Heidegger speaks of Dasein’s submission to history as an act of heroism, as a self-submission, and by extension, a self-mastery. Furthermore, Heidegger insists that Dasein’s existential character as a Being-with-Others requires it to involve other Daseins in its historizing. Dasein can do so by leaping ahead of Others in order to disclose possibilities which will help them become transparent to themselves. Rather than instituting an impersonal regime in which das Man reigns, authentic Daseins can then work together on a common project while still preserving their authentic individuality. Heidegger states, “But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny. This is how we designate the historizing of a community, of a people [Volk.] Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free.”^{^[79]} Ominously, Heidegger extends his description of Dasein’s heroism to an entire group of people, of a Volk, describing their effort to understand themselves as a struggle [Kampf,] potentially a violent one.

^{^[1]} Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 27/8 (Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.)

^{^[2]} See Joan Stambaugh’s instructive reading of the development of Heidegger’s description of the process of concealment and unconcealment in The Finitude of Being. [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.]

^{^[3]} Heidegger uses this word frequently. For example, on Being and Time p 25/6.

^{^[4]} Ibid. p. 51/28 Throughout this paper, I will sometimes deviate from the Macquarrie and Robinson translation by translating the German term seiend as “being” rather than as “entity.”

^{^[5]} Book 6 of the Republic explains that the ideas underlying visible, phenomenal reality are themselves invisible.

^{^[8]} Heidegger directly confronts Plato’s separation between sensuous truths and the supersensuous ground of truth almost a decade after the publication of Being and Time in his first lecture course on Nietzsche (1936-7) and his essay Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (1942.)

^{^[13]} Heidegger, even in his student days, has always displayed an affinity for Nietzsche. I would argue that many ideas in Being and Time, including the correlation between light and power, are developed from Heidegger’s meditations on Nietzsche. Heidegger himself seems to affirm this comparison by recasting many of his own concepts in Nietzsche’s vocabulary in his Nietzsche lectures, especially the first two. However, the relationship between Nietzsche and Heidegger is quite complex and therefore would require an extremely nuanced discussion, one which lies outside the scope of this thesis. David Farrell Krell has done a lot of good work in this area. See his Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy [Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992.] and his Intimations of Mortality [University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986.] Also see Jacques Taminiaux’s Heidegger and the project of fundamental ontology [Translated by Michael Gendre. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1991.]

^{^[32]} Heidegger’s notion of Being-as-Becoming seems to be derived from Nietzsche. Not only does he discuss the relationship between these Being and Becoming in his Nietzsche lectures, but already in Being and Time, he echoes Nietzsche, stating “Only because the Being of the “there” receives its Constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become,) can it say to itself ‘Become what you are’ and say this with understanding” (Ibid. p. 186/145]

^{^[33]} This notion that the illusory character of the world is a necessary function of the reality of its flux is very similar to the notion of pratitya-samutapada expressed by Buddhist thinkers such as Nagarjuna.

^{^[38]} Heidegger may already be thinking about Heraclitus who, as he notes in his essay “Aletheia” is referred to as The Obscure. See Martin Heidegger’s Early Greek Thinking, p. 102 - 123. [Translated by David Farrell and Frank Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, 1984.]

^{^[49]} The most famous and most frequently quoted example of this is his statement that “Language is the house of Being.” (See “Letter on Humanism” p. 217. Translated by Frank A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray. In Ed. D. F. Krell Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings [New York: Harper & Row, 1993.]) Heidegger investigates language in depth throughout his later work. See especially his On the Way to Language. [Translated by Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971] and the essays collected in Poetry, Language, Thought. [Translated by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 1971]