Sokal replies

[will.miller.ace at artsfb.org.uk]

Sokal is right to point out, however, that saying something is a 'law' does 
not necessarily indicate that what is meant is a 'permanent' situation - as 
far as I can tell, the distinctive feature about laws, especially the legal 
type, paradoxically, is that they change. I also think there is a 
distinction between natural facts (as impermanent as they might be) and 
social context. Certainly without social context facts are meaningless, 
invisible, unknown. Yet, unless you want to argue a fairly pure form of 
solipsism, it is not social context which itself changes natural facts - 
even where (say in primitive religious fertility rituals) it may appear to 
do so.
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From: andrew at cee.hw.ac.uk
To: surfus at chuma.cas.usf.edu (Bonn; ARTSFBS/ACE/WMILLER
Cc: pynchon-l at waste.org
Subject: Re: Sokal replies
Date: 27 May 1996 11:35

Bonnie Surfus writes:

Or rather Sokal does...

> Fish's discourse on the "social construction" of science and baseball is
> amusing, but the situation can be stated much more simply. The laws of
> nature are not social constructions; -- more -- the universe existed long
> before we did. Our theories about the laws of nature are social
> constructions. The goal of science is for the latter to approximate as
> closely as possible the former.  Fish seems to agree.

Well, here's the nub of the matter. What does Sokal achieve by making
this distinction between between `the laws of nature' and `our
theories about the laws of nature'. This is the thin end of Plato's
wedge. As far as I am concerned `the laws of nature' are like any
other rules - tools we use in order to regulate our interaction with
said nature. Does the fact that we adopt something as a law mean that
phenomena are thereby regulated? Adding the qualification `our
theories about' to `the laws of nature' qualifies the term as little
as the prefix `it is true that' qualifies the assertion `2 + 2 is 4'.

Another hint to the Wittly-wise - Sokal is running up against a
sagen/zeigen distinction here. Why? because he has adopted the picture
(correspondence) theory of physical science. Unfortunately the picture
has nothing to correspond to but itself.

> Unfortunately, not everyone in the trendy field of "cultural studies of
> science" agrees. In a lecture at the New York Academy of Sciences
> (February 7, 1996), _Social Text_ co-editor Andrew Ross said: "I won't
> deny that there is a law of gravity. I would nevertheless argue that there
> are no laws in nature, there are only laws in society.  Laws are things
> that men and women make, and that they can change."  [verbatim quote in my
> notes]

It's not just the trendy field of cultural studies. Philosophers of
various hues and histories would also find Sokal's arguments
disagreeable. However much (and for however long) we profit by
regularities in Nature the notion that the Old Dame is thereby legally
bound to honour our expectations (Nature imitates Art, official!)
requires a mighty feat of jurisprudential prestidigitation.

> What could Ross possibly mean? That the law of gravity is a social law
> that men and women can change? Anyone who believes _that_ is invited to
> try changing the laws of gravity from the windows of my apartment: I live
> on the twenty-first floor. -- more -- Now, perhaps all Ross means is that
> our _understanding_ of the laws of physics changes over time; but if
> that's what he meant, why didn't he say so, and what's the big deal?

What would the status of Sokal's `law of gravity' be if tomorrow
things started to behave differently. Today, while things drop from
great heights it's a `law of nature' which we approximate with
`theories'. Tomorrow, when things start floating gently to the ground,
or maybe the ceiling, it's a term without a referent. Nature just
turned out not to have a `law of gravity'. So what then is Sokal
talking about today? Something which is *real*, inherent in the *real
world*, unless of course phenomena take a turn for the worse and it
becomes horse feathers? The point about physical laws is not that they
denote but that they can be (are) used as a basis for making
decisions. Any attempt to make them refer to something `out there'
falls foul of the possibility that Nature may throw a curve
ball. Ontology is a red herring.

Sorry if this seems to be off topic but it really is right on topic.


Andrew Dinn
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And though Earthliness forget you,
To the stilled Earth say:  I flow.
To the rushing water speak:  I am.