Prosthetic Paradise (was Re: pynchon-l-digest V2 #1012

[jporter]

Kai contends:

>  According to Bruno Latour's actor/network theory, a much debated
>approach in
>  the contemporary sociology of technology, humans and non-human artefacts
>can
>  both be observed as symmetric "actants" (- Aktanten) in a
>"socio-technical
>  network". Visitor + Automatic Door Opener = Entrance Machine.

I've always been prejudiced toward Doormen myself, but that's another
issue. It should be mentioned in this thread that the definition of "Human"
is probably incomplete without mention of "machine," or some related
concept, perhaps the broader "Technology."

Language, in fact, was one of the first technologies, a close second to, or
a simultaneous co-technology in combination with, self-conscious awareness,
both evolving from the more general consciousness which proceeded
self-consciousness.

An argument can be made that machines are just linguistic forms. W.C.
Williams has considered it from the opposite angle- words, or in his case,
poems, as "word machines."

Language probably was much more external, or rather, independent (as was
"thinking") for proto-humans. Gradually, or perhaps not so gradually, a
genetic predisposition, and dependence on grammatical sign usage
co-developed with the signs themselves. This is not to say that language
was "internalized." It would be more accurate to say that an internal
dependence on external signs, symbols and grammatical structures
co-developed, and I mean "signs, symbols and grammatical structures" in the
broadest sense: from body positions, emotional grunts, etc., through pebble
tools, up to and including meta-technologies like genetic engineering
systems and the internet, and perhaps, even psi and spiritual technologies.

Whether or not the relationship between the internal, animate,
self-concerned and autopoetic systems which perpetuate their mutual
co-dependence through what is currently deemed the human form, enjoy a
mutually co-dependent relationship with the external inanimate
configurations on which they are dependent, or, whether those external
configurations are merely our linguistic expressions- without independent
agency (or as I prefer- desire)- and, therefore, merely artifacts of our
agency or desire, is, to my mind, an open question.

Certainly, both human forms and machines must be replicated, or in our
case, reproduced, in order to persevere, as time goes by. And certainly
reproduction and perseverance of the human form is ever more dependent on
the presence of increasingly sophisticated and complex machines.

Just as I think it would be incorrect to say that language has been
internalized, I would disagree with the notion that desire, if only for
self-perpetuation, has been externalized. Whether it has arisen
spontaneously amongst the machines is another question.

When we find the nature of our desires so perplexing, how can we hope to
understand desire independent of our own?

jody