MDMD Wicks' Daily Devotions

[Terrance]

M&D Chapter Four  
Daily Devotions. 

Recall that in Chapter 1 we learn that as part of his daily devotions,
Wicks has been visiting Mason's Grave. The Verger (anyone looked this
word up in the OED?) has taken to nodding at him, like a shade (thank
you Mark, I'm going to pay closer attention to the lights, shades,
shadows here) with a grievance.  
Now, we learn that part of Wicks' daily devotions had included the
teachings of the Stoic Epictetus. 


http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/epictetu.htm

Indeed, Epictetus metaphorically speaks of his school as being a
hospital to which students would come seeking treatments for their ills
(Discourses 3.23.30). Each of us, in consequence merely of being human
and living in society, is well aware of what comprise these ills. In the
course of daily life we are beset by frustrations and setbacks of every
conceivable type. Our cherished enterprises are hindered and thwarted,
we have to deal with hostile and offensive people, and we have to cope
with the difficulties and anxieties occasioned by the setbacks and
illnesses visited upon our friends and relations. Sometimes we are ill
ourselves, and even those who have the good fortune to enjoy sound
health have to face the fact of their own mortality. In the midst of all
this, only the rare few are blessed with lasting and rewarding
relationships, and even these relationships, along with everything that
constitutes a human life, are wholly transient.
But what is philosophy? Does it not mean making preparation to meet the
things that come upon us? (Discourses 3.10.6, trans. Oldfather)

The ills we suffer, says Epictetus, result from mistaken beliefs about
what is truly good. We have invested our hope in the wrong things, or at
least invested it in the wrong way. Our capacity to flourish and be
happy (to attain eudaimonia) is entirely dependent upon our own
characters, how we dispose ourselves to ourselves, to others, and to
events generally. What qualities our characters come to have is
completely up to us. Therefore, how well we flourish is also entirely up
to us.




But had these daily devotions to Stoicism proved of any use to Wicks?  

To the children, he remarks aloud, "Of course prayer got us through." 

Ethelmer claims that were he in the Seahorse he too would have resorted
to prayer. 

Back from College, he murmurs this to Brae. She is mildly astonished. 



The dynamics of these relations in the cozy room are beginning to take
on a very important part in the tale of Dixon and Mason & Co. 

For Epictetus, the terms 'God', 'the gods', and 'Zeus' are used
interchangeably, and they appear frequently in the Discourses. In the
Handbook, God is discussed as the 'captain' who calls us back on board
ship, the subsequent voyage being a metaphor for our departure from life
(see Handbook 7). God is also portrayed as 'the Giver' to whom we should
return all those things we have enjoyed on loan when we lose close
relatives or friends who die, and when we lose our possessions through
misfortune (see Discourses 4.10.16 and Handbook 11).
If the Stoic making progress (the prokopton) understands God, the
universe, and themselves in the right way, they 'will never blame the
gods, nor find fault with them' (Handbook 31.1, trans. Oldfather):
Will you be angry and discontented with the ordinances of Zeus, which
he, with the Fates who spun in his presence the thread of your destiny
at the time of your birth, ordained and appointed? (Discourses 1.12.25,
trans. Hard)
Indeed, they will pray to God to lead them to the fate that He has
assigned them:
Lead me, Zeus, and you too, Destiny,
Wherever I am assigned by you;
I'll follow and not hesitate,
But even if I do not wish to,
Because I'm bad, I'll follow anyway.
(Handbook 53, trans. White = extract from Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus)
[For] God has stationed us to a certain place and way of life.
(Discourses 1.9.24, trans. Dobbin)
Epictetus presents orthodox Stoic views on God. His justification for
believing in God is expressed essentially along the lines of what we
recognise as an argument from design. The order and harmony that we can
perceive in the natural world (from astronomical events to the way
plants grow and fruit in season) is attributed to a divine providence
that orders and controls the entire cosmos intelligently and rationally
(see Discourses 1.6.1-11, 1.14.1-6, 1.16.7-8 and 2.14.11/25-7). The
Stoics were materialists, and God is conceived of as a type of fiery
breath that blends perfectly with all other matter in the universe. In
doing this, God transforms matter from undifferentiated 'stuff' into the
varied forms that we see around us. This process is continuous, and God
makes the world as it is, doing what it does, moment by moment. Just as
the soul of a person is understood to bring alive and animate what would
otherwise be dead and inert matter, so God is thought of as the 'soul of
the world', and the universe is thought of as a sort of animal.
Stoics hold that the mind of each person is quite literally a fragment
(apospasma) of God (see Discourses 2.8.11), and that the rationality
that we each possess is in fact a fragment of God's rationality; and
this Epictetus primarily identifies as the capacity we have to make
proper use of impressions (see Discourses 1.1.12). Epictetus expresses
this in terms of what God has 'given us'; He is conceived of as having
constructed the universe in such a way that we have in our possession
all that is within the compass of our own character or moral choice and
nothing else, but this is no reason for complaint:
What has He given me for my own and subject to my authority, and what
has He left for Himself? Everything within the sphere of the moral
purpose He has given me, subjected them to my control, unhampered and
unhindered. My body that is made of clay, how could He make that
unhindered? Accordingly He has made it subject to the revolution of the
universe-[along with] my property, my furniture, my house, my children,
my wife. 
 But how should I keep them? In accordance with the terms upon
which they have been given, and for as long as they can be given. But He
who gave also takes away. 

And so, when you have received everything, and your very self, from
Another [i.e., God], do you yet complain and blame the Giver, if He take
something away from you? (Discourses 4.1.100-3, with omissions, trans.
Oldfather)
The capacity that the prokopton has for understanding, accepting, and
embracing this state of affairs, that this is indeed the nature of
things, is another of the main foundation stones of Stoic ethics.