AW: Re: Serious news from Europe on Ukraine
Mark Kohut
mark.kohut at gmail.com
Wed Feb 16 11:24:21 UTC 2022
Kennan, that deeply embedded anti--Semitic theorizer and influencer of
American foreign policy, esp regarding Russia---I still remember that
paperback, what was it,* American Diplomacy, *that those cold war priests
and brothers foisted on me during the Cold War.
So here in 1997, Kennan writes this thoughtfully. While Yeltsin is Top Dog
and Putin is somewhere in the government maneuvering to be Top Dog. Which
he became and I ask: Would Kennan
argue the same way in 2022? ..Would Kennan, unlike you, have kept up deeply
with Putin's beliefs and actions and written the same thing?
I don't know either but your dead history means nothing about Putin's
Russia and Ukraine now. Nothing.
Russian reactions to possible NATO expansion during the 1990s were however
mixed. During an August 1993 visit to Poland, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Yeltsin> told Polish
President Lech
Wałęsa <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lech_Wa%C5%82%C4%99sa> that "Russia
does not oppose Poland's membership in NATO and does not perceive its
membership in NATO as a threat to Russia." Under pressure from opposition
within Russia, this informal declaration was retracted the following month,
[11] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-11> and
Yeltsin wrote that October that expansion violated the spirit of the 1990
agreement, marking the beginning of this grievance among Russian elites.[12]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-12> Similarly,
in May 1997, Yeltsin signed an agreement with NATO
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Founding_Act_on_Mutual_Relations,_Cooperation_and_Security,_1997>
that included text allowing enlargement, but then described NATO expansion
as a threat in his "National Security Blueprint" that December.[13]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-13> In a 2007
speech <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_speech_of_Vladimir_Putin>,
Russian President Vladimir Putin
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin> cited a 1990 quote from Manfred
Wörner <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manfred_W%C3%B6rner> to further imply
that guarantees about enlargement were made,[14]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-14> and this
impression was later used by him as a potential justification for Russia's
2014 actions in Ukraine
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation>
and the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021%E2%80%932022_Russo-Ukrainian_crisis>.
[15] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-15>[16]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-16>
Debate within the American government as to whether enlargement of NATO was
feasible or desirable began during the George H.W. Bush administration
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_George_H._W._Bush>.[17]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-:2-17> By
mid-1992, a consensus emerged within the administration that NATO
enlargement was a wise realpolitik measure to strengthen American hegemony.
[17] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-:2-17>[18]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-18> In the
absence of NATO enlargement, Bush administration officials worried that the
European Union might fill the security vacuum in Central Europe
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Europe>, and thus challenge American
post-Cold War influence.[17]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-:2-17> There
was further debate within the Clinton administration
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Bill_Clinton> between a rapid
offer of full membership to several select countries verses a slower, more
limited membership to a wide range of states over a longer time span.
Victory by the Republican Party, who advocated for aggressive expansion, in
the 1994 US congressional election
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections>
helped sway US policy in favor of wider full-membership enlargement.[19]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-19>
Visegrád Group[edit
<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Enlargement_of_NATO&action=edit§ion=3>
]
[image: A long red table makes a pentagon around a blue floor with the NATO
compass logo, while many rows of people in suits sit on all sides.]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NATO_Summit_in_Washington_1999.jpg>
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NATO_Summit_in_Washington_1999.jpg>
NATO added the Czech Republic <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech_Republic>
, Hungary <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungary>, and Poland
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poland> at the 1999 Washington summit
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Washington_summit>, and established the
protocol for Membership Action Plans.
In February 1991, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia formed the Visegrád
Group <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visegr%C3%A1d_Group> to push for European
integration <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_integration> under
the European
Union <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union> and NATO, as well as
to conduct military reforms in line with NATO standards. Internal NATO
reaction to these former Warsaw Pact
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Pact> countries was initially
negative, but by the 1991 Rome summit
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Rome_summit> in November, members
agreed to a series of goals that could lead to accession, such as market
and democratic liberalization, and that NATO should be a partner in these
efforts. In subsequent years, wider forums for regional cooperation between
NATO and its eastern neighbors were set up, including the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_Cooperation_Council> (later
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro-Atlantic_Partnership_Council>) and
the Partnership
for Peace <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partnership_for_Peace>.[20]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-FOOTNOTEDavidLevesque1999200%E2%80%93201-20>
Russian military actions, including the First Chechen War
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Chechen_War>, Transnistria War
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria_War>, and War in Abkhazia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Abkhazia_(1992%E2%80%931993)>, were
among the factors driving Central and Eastern European
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_and_Eastern_Europe> countries,
particularly those with memories of similar Soviet offensives, to push for
NATO application and ensure their long-term security.[21]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-21>[22]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-22> Political
parties reluctant to move on NATO membership were voted out of office,
including the Bulgarian Socialist Party
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_Socialist_Party> in 1996 and Slovak
HZDS
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Party_%E2%80%93_Movement_for_a_Democratic_Slovakia>
in 1998.[23]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-FOOTNOTEBarany2003190,_48%E2%80%9350-23>
Hungary's interest in joining was confirmed by a November 1997 referendum
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Hungarian_NATO_membership_referendum> that
returned 85.3% in favor of membership.[24]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-24>
While the other Visegrád members were invited to join NATO at its 1997
Madrid summit <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Madrid_summit>, Slovakia
was excluded based on what several members considered undemocratic actions
by nationalist Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladim%C3%ADr_Me%C4%8Diar>.[25]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-FOOTNOTEGheciu200572-25>
Romania <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania> and Slovenia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenia> were both considered for
invitation in 1997, and each had the backing of a prominent NATO member,
France and Italy respectively, but support for this enlargement was not
unanimous, particularly in the US Congress
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress>.[26]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-FOOTNOTEBarany200323%E2%80%9325-26>
In an open letter to US President Bill Clinton
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Clinton>, more than forty foreign
policy experts including Bill Bradley
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Bradley>, Sam Nunn
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Nunn>, Gary Hart
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gary_Hart>, Paul Nitze
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Nitze>, and Robert McNamara
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McNamara> expressed their concerns
about NATO expansion as both expensive and unnecessary given the lack of an
external threat from Russia at that time.[27]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#cite_note-FOOTNOTEBarany200316%E2%80%9318-27>
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 11:07 AM Hübschräuber via Pynchon-l <
pynchon-l at waste.org> wrote:
> ------- Original Message -------
> Martin Dietze <mdietze at gmail.com> schrieb am Donnerstag, 10. Februar 2022
> um 08:41:
>
> > I did address it. Debaltseve did not need to be included in the
> agreement, because it was never about particular places. It simply stated
> that both sides stayed where they are.
> >
> > Hence the situation is crystal clear.
> >
> > And really, this is getting silly. The facts around Debaltseve have long
> been known and are widely accepted. No need to keep pulling out nifty
> details in Russia’s defence.
>
> Yes, you did address it.
>
> I take your point on Debaltseve. Still, the situation is far from "crystal
> clear". As that other article noted: "This glaring omission was interpreted
> in different ways by different people." Your say one of those
> interpretations is the only valid one. I do not support the Separatists'
> interpretation of this part of the Agreement, as I know too little about
> the matter, but it should be mentioned that it exists.
>
> I understand that "nifty details" are not relevant when one is "defending
> Russia" ( just as the Nuland-Pyatt phone call in which they selected the
> next Ukrainian government is "irrelevant"), but of the utmost importance
> when one states that the UPA/ONU collaborated with the Nazis.
>
> As regards the grand scheme of things, these words by the noted
> Soviet/Russian propagandist George Kennan might be of interest:
>
> "But something of the highest importance is at stake here. And perhaps it
> is not too late to advance a view that, I believe, is not only mine alone
> but is shared by a number of others with extensive and in most instances
> more recent experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is
> that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in
> the entire post-cold-war era.
>
> Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western
> and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect
> on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the
> cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in
> directions decidedly not to our liking.“
>
> https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html
> --
> Pynchon-L: https://waste.org/mailman/listinfo/pynchon-l
>
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